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Abstract 
 
 
The study of reference often leads to addressing fundamental issues in semantics, 
metaphysics and epistemology; this suggests that reference is closely linked to the three 
realms. The overall purpose of this study is to elucidate the structure of some of these 
links, through a close examination of the “mechanism” of reference. As in many other 
enquiries, considering the possible (i.e., the modal,) in addition to the actual proves very 
helpful in clarifying and explicating insights. The reference of a term with respect to 
possible worlds is commonly called “intension”; so this is a study of intensions. The main 
contribution of the study is an outline for a “calculator” of intensions. It is argued that 
the intension of a term is a function of three variables: (a) the way in which the term 
“picks out” its referent in different possible worlds (semantics); (b) criteria of identity 
(metaphysics); and (c) the actual state of affairs (actuality). While considering different 
possible values for these variables, it is demonstrated how the variables combine to 
generate the term’s intension. In other words, the result is a calculator that when 
provided with the required values, yields the reference of the term in different possible 
worlds. By taking into account the possible gap between what we take the values of these 
variables to be and what they may in fact be, we also gain important insights into the 
epistemic aspect of reference. In addition, since a rigid designator is a term with constant 
intension, the proposed thesis provides an elaborate account of rigidity. 
The first chapter is devoted to the development of the calculator of intensions. 
Each of the following three chapters elaborates on one aspect of intensions, namely, the 
semantic, metaphysical and epistemic aspects. In the course of these chapters, various 
familiar puzzles pertaining to the respective philosophical realms are addressed (many of 
these puzzles are discussed in Kripke’s Naming and Necessity – a work that considerably 
inspired this study). In the fifth and last chapter the analysis of intensions is applied to 
two case-studies from relatively recent philosophical literature: the Kripke-Lewis debate 
over the identity theory of mind, and the debate over the significance of Donnellan’s 
referential/attributive distinction. The novel accounts that these applications generate 
purport to illustrate the importance and originality of the proposed thesis.  
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In order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask 
what a meaning does, and then find something that 
does that 
David Lewis, “General Semantics” 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
i. Motivation and Overview 
This dissertation is about reference, i.e., the relation between language and reality; 
between words and world. Moreover, it is about reference not only in actual states of 
affairs, but also in possible states of affairs, or, as it is commonly put, in possible worlds. 
Rudolf Carnap called the reference of a term with respect to different possible worlds 
“intension” (spelt with “s”).1 So this dissertation is about intensions.  
Why reference? The study of reference often leads to addressing fundamental 
issues in semantics, metaphysics and epistemology. A familiar example is Saul Kripke’s 
seminal work Naming and Necessity.2 (Indeed, this dissertation is considerably inspired by 
Kripke’s work and by the subsequent vast body of literature it generated). This suggests 
that reference is closely linked to the three realms. It is these links that are the main 
interest of the present dissertation. The overall purpose of this study is thus to elucidate 
the structure of some of these links. This is achieved through a close examination of the 
“mechanism” of reference.  
Why intensions? In many enquiries, considering possible worlds (i.e., modality,) 
in addition to the actual world proves very helpful in clarifying and explicating insights 
(more on this below). The case of reference is no different in this respect: examining 
reference not only in the actual world but also in other possible worlds significantly 
improves our understanding of reference. Specifically, this study examines how different 
factors affect the reference of a term with respect to different possible worlds, i.e., how 
different factors affect intensions. (However, given the extensive analogy between the 
modal and the temporal, much of what is said here about reference in different worlds 
holds for reference in different times as well. Incidentally, the latter may be of more direct 
relevance to everyday concerns, such as identity over time. Nevertheless, this study 
focuses almost exclusively on reference in different possible worlds rather than in 
different times.)  
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This process results in the main contribution of the dissertation, which is an 
outline for a “calculator” of intensions. It is argued that the intension of a term is a 
function of three variables: (a) the way in which the term “picks out” its referent in 
different possible worlds (semantics); (b) criteria of identity (metaphysics); and (c) the 
actual state of affairs (actuality).3 While considering different possible values of these 
variables, it is demonstrated how the variables combine to generate the term’s intension. In 
other words, the result is a calculator that when provided with the required values, yields 
the intension of a term. By taking into account the possible gap between what we take 
the values of these variables to be and what they may in fact be, we also gain important 
insights into the epistemic aspect of reference.  
In addition, since a rigid designator is a term with constant intension, the proposed 
analysis provides an elaborate account of rigidity. 
It should not come as a surprise then that this study of reference addresses 
various familiar puzzles in semantics, metaphysics and epistemology (many of which are 
raised in Kripke’s above work). The following list of puzzles gives a flavour of the types 
of matters with which we will be concerned throughout this dissertation. (Indeed, many 
of the puzzles belong in more than one realm, which implies the links between them): 
Semantics: Does the term “water” refer to the watery stuff on Twin Earth, which is not 
H2O but rather XYZ? Does it refer to the pink solid H2O on another possible world? 
“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are two names for the same planet, so in a sense 
Hesperus might not have been distinct from Phosphorus, but in another sense we feel 
that it might have been; that they may have turned out to be distinct (e.g., for all the 
ancient astronomers knew). How shall we reconcile these seemingly conflicting 
intuitions? We see a man holding a martini glass, and thus refer to him as, “the man 
drinking a martini”. It turns out that he is drinking water; did we succeed in referring to 
him nevertheless? “The police know concerning Smith’s murderer, whoever he is, that he 
committed the murder, but they’re not saying who he is”; is this a singular proposition 
about a particular person, or is it a general one concerning whoever murdered Smith?  
Metaphysics: Could this table come into existence from a different hunk of wood than 
the one it was originally made of? Can the clay statue of Goliath survive a complete part-
replacement? Can it survive being smashed into a ball? Is there such an entity, called 
“Prez”, which is composed now (2007) by George W. Bush, was composed in 1790 by 
George Washington, and in 1863 by Abraham Lincoln? Can there be a possible world in 
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which Adam and Noah “switched roles”; that is, a world in which the guy who is 
absolutely similar to our Noah in all respects is in fact Adam, and vice versa? The essence 
of gold is said to be, having atomic number 79; what is the essence of being stuff with 
atomic number 79? If it is true that once we have created a physical duplicate of Fido the 
dog there is nothing left to duplicate (i.e., all other aspects of Fido were thereby also 
duplicated), does it follow that Fido’s criteria of identity are physical? Can pain not be 
painful? Can something that feels painful not be pain? 
Epistemology: Could we discover that Queen Elizabeth was not the daughter of George 
VI, i.e., is it Queen Elizabeth that we would be talking about in this case? Is it the job of 
science to discover the essence of things? What happened when we discovered that 
whales are mammals and not fish; was there a change in the concept ‘fish’? How should 
we react if we were to discover that all things to which we refer to as “cat” are in fact 
robots controlled from Mars; should we say that cats are nothing but robots, or that we 
thought that there were cats but there aren’t any?  
 
The overall structure of the dissertation is the following: the first chapter is mainly 
devoted to the development of the calculator of intensions, and to the consequent 
account of rigidity. Each of the following three chapters discusses one aspect of 
intensions, namely, the semantic, metaphysical and epistemic aspects. Each of these 
chapters offers some more specific arguments and analyses relevant to the aspect of 
intensions that it explores. In addition, in the course of these chapters the above puzzles 
pertaining to the respective philosophical realms are addressed. In the fifth and last 
chapter we apply our intensions formula to two case-studies. The first is the Kripke-
Lewis debate over the identity theory of mind as entailed by functionalism. Here our 
analysis is based on revealing the intension of “pain” as entailed by the competing views. 
The second case-study is Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and the 
attributive uses of definite descriptions. Our analysis in this case is based on revealing the 
intension of “Smith’s murderer” as entailed by different interpretations of Donnellan’s 
distinction. It is hoped that the novel accounts that these applications generate illustrate 
the original contribution of this dissertation. 
Due to the central role that intensions play in this study, it is worthwhile to 
briefly summarise the history of the notion of intension as reference across possible 
worlds. This is what we do next.  
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ii. A brief history of intensions  
The history leading to the formation of the notion of intension as reference across 
possible worlds begins with the following well-known problem. In many contexts, 
substituting an expression with another expression that refers to the same object 
preserves the truth of the sentence. Thus, given that the number of the planets is nine,4 
we may substitute “nine” in  
(1) Nine is greater than seven  
with “the number of the planets”, to get 
(2) The number of the planets is greater than seven.  
In other words, in such contexts, all that matters is the referent, also called the extension, 
of the terms involved (in our case, the number nine). Such contexts are thus called 
extensional contexts. Classical first-order logic is designed to deal with such contexts; it is 
extensional in nature. However, in some contexts, such substitutions fail to preserve 
truth. For instance, the ancient astronomers believed that there were six planets. Thus, 
although it is true that  
(3) The ancient astronomers believed that nine is greater than seven  
it is nonetheless false that,  
(4) The ancient astronomers believed that the number of the planets is greater 
than seven; 
even though “nine” and “the number of the planets” pick out the same referent, namely, 
the number nine.5 Such belief context is called propositional attitude context. Other 
propositional attitude contexts create a similar problem. E.g., “S knows that…”, “S hopes 
that”, “S regrets that…” etc. But there are contexts other than propositional attitudes that 
similarly do not permit substitution salva veritate (i.e., in a truth preserving way) of 
expressions that pick out the same referent. One such context is the modal context; for 
example, although it is true that  
(5) Nine is necessarily greater than seven 
it is nonetheless false that 
(6) The number of the planets is necessarily greater than seven6 
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(at least on one plausible reading of the sentence). Another such context is the temporal; 
e.g., although it is true that  
(7) Britain’s prime minister used to be a woman  
(having Thatcher in mind), nevertheless,  
(8) Tony Blair used to be a woman  
is false, despite the fact that the terms “Britain’s prime minister” and “Tony Blair” refer 
to the same individual. A similar problem applies to obligation contexts, like “it ought to 
be the case that…”.  
Furthermore, in addition to violating the principle of substitution, such contexts 
also violate a family of other extensional principles.7   
So we have a range of contexts that behave in a way that violates extensional 
principles, and consequently cannot be dealt with by classical extensional logic. In 
Quine’s view, this inability to be accommodated within classical logic does not indicate a 
flaw in classical logic, but rather a flaw in those contexts.8 In his view, instead of 
amending logic to fit those constructions, we should rather amend the defiant 
constructions. Others thought otherwise. In contrast to Quine, they tried to “save the 
phenomena”, i.e., they chose to take the linguistic phenomena as a given and to explicate 
them and, in some cases, even to develop a logic that would accommodate them. 
Frege, who famously raised a powerful version of the above problem, suggested 
the following solution.9 First he introduced a distinction between two aspects of 
expressions – their bedeutung and their sinn, commonly translated as reference, or denotation, 
and sense, or meaning, respectively.10 (Frege’s account of sense is as that which accounts 
for the cognitive significance of an expression.) Based on this distinction, Frege claimed that 
although expressions like “the number of the planets” and “nine” have the same 
reference, namely, the number nine, they nonetheless have different senses. More 
specifically, the two terms express different ways of conceiving the referent, and hence 
have different cognitive significance. Now, according to Frege, in extensional contexts, 
expressions stand for their reference. Hence such contexts allow for substitution of co-
referring terms salva veritate. However, what happens in non-extensional contexts is that 
expressions no longer stand for their referents, but instead they stand for their senses. 
Now sameness in reference does not guarantee sameness in sense (think for instance of 
the celebrated example of “creature with heart” and “creature with kidneys” – apparently, 
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the two terms happen to refer to the same group of organisms, yet the terms clearly 
differ in their cognitive significance). Consequently, in such contexts we may not 
substitute terms that merely co-refer, as they may have different senses. Carnap’s system 
(to be introduced shortly) used intension and extension instead of Frege’s sense and reference 
respectively.11  Following this distinction, contexts that do not permit substitution of co-
referring expressions became known as intensional contexts.  
 The two aspects of expressions, sense and reference, apply not only to singular 
terms, such as “the number of the planets” or “nine” but also to predicates and whole 
sentences. In a letter to Husserl, Frege conveniently draws a chart specifying the 
reference and sense of each of these types of expressions (i.e., in extensional contexts. As 
mentioned above, according to Frege, in intensional contexts expressions refer to their 
senses). The following table is based on Frege’s chart:12   
 Singular term  Predicate  Sentence 
Reference  Object  Concept/set13 Truth-value 
Sense    Individual concept14  Sense of the predicate Thought15 
Table I.1 
The problem with Frege’s solution is that it is too “qualitative”. That is, since 
senses remain somewhat obscure entities, such an account does not furnish a disciplined 
enough way to talk about intensional phenomena. In particular, Frege’s solution does not 
propose any formal way of introducing senses into logic. In order for logic to deal with 
intensional phenomena we need to bring senses into logic. We need an explicit symbolic 
distinction between senses and references, one that will permit rigorous analysis.  
Such an attempt at developing an intensional logic was pioneered by Alonzo 
Church, building on Russell’s theory of types:16 Russell discovered the famous paradoxes 
(that carry his name) entailed by Frege’s system, and developed his theory of types as a 
solution.17 Church took Russell’s theory of types on board, and developed and formalised 
it into an intensional logic.  
Church’s pioneering attempt proposed a logical account of what senses do, but 
not so much of what senses in fact were. Such a system was developed by Rudolph 
Carnap in roughly the same period.18 (Apparently Carnap and Church’s ideas had 
significant mutual influence, and both philosophers refer to one another.)19 Carnap’s core 
idea is ingeniously simple. Although “the number of the planets” and “nine” have actually 
the same extension, they might not have. I.e., there is a possible state of affairs in which the 
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number of the planets is not nine; say, a state in which there are merely six planets. 
(Similarly, although the group of creatures with heart and the group of creatures with 
kidneys happen to coincide, they might not have.) In other words, the difference in the 
behaviour of the two terms is captured not by their actual extensions, but rather by their 
possible extensions.  
Thus, on Carnap’s view, in intensional contexts, we may substitute only such 
expressions that have the same extension, not only in the actual state, but rather in all 
possible states. For instance, since “the number of the planets” and “nine” have different 
extensions in some states, they may not be substituted in intensional contexts. Thus, 
substituting “nine” in (5) above with “the number of the planets” generates (6), which 
does not preserve the truth of (5), and hence such substitution is not permissible. 
However, since “nine” and, say, “the positive square root of eighty-one” do have the 
same extension in all possible states, substituting “nine” in (5) with “the positive square 
root of eighty-one” yields:  
(9) The positive square root of eighty-one is necessarily greater than seven 
which does preserve truth.  
Technically, Carnap formulated his idea in terms of state-descriptions. A state-
description is a “representation” of a possible state.20 Each expression picks out a certain 
extension in the actual state as well as in possible states. Thus, Carnap defined intension as 
a function that assigns to each state-description the extension of the expression in that 
state-description.21 For example, the intension of “the number of the planets” assigns to 
the actual state-description the number nine; to another possible state-description the 
number six; and so forth, it assigns to each state-description the number of the planets in 
that state.  
Since different types of expressions – singular terms, predicates, sentences – have 
different types of extensions, they will also have different types of Carnapian intensions. 
In detail, since the extension of a singular term is an individual, the intension of a 
singular term is a function from state-descriptions to individuals; likewise, as the 
extension of a predicate is a set, the intension of a predicate is a function from state-
descriptions to sets; and if the extension of a sentence is a truth-value (as Frege thought), 
then the intension of a sentence is a function from state-descriptions to truth-values (or, 
simply, a set of state-descriptions).  
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We may compare Frege’s and Carnap’s views in the following way. Frege 
suggested that in intensional contexts we may not substitute expressions that merely have 
the same reference, but rather only expressions that have the same meaning. Frege 
proposed to understand the meaning of the expression in terms of sense, i.e., that which 
accounts for the expression’s cognitive significance. Carnap endorsed Frege’s idea that in 
intensional contexts we may substitute only expressions that have the same meaning, and 
not merely the same reference. However, Carnap proposed to understand meanings in 
terms of intensions, i.e., functions from state-descriptions to extensions. (Accordingly, he 
used extension instead of reference, but in this case the two terms are largely equivalent.) 
Juxtaposing Carnap’s intensions with Frege’s senses (see Table I.2 below), Carnap’s 
system suggests a clear account of what Frege’s somewhat obscure senses are. In detail, 
individual concepts are understood as functions from state-descriptions to individuals; 
properties, or concepts, are understood as functions from state descriptions to sets, and 
thoughts, or propositions, are understood as functions from state-descriptions to truth-
values (or simply as sets of state-descriptions): 
 Singular term  Predicate  Sentence  
Reference/extension  Object  Concept/set Truth-value  
(Frege’s) sense    Individual concept Sense of the 
predicate 
Thought/proposition 
(Carnap’s) intension A function from 
state-description to 
 objects 
A function from 
state-descriptions to 
sets 
A function from state-
descriptions to  
truth-values  
(or, simply, a set of state-
descriptions)  
Table I.2 
Thus in Carnap’s system, intensions are in fact defined in terms of extensions. 
Consequently, as opposed to Frege’s theory which involves two qualitatively different 
aspects of expressions – their reference and their sense – Carnap’s method of extension 
and intension involves, fundamentally, only one element, which is extension. It may be 
said then that Carnap’s system “extensionalises” meanings. Thus understood, intensions 
become model-theoretic entities that may be thereby analysed within the framework of 
set-theory.  
Carnap’s ideas laid the foundation for the possible-worlds approach in 
intensional logic. Carnap defines his “state-descriptions” as follows:  
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A class of sentences in SI which contains for every atomic sentence either this 
sentence or its negation, but not both, and no other sentence, is called a state 
description in SI, because it obviously gives a complete description of a possible state 
of the universe of individuals with respect to all properties and relations expressed by 
predicates of the system. Thus the state descriptions represent Leibniz’s possible 
worlds or Wittgenstein’s possible states of affairs.22  
He credits Wittgenstein’s ideas in the Tractatus23 for being “the starting-point for the 
development of [his] method”. Indeed, as the above quotation indicates, Carnap’s state-
descriptions are representation of Wittgenstein’s possible states of affairs, or Leibniz’s 
possible worlds. Now intensions for Carnap are functions from state-descriptions to 
extensions. If we replace Carnap’s state-descriptions, i.e., the representations of 
possibilia, with the possibilia themselves, we get the basics of what became known as the 
application of possible-worlds semantics (PWS) to intensional logic. On this version of 
intensional logic, the intension of an expression is simply a function from possible worlds to 
extensions.  
Following Carnap, Bressan24 and Montague25 both developed the possible-worlds 
approach in intensional logic. As Bressan’s motivation was mainly in the realm of 
physics, it was largely Montague’s work that contributed to the application of intensional 
logic in philosophy.26  
However, although a possible-worlds approach in intensional logic manages to 
cope well with intensional contexts such as modality, tense, obligation, and indexicals, 
nonetheless propositional attitude contexts pose some serious problems to the possible-
worlds semantics approach. Let me demonstrate this.  
To recall, in many contexts, having the same extension is sufficient for 
substitution salva veritate (such contexts are called “extensional”). In intensional contexts 
however, having the same extension is not enough. Such contexts require not only the 
same extension but also the same meaning to allow for substitution salve veritate. Possible-
worlds semantics interprets meanings as functions from possible worlds to extension, i.e., 
as intensions. Thus, on this interpretation, substitution in intensional contexts requires 
co-extension across all worlds. E.g., as the above example shows, although we may not 
substitute “nine” in the modal context (5) with “the number of the planets”, we may 
nevertheless substituted “nine” with “the positive square root of eighty-one”; such 
substitution generates (9) which preserves the truth of (5). However, what seems to work 
in modal contexts appears not to work in propositional attitude contexts. For example, 
although it may be true that  
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(10) Jones believes that nine is greater than seven  
nevertheless, if Jones fails to realise that the positive square root of eighty one is nine, it 
might be false that  
(11) Jones believes that the positive square root of eighty-one is greater than 
seven. 
Jones may simply have the one belief without having the other. So it seems that in the 
case of propositional attitude contexts, even having the same extension in all possible 
words, i.e., the same intension, cannot guarantee truth-preserving substitution.  
Put differently, we may say that Carnapian intensions cannot provide the full 
story about what meaning is. The meaning of “nine” is different from the meaning of 
“the positive square root of eighty-one”, and this difference cannot be captured by the 
extension in possible worlds; both terms have exactly the same extension in all possible 
worlds, i.e., they have the same intension.27 (Similarly, think of the well-known example 
of “triangular” and “trilateral”).  
Such problems led to the development of some alternative intensional logics 
(Notably the systems suggested by Creswell28, Anderson29 and Zalta30).  
 However, despite ultimately failing to satisfactorily address problems such as the 
above, possible worlds semantics proved to be extremely fertile, and is in extensive use in 
many areas of philosophy, as well as in some neighbouring fields of study. As the 
following passage from Perry indicates:  
[Possible-worlds semantics] has been applied to a number of intensional phenomena 
in addition to necessity and possibility, including conditionals, tense and temporal 
adverbs, obligation and reports of informational and cognitive content. PWS spurred 
the development of philosophical logic and led to new applications of logic in 
computer science and artificial intelligence. It revolutionized the study of the 
semantics of natural languages. PWS has inspired analyses of many concepts of 
philosophical importance, and the concept of a possible world has been at the heart of 
important philosophical systems.31 
To summarise, intensions are functions from possible worlds to extensions. In 
particular, the intension of an expression is a function that assigns to each possible world 
the extension of that expression in that world. Carnap’s original aim in developing this 
notion of intension was to provide an account of meaning. However, as an account of 
meaning, intensions were shown to face a crucial problem: although they manage to 
capture many differences in meanings, nonetheless, there are some cases in which 
intensions fail to capture such differences. Nevertheless, despite this flaw, intensions, and 
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possible worlds semantics in general, proved very helpful for many other purposes, 
regardless of their original purpose. In fact, I believe that the use of possible worlds 
semantics in general, and of intensions in particular, is a mere formal expression of a 
much broader effective approach that underlies many of our practices, namely, gaining 
insights about what is the case by contemplating what might have been (and what may be) the 
case. Accordingly, this dissertation is largely guided by this approach in its exploration of 
reference. 
 
Lastly, a brief comment about notes: to avoid frequent obstructions to the flow of the 
argument, I chose to use endnotes rather than footnotes in this dissertation. The 
drawback is of course the relative inconvenience in consulting endnotes. However, it is 
hoped that on the whole, the advantage of this decision in terms of convenience of 
following the main thread of thought overrides this drawback. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
 
1 Carnap (1947) 
2 Kripke (1972/1980)  
3 In fact, the initial formulation of the formula in Chapter 1 is slightly different, and we shall only 
reach this particular formulation at the end of Chapter 2 (See Section  2.4).  
4 Ignoring some recent astronomical controversies.  
5 The discovery of the puzzle is commonly attributed to Frege, but at least some version of it 
probably dates back to the ancient Greeks in the form of The Hooded Man paradox: “You say that 
you know your brother. Yet that man who just came in with his head covered is your brother and 
you did not know him” (Hyde, 2005); the paradox was later widely discussed by medieval 
logicians. (The paradox is attributed to the Megarian logician Eubulides of Miletus – a 
contemporary and critic of Aristotle – as one of the “Seven Megarian Paradoxes” which include 
the famous Sorites paradox and the Liar paradox.)  
6 This influential example is due to Quine (1963a)  
7 For example, existential generalisation. It is a principle of extensional logic that the fact that a 
has the property P entails that there exists something that has the property P (i.e., Pa ⊃ ∃xPx). 
However, from “Jones likes Santa Claus” (paraphrased as “Santa Claus has the property of being 
liked by Jones”) it does not follow that Santa Claus exists.  
8 In particular, Quine (1956, 1961) thought that in such contexts expressions do not refer at all; 
he called them referentially opaque.  
9 Frege (1892)  
10 Something like that distinction was of course around much before Frege, and goes back to at 
least the medieval distinction between signification and supposition (William of Sherwood, 1240’s, tr. 
N. Kretzmann; 1966). Closer to Frege’s times, Mill (1867) distinguished the denotation of a term 
from its connotation.  
11 Carnap (1947)  
12 The letter is dated 24 May 1891. The original (translated) chart (as it appears in Wiggins 
(1984)), is:  
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Sentence  Singular term  Concept-word  
 
sense of  sense of  sense of 
the sentence  the singular term  the concept-word 
(thought)    
 
reference of the  reference of the (reference of the  object falling 
sentence  singular term  concept-word  under the concept 
(truth value) (object)  (concept)) 
 
13 Extensional semantics, developed following Frege’s ideas, standardly treats the reference of 
predicates as sets; specifically, the reference of an n-place predicate is the set of n-tuples of 
objects to which the predicate applies. As Frege’s letter to Husserl indicates (see Endnote 12), his 
own view was along these lines.  
14 I.e. an identifying condition for individuals. Many (notably Kripke) understood such a 
condition to be an abbreviation of a definite description (see sections  1.1.1 and  2.2.1.1.2 for some 
discussion) However, such an interpretation is controversial and there are other important 
alternatives (Cf. Marti, 1998).  
15 Commonly referred to more technically as proposition.  
16 Church (1951). Although an abstract carrying the same title appeared already in his (1946), and 
an informal discussion was presented in the introduction to his (1944). 
17 Russell’s discovery of the paradoxes was made as early as 1901; first introduced in his (1903) 
and further developed in his (1908) and in Russell and Whitehead (1910, 1912, 1913). The 
paradoxes are related to the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Such a set is a 
member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself.  
18 Carnap (1947). This observation is due to Fitting (2006) 
19 Fitting (2006) 
20 Carnap (1947, p. 9); see quote on p. 22.  
21 In the context of logic, the use of the term intension dates back to at least the early 19th century, 
and stands for something like the meaning of the expression:  
The Internal Quality of a notion,- its Intension or Comprehension is made up of .. the various 
characters connected by the concept itself into a single whole in thought. 
(Sir W. Hamilton (1836-60), Logic viii, as cited in the OED).  
Clearly, Carnap’s use of the term is much more technical.  
22 Carnap (1947, p. 9) 
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23 Wittgenstein (1921). It can be derived from Wittgenstein that there are many possible states of 
affairs, one of which is the actual state of affairs. Thus Wittgenstein’s ideas are sometimes seen as 
anticipating possible-worlds semantics (e.g., Fitting, 2006). 
24 Bressan (1972) 
25 Montague (1960; 1970) 
26 Recently, Copland (2006) has suggested the following genealogy of possible-worlds semantics. 
He proposes three “threads”: first the analysis of modalities in terms of quantification over 
possible worlds. This idea he attributes to Carnap (1946). The second thread is the relation of 
accessibility between worlds. This relation is absent in Carnap’s system. Although the relation was 
introduced and discussed in the 1940’s, it was only in the mid 50’s that it was applied explicitly to 
possible worlds by Meredith and Prior (1956). The third thread, according to Copeland, includes 
completeness proofs. Such proofs were first provided by Smiley (1957). Other proofs were 
provided by Bayart (1958, 1959); Kripke (1959); and, Hintikka (in his informal talks as a research 
fellow in Harvard, around 1958-9).  
27 It should be noted however, that although ultimately sameness in intension does not guarantee 
sameness in meaning, still, intensions and meanings do bear an “almost” one-one correlation to 
one another, and therefore sameness in intension, for the overwhelming majority of cases, does 
go hand in hand with sameness in meaning. For some more discussion see Section  3.3.5.  
28 Creswell (1985) 
29 Anderson (1984) 
30 Zalta (1988) 
31 Perry (1998)  
 1 A BLUEPRINT FOR A CALCULATOR OF INTENSIONS 
 
 
Overview 
Our prime interest is in reference. More specifically, reference in actual and possible 
states of affairs. In other words, we are interested in (Carnapian) intensions. Formally, 
intensions are defined as functions from possible worlds to extensions: the intension of a 
term is a function that assigns to each possible world the extension of the term in that 
world.  
First, we locate the different factors upon which intensions depend. (These 
factors are found through insights that we collect from different philosophical debates, at 
least some of which are traditionally unrelated to one another.) Specifically, in the first 
stage these factors are found to be; (a) the semantic function of the term, i.e., the way in 
which the term is designed to “pick out” its referent with respect to different possible 
worlds (e.g., as a Russellian definite description, or as a Millian proper name, etc.); (b) the 
criteria of identity (e.g., whether objects are primarily material objects that merely happen 
to have their manifest properties, or whether they are primarily manifest objects that 
merely happen to have their material constitution); and (c) the actual referent. Changing 
the values of any of these variables may result in a change in the reference of the term 
with respect to different possible worlds, viz., it may result in a change in the intension of 
the term. 
However, learning that each of these factors affects intensions, is still far from 
being enough for determining how the three work together to fix intensions; the whole in 
this case is greater than the sum of its parts. Thus, we next explore how the reference of 
a term across counterfactual worlds is fixed by the three factors together. (This will make 
the main original contribution of this chapter.) To avoid presuppositions, we construct a 
thought experiment which takes place on Mars. Our Martian colleagues introduce us to 
some Martian stuff referred to as “T”, and ask us to help them identify T on other 
possible worlds. Or, technically speaking, we are asked to determine the intension of “T”, 
i.e., what the term designates with respect to different possible worlds. Following a short 
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series of (thought-) experiments on the planet, we come up with a general “calculator” of 
intensions, i.e., a “formula” that, when provided with some required data, enables the 
determination of the intension of a term in question. We then draw some morals about 
rigidity.  
Having developed our intensions calculator, we turn to use it for some critical 
discussions. First, we return to examine the traditional debates from which we inherited 
the factors in our formula. We learn that the intensions that are implicit or explicit in 
those debates are merely partially justified, as they take only one factor into account and 
not all three. Finally, we use our insights about rigidity to critically discuss Kripke’s 
essentialism. We conclude that although Kripke is justified in holding that rigidity entails 
some modal properties, Kripke is nonetheless not justified in using rigidity to derive specific 
essential properties.  
 
As this is the first chapter, terms and ideas are brought into discussion for the first time, 
and hence require frequent qualifications and commenting, as well as addressing worries 
that the reader may have in mind before more has been said as the argument unfolds. 
However, to facilitate the flow of the argument, it is advisable to read the endnotes to 
this chapter after reading the main text, unless there is a required specification or a 
particular worry that seeks response. 
 
1.1 The Dependence of Intension on Other Factors – Three Cases 
1.1.1 The dependence of intension on the term’s semantic function  
(Or: what we learned about intension from the New Theory of Reference) 
A common way of dealing with problems regarding the semantics of terms is by invoking 
thought experiments that involve counterfactual worlds1,2 (also known as “twin-earth” 
thought experiments). A paradigm is the case of the term “water”. Consider a 
counterfactual world in which the watery stuff, i.e., the colourless odourless stuff that 
falls from the sky and flows in rivers etc., is not H2O but rather XYZ. Does it deserve to 
be called “water”?3 This thought experiment can be extended: consider also a 
counterfactual world in which the H2O stuff is non-watery, but is say, pink, opaque and 
solid. Does it deserve to be called “water”?4  
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According to the so-called Frege5-Russell6 view, (or at least according to the way 
that Kripke understands their view,7) terms like “water” have a descriptive content, and 
they designate8, with respect to every possible world, that which fits their descriptive 
content.9 Thus, “water” – whose descriptive content is, presumably, ‘the watery stuff’ – 
designates, with respect to every possible world, that which is watery in that world. That 
will include the watery XYZ, but not the non-watery, i.e., pink solid H2O. This theory of 
reference is commonly called “descriptive”.10 Accordingly, let us call terms that have such 
a semantic function “descriptive terms”.  
By contrast, according to Kripke’s view,11 terms like “water” are designed to 
designate, with respect to every possible world, the same referent that they designate in 
the actual world.12,13,14 Thus, says Kripke, since in the actual world “water” designates 
H2O, “water” designates H2O in every possible world. That will exclude the watery XYZ, 
but will include the pink-solid H2O.15 This theory of reference is commonly called 
“referential” or simply, the “New Theory” of reference. Let us call terms that designate 
according to this theory “nondescriptive”.16 
There are many arguments against, as well as in favour of, each view. However, 
as in this study we are interested mainly in intensions, we shall refrain from taking sides 
in the debate, and instead concentrate our attention on what we can learn from the 
debate about reference in possible worlds, i.e., about intensions. And, as we shall see, the 
above semantic debate can teach us something about intensions.  
We can divide counterfactual worlds into four relevant types. W1: containing (like 
the actual world) watery H2O (H2O+W); W2: containing watery stuff which is not H2O, 
e.g., XYZ (¬H2O+W); W3: containing non-watery, e.g., pink-solid, H2O (H2O+¬W); and 
W4: containing only stuffs which are neither H2O nor watery (¬H2O+¬W). (For the sake 
of simplicity, we suppose homogeneity within a world, i.e., we ignore here worlds that 
contain more than one of these types, e.g., worlds in which there is both watery XYZ and 
non-watery H2O.17) Thus, according to the Frege-Russell theory, “water” is descriptive 
and therefore designates the watery stuffs on worlds W1 and W2, but not the non-watery 
stuffs on worlds W3 and W4. According to Kripke’s view, by contrast, “water” is a 
nondescriptive term, and hence it designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, 
the same stuff that it designates in the actual world, namely, H2O. A nondescriptive 
“water” thus designates the H2O stuffs on W1 and W3, but not the non-H2O stuffs on W2 
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and W4 (note that the two views are compatible with our use of the term in the actual 
world, i.e., of type W1). The resulting intensions of “water” are thus:   
 W1 
H2O + W
W2 
¬H2O + W
W3 
H2O + ¬W
W4 
¬H2O + ¬W  
“Water” is descriptive  + + - - 
“Water” nondescriptive + - + - 
Table 1.1 
What Table 1.1 shows is that the intension of “water”, i.e., the reference of 
“water” with respect to different counterfactual worlds, is dependent on whether the 
term “water” is descriptive or not. And in general, the intension of a term depends, at 
least in part, upon its semantic function. In other words, changing the semantic function 
of a term may result in a change in the intension of that term. 
 
1.1.2 The dependence of intension on criteria of identity  
(Or: what we learned about intension from discussions about identity and 
change) 
It is customary to engage with the metaphysical problem of identity by invoking thought 
experiments that involve manipulations of objects. Specifically, these manipulations 
commonly involve changes to the material constitution of the object, hence the more 
restricted title, “the problem of material constitution”.18 
Following the ancient Greeks, many versions of the problem make reference to a 
statue. Consider a clay statue of David. Or, let us describe it more neutrally: consider an 
object which is made out of clay and has a David shape. Call it “David”.19 Now consider 
a scenario in which David is smashed into a ball. Is the clay ball David? Let us extend the 
thought experiment. Consider another scenario in which David undergoes a gradual part-
replacement, until it is entirely made out of bronze.20 Is this David?  
Mereological essentialism has it that parts are essential to their wholes (commonly 
summarised by the slogan “composition is identity”); hence objects cannot undergo part-
replacement and remain the same.21 In other words, on this view, the criterion of identity22,23 
for objects is: an object remains the same as long as it keeps its material parts.  Thus, on 
this view, the clay ball is identical to David but the bronze statue is not.  
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By contrast, Burke (1994) suggested another criterion of identity, which he 
discusses in terms of sortal (a sortal is what gives the criterion of identity to an object24): 
“of the sortals satisfied by an object, the one that tells the object’s sort is the one whose 
satisfaction entails possession of the widest range of properties.”25 Based on this 
criterion, Burke selects, for example, “tree” over “hunk of cells”, and “statue” over a 
“piece of copper” as sortal properties.26 Accordingly, being the same object as David is 
not being the same lump of clay, but rather, being the same statue (which also allows for 
part-replacement27). Thus, according to this principle, the above bronze statue is David, 
but the clay ball is not.28  
In Wiggins’s terminology,29 we can say that on the first view, being a lump of clay 
is what David is, while being a statue is merely what David is like, whereas on the second 
view being a statue is what David is, and being a lump of clay is what David is like. 
Another terminology uses the distinction between things and properties of things. Thus on 
this terminology, according to the first view, lumps of clay and lumps of bronze belong 
to the group of things that inhabit the world, whereas being statue-shaped and being vase-
shaped belong to the group of properties of such things (and others) in the world. By 
contrast, Burke’s view has it that it is statues and vases that belong to the group of things 
in the world, while being constituted by a lump of clay and being constituted by a lump 
of bronze are but properties of such things (and others). 
Admittedly, there are other views, e.g., that there are two objects in the same 
place at the same time – a statue and a lump of clay;30 or, that what the original object 
primarily is, is relative to the way it is described/intended/thought of,31 i.e., the clay ball 
is identical to David relative to the description “lump of clay” but not relative to the 
description “statue”; or, that the original object is a stage (i.e., a temporal part of a four-
dimensionally extended object), shared by two different collections of stages – a statue-
collection and a lump-collection;32 or that identity is governed by Leibniz’s law (i.e., two 
objects are identical if and only if they share all their properties33) and hence that neither 
the clay ball nor the bronze statue are David;34 and more.35 However, for the purpose of 
the argument advanced here, it suffices that there is more than one metaphysical view. 
Again, there are strong arguments for and against each view, but being concerned 
with intensions, we shall not engage here in choosing sides. Interestingly, this debate can 
also teach us something about intensions. Let me demonstrate this.  
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We can translate the above scenarios into a modal version by supposing that each 
occurs in some counterfactual world. Accordingly, we can divide all counterfactual 
worlds into types according to the end-state of the manipulation. W1: (David remains as 
is) a clay statue (C+S); W2: the same lump of clay, different shape (C+¬S); W3: the same 
shape, different matter (¬C+S); and W4: different matter and different shape (¬C+¬S).36 
The request to determine which object is David, is in fact the request to 
determine, with respect to each counterfactual world, whether the relevant object 
deserves the name “David”. In other words, the request is simply to determine the 
intension of “David”.37 Specifically, on the mereological essentialist view, “David” 
designates the lump of clay, whatever shape it has, thus “David” designates the objects 
on W1 and on W3 but not those on W2 and on W4; on Burke’s view, by contrast, “David” 
designates the same statue, whatever it is made of, i.e., “David” designates the objects on 
W1 and on W2, but not those on W3 and on W4. The intension of “David” is thus:   
 W1   
C + S
W2
¬C + S
W3
C + ¬S
W4 
¬C + ¬S
Mereological essentialism  + - + - 
Burke’s view   + + - - 
Table 1.2 
It turns out that different criteria of identity result in different designations with 
respect to counterfactual worlds. Thus, one interesting lesson from metaphysical 
discussions of identity through change is that the intension of a term may depend, at least 
partially, on criteria of identity. In other words, different criteria of identity of an object 
may result in different intensions of the term that designates this object.  
 
1.1.3 The dependence of intension on the actual referent of the term  
(Or: what we learned about intension from two-dimensional semantics) 
The type of dependence discussed in this section is mainly manifest in the two-
dimensional semantics literature.38  
Consider the Leibniz-Newton controversy over who invented the Calculus first. 
Surely, one of them was the first to invent it, but it was a matter of acrimonious 
controversy who actually did. This controversy can also teach us something about 
intensions.  
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Take the singular term “the actual inventor of the Calculus”.39 Like the simple 
definite description “the inventor of the Calculus”, it designates in the actual world the 
person who fits the description, i.e., the person who actually invented the Calculus. 
However, with respect to counterfactual worlds, whereas the simple definite description 
(arguably) designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, the individual who 
invented the Calculus in that world, the actualised description “the actual inventor of the 
Calculus” by contrast designates, with respect to each counterfactual world, the 
individual who invented the Calculus in the actual world, i.e., regardless of who invented it 
in that counterfactual world. Or so at least we shall postulate here.40  
Now, consider a counterfactual world, in which it is clear that Newton was the 
first to invent the Calculus. Is he the actual inventor of the Calculus in that world? 
Similarly, in a counterfactual world in which Leibniz originally invented the Calculus: is it 
him who is the actual inventor of the Calculus in that world?  
The answers depend on the inventor in the actual world. Leibniz claimed to have 
conceived the invention first. Hence, according to Leibniz, “the actual inventor of the 
Calculus” designates himself in every counterfactual world, regardless of who first 
conceived the invention in that world. However, according to Newton and Hook (it was 
the latter who conducted this bitter debate with Leibniz), Newton preceded Leibniz, and 
hence the term designates Newton in every counterfactual world, regardless of who first 
conceived the invention in that world.  
Thus, the designation of the singular term “the actual inventor of the Calculus” 
(or, indeed, of any term which abbreviates this actualised description) with respect to the 
different counterfactual worlds in each case is:  
Counterfactual 
worlds 
 
The actual world  
W1 
The inventor of 
the Calculus is 
Leibniz 
W2 
The inventor of 
the Calculus is 
Newton 
W3 
The inventor of the 
Calculus is neither 
Newton nor Leibniz 
The inventor of the 
Calculus is Leibniz 
Leibniz Leibniz Leibniz 
The inventor of the 
Calculus is Newton 
Newton Newton Newton 
Table 1.3 
It turns out that different actual referents of a certain term may result in different 
intensions of that term.  
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History is but one realm in which we deliberate different possibilities of the 
actual world. In fact, any realm of a posteriori exploration, like searching for the 
gravitational force of Mars, or for the unit of inheritance in organisms, aims at finding 
what the actual state of affairs is like in a certain respect. Different findings about the 
actual state of affairs may result in different intensions. In particular, different findings 
with respect to the actual referent of a term may result in different intensions of that 
term.  
Note that Table 1.3 posits two sets of possible worlds: a set of counterfactual 
worlds (horizontal), and a set of actual worlds (vertical).41 The two sets of worlds 
correspond to two types of possibilities: possibilities of the actual vs. possibilities of the 
counterfactual. Thus, in one sense, it is possible that the actual inventor of the Calculus 
was Newton, and similarly, it is possible that the actual inventor of the Calculus was 
Leibniz. This sense of possibility corresponds to possibilities of the actual world: the 
term “the actual inventor of the Calculus” designates different referents in different actual 
worlds. However, given what the actual world is like, there is another sense in which it is 
not possible that the actual inventor of the Calculus is different from who it in fact was; 
this sense corresponds to possibilities of the counterfactual: the term “the actual inventor 
of the Calculus” designates the same referent in all counterfactual worlds.42  
Thus the division into two sets of possible worlds is a good way to account for 
conflicting intuitions that we sometimes have: e.g., if the actual inventor was Newton, 
then on the one hand the actual inventor might have been Leibniz, whereas on the other 
hand the actual inventor might not have been Leibniz.43 
The intension of a term was defined as a function that assigns to each possible 
world the extension of the term in that world. Given the two sets of worlds – actual 
worlds and counterfactual worlds – we can thus define two types of such functions: one 
from counterfactual worlds to extensions, the other from actual worlds to extensions.44 
Chalmers calls these secondary intension and primary intension, respectively;45 Jackson calls 
them C-intension and A-intension respectively (“C” for “counterfactual”; “A” for 
“actual”).46 Throughout this dissertation, we shall simply use “intension” to indicate the 
first function, i.e., from counterfactual worlds to extensions.  
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1.1.4 An epistemological note  
In each of the above three cases there was one factor for which we have considered 
different options. Our reason for considering the different options in each of the cases 
was a certain state of uncertainty; some epistemic ignorance. The reason for the uncertainty 
in each case was that the facts, at least as far as we could tell, seemed to underdetermine 
the definite value of the variable in question. In particular, in the first case, the way 
people normally use the term “water”, i.e., in the actual world, seems to be perfectly 
compatible with both the term being descriptive and with the term being nondescriptive. 
In the second case, the way the world looks and behaves seems to be compatible with 
both a material criterion of identity for David and with a manifest criterion of identity. 
(Generally, a world with material criteria of identity and a world with manifest ones could 
look and behave exactly the same.) Lastly, in the case of the actual inventor of the 
Calculus, given all the evidence we have, it is not clear to date whether it was Newton or 
Leibniz who first arrived at the Calculus, if any. Overall then, we may say that in each 
case the information available to us underdetermined the values of the variables in 
question. (Note that this has no entailment as to facts of the matter; in each case there 
may or may not be facts of the matter.) 
Now, we have also witnessed how, in each case, different options regarding the 
variable in question may result in different intensions. Clearly then, being in a certain 
state of ignorance about a certain variable highlights the dependence of the intension on 
that variable. However, such a state of ignorance is not essential to the dependency. In 
other words, although the different possibilities with regard to the three variables can 
account for corresponding epistemic states of ignorance, they need not; the possibilities 
stand independent of our epistemic state. What the above cases show is that were the 
value of a certain variable changed, the intension would change accordingly. And this 
would remain true even if we knew beyond any doubt the correct values! For example, 
had we simply known, beyond any doubt, that “water” is a nondescriptive term, it would 
still remain true that were it not such a term, but rather a descriptive one, its intension 
would change accordingly. Similarly, had we known beyond any doubt that the criterion 
for being identical to David is material, it would still be true that were the criterion of 
identity manifest, the intension of “David” would change accordingly. And, lastly, had we 
known beyond doubt that the actual inventor of the Calculus was Newton, it would still 
be true that were the actual inventor Leibniz, the intension of “the actual inventor of the 
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Calculus” would change accordingly.47 And these are enough to indicate the relevant 
dependencies.  
The conclusion to be drawn here is that the dependence of intension on each of 
the three factors by no means relies on epistemic doubts, although such doubts clearly 
emphasise it.  
 
1.2 The Intension of a Term as a Function of all Three Factors 
So far, we have established that the intension of a term may depend, at least partially, on 
each of the following three factors: (a) the semantic function of the term; (b) the criteria 
of identity;48 and (c) the actual referent of the term.49  
Yet apparently in each of the above cases we were able to determine the 
intension of our term on the basis of just one factor. Specifically, in the first case of water, 
we’ve determined the intension of “water” on the basis of the semantics of the term 
“water” alone; in the case of the clay statue David, we’ve determined the intension of 
“David” on the basis of the criteria of identity alone; and in the last case of the Leibniz-
Newton controversy, we’ve determined the intension of “the actual inventor of the 
Calculus” on the basis of the actual referent alone. So, this may suggest that we may need 
but one of the three factors, if at all, and not all three of them, in order to determine 
intensions.  
This, however, is a mistake. The reason for our ability to determine intensions on 
the basis of just one factor in each case was that the values of the other two factors were 
either provided, or speculated by us. Let me demonstrate this.  
In the case of water, although we had no presuppositions regarding the semantic 
function of “water”, nonetheless, we’ve assumed certain criteria of identity, namely, that 
being the same as the actual watery H2O is simply being H2O, and not, for instance, 
being watery. If the latter were the case, the intension would change accordingly (as was 
illustrated in the statue/lump case). In addition, we were told that the stuff we called 
“water” in the actual world, was indeed watery H2O. This is largely based on our current 
scientific reports. However, science is an a posteriori endeavour, and as such is fallible, i.e., 
it may be the case that current science is just wrong about it, and that the material 
constitution of the actual watery stuff is something other than H2O. Again, if the latter 
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were the case, the intension would alter accordingly (as was illustrated in the Leibniz-
Newton case).  
In the second case, of David, we had no metaphysical presuppositions. Yet, we 
have assumed that the proper name “David” is not a descriptive one, i.e., we have 
assumed that it is not an abbreviation of some definite description, say, “having a statue-
shape of David”, but rather (as the New Theory of reference dictates) a nondescriptive 
term. Yet if the former is the case, it will modify the intension of “David” accordingly (as 
we have seen in the first example). In addition, we have been told what the actual 
referent was, namely, a clay statue. However, if we were really to be at the scene, then for 
all we know, the actual statue could be a clay-like plaster statue. Or even a hologram of a 
clay statue. Again, this would change the intension of “David” as well (as the Leibniz-
Newton case shows).  
Lastly, in the case of the actual inventor of the Calculus, although we made no 
assumptions about the actual referent, we’ve assumed no problem with re-identifying 
Leibniz and Newton in other possible worlds, i.e., we’ve assumed clear criteria of identity 
for persons, which is a heavy metaphysical presupposition. Different criteria of identity 
for people entail different referents in counterfactual worlds, viz., different intensions.50 
Also, the semantic function of the term was given to us by clearly stating that it was an 
actualised description. However, a term with a less clear semantic function, e.g., a term 
for which the semantic function is under dispute, or simply a term in a foreign language, 
would not enable us to determine the intension in this case on the basis of the actual 
referent alone.  
To summarise, out of the three factors upon which intension depends, in each of 
the three cases there was one factor that was not presupposed, while the other two 
factors were either given or speculated. The important point is that, regardless of 
whether the presuppositions made were right or wrong, were the values of any of the 
three factors changed, the intension could change accordingly. (We shall later see how 
exactly in detail). Hence, it follows that the intension of a term is always dependent on all 
three factors.51  
We may look at it this way: the formula that determines the intension (to be 
constructed soon) consists of three variables. The exact intension of a certain term is 
fixed by the values of these three variables. In each of the above cases the values of two 
of the variables were fixed, leaving the value of the third one open. This has generated a 
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manipulation which isolated one of the variables, thus enabling us to learn the 
contribution of this variable to the overall intension, separately for each variable.  
The next stage is to see how the three factors work together to fix the overall 
intension. To illustrate the combined contribution, let us consider the following science-
fiction scenario.  
 
1.2.1 The way the three factors combine to fix intensions – a Martian case-
study52 
Suppose our Martian fellow-philosophers introduce us to some Martian, jellylike, purple 
stuff called “T”, and ask us to help them identify T on other possible worlds to which 
they frequently travel.53 (Needless to say, Mars, as well as Earth, both belong to the actual 
world). In other words, we are asked to determine what would deserve to be called “T” 
in counterfactual situations. Or, more technically, we are simply asked to determine the 
intension of the term “T”.54 We, of course, are happy to assist. So happy, that we postpone 
our doubts about the possibility of travelling to other possible worlds. 
So we start working. If “T” is a descriptive term,55 then “T” has a descriptive 
content, for instance, ‘a jellylike purple stuff’. In such a case, the Martian stuff is 
designated by “T” by virtue of fitting this descriptive content of “T”, and likewise “T” 
designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, whatever fits this descriptive 
content, i.e., whatever is jellylike purple stuff, in that world. As there might be different 
stuffs that fit this descriptive content, T on some counterfactual worlds may be distinct 
from the actual Martian referent.  
Yet “T” may not be such a term; it may be a nondescriptive term, i.e., a term that is 
designed to designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, the same stuff that it 
designates in the actual world.56 If “T” is indeed such a nondescriptive term, then “T” 
designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, just this very same stuff that we 
were introduced to a short while ago on Mars, in that world.  
So if “T” is a nondescriptive term, then in order to identify T on counterfactual 
worlds we need to be able to tell whether a certain stuff that we might encounter on 
some such world is or is not identical to our actual stuff. Thus before travelling to 
counterfactual worlds, we need to get a pretty good idea of what this stuff that “T” 
actually designates consists in. So we go and have a closer examination of that actual 
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referent of “T”. We note its manifest properties – that it is purple, jellylike, etc., and 
upon further examination we determine its physical constitution to be P. We learn from 
the Martians that they in fact conceive the collection of manifest properties as one 
property, M. We easily manage to adapt and conclude that the actual referent of “T” has 
the properties P and M. So “T”, if nondescriptive, designates, with respect to every 
counterfactual world, that which is identical to this P+M stuff. Had this actual referent 
been different, the reference of “T” with respect to different possible worlds, i.e., the 
intension of “T”, would accordingly be different.  
With respect to these two properties, P and M, there are four kinds of stuffs that 
may be found on counterfactual worlds: (a) stuff that is P and M (P+M); (b) stuff that 
although shares the manifest property M has nonetheless a different physical 
constitution, say, Q (Q+M); (c) stuff that has the same constitution P but a different 
collection of manifest properties, say, N (P+N);57 and finally, (d) stuff that is neither P 
nor M, say, some Q and N stuff (Q+N). Each of these stuffs in fact stands for a type of 
a counterfactual world:58 W1 containing (like the actual world) P+M stuff; W2 containing 
Q+M stuff; W3 containing P+N stuff; and W4 containing Q+N stuff. (We are aware, that 
if there is more than one alternative to P, or more than one alternative to M, there will be 
accordingly more candidates, and thus more types of counterfactual worlds. Our list of 
counterfactual worlds may thus not be exhaustive. This fact, however, need not currently 
worry us, for the argument as it stands by no means depends on a complete list of 
counterfactual worlds).  
For a start, we consider the candidate that has the same manifest property M as 
the actual stuff, but different material constitution, namely, Q+M, which is the stuff on 
counterfactual worlds of type W2. Is it identical to the actual stuff or not?  
Being heavily indoctrinated by the presuppositions of our Earthean science, we 
tend to believe that the world is such that it contains various materials, such as P and Q, 
that merely happen to have manifest properties like M and N. In other words, we 
presuppose that the criterion of identity for stuffs is their material constitution. So it 
seems that despite the sameness of the manifest property, the stuff on counterfactual W2 
(Q+M) is different from the actual stuff (P+M). It is, rather, the stuff on counterfactual 
W3, P+N, which is identical to the actual stuff P+M, despite the difference in their 
manifest property. Yet, to our surprise, we soon learn that the Martians have a different 
view on this matter; they take the world to be such that it primarily contains manifest 
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entities, such as M and N, that merely happen to have some material constitution, like P 
or Q. In other words, they believe that the criterion of identity for stuffs is their manifest 
property. Thus in their view, the stuff on counterfactual W2, Q+M, and the actual stuff, 
P+M, are identical since they share the same manifest property M. After the initial, 
mutual puzzlement about these conflicting views, we soon realise how dogmatic our 
beliefs are, and thank the fortunate encounter that allowed us to broaden our outlook 
and to see both options. We both admit, however, that we have no way of determining 
what the world is really like in this respect. Indeed, for all we know, there may be no fact 
of the matter here at all.  
Furthermore, we now appreciate that with regard to any property Ω of our stuff, 
it is possible, contrary to both what we or the Martians believe, that Ω is the criterion of 
identity of that stuff, i.e., the world is such that it primarily contains Ωs, that merely 
happen to have other properties, such as material constitution like P or Q, and manifest 
properties like M or N (such a property Ω may, for instance, be the referent’s function). 
So in principle, there are many more possible metaphysical alternatives.59  
Turning back to our job, we conclude so far that the intension of the term “T”, 
i.e., “T”’s reference with respect to different counterfactual worlds, is dependent upon 
three different factors: (a) the semantic function of “T”; (b) the referent of “T” in the 
actual world; and (c) the criteria of identity of the actual referent, namely, what the 
referent is vs. what it is merely like (despite our strong, yet utterly dogmatic, conviction 
that the manifest properties are merely what this material object is like).   
But what then is the intension of “T”? What does in fact deserve to be called 
“T”?  
Well, surely, to determine the intension of “T” we need the values of each of the 
above three variables. We have already come to suspect that we do not know for sure the 
value of the third variable – the criteria of identity. But as if this worry was not enough, 
the Martians go on to tell us that they are not even sure about the values of the other two 
variables either – the semantic function of “T” and the actual referent of “T” (more 
precisely, the properties of the actual referent). All they are willing to commit to is the 
purple jellylike stuff to which the term “T” actually applies on Mars. Firstly, regarding the 
true properties of this actual referent; although their current science tells them that it has 
the properties P and M, they are nonetheless well aware of how fallible their science has 
been, and therefore are careful not to assume that it isn’t failing this time as well. And 
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secondly, as to the semantic function of “T”, some of them think that “T” designated 
that stuff by virtue of simply naming it; whereas others, by contrast, contend that “T” 
designated the stuff by virtue of that stuff fitting the descriptive content of the term “T”, 
namely, by being jellylike, purple etc. (i.e., having the property M). Furthermore, they 
think that other views on this matter are also possible. And there is nothing in the actual 
application of the term on Mars to tell them which of the views is right. Pondering this, 
we begin to suspect that our epistemic state may not be very different from theirs. Firstly, 
the one certain thing about our science is that it is fallible, and hence it may well be that 
the actual stuff is not P+M as our investigation tells us. Secondly, concerning the 
semantic function of “T”, for all we know, “T” could refer to its stuff by virtue of 
different semantic functions. And thirdly, as for the criteria of identity, we have already 
established that it was likewise underdetermined by the facts.  
(To be sure, the intension of “T” does not depend upon the Martians’ views 
about the three factors; nor upon ours. The intension of “T” depends upon the real 
values of these factors (if there are facts of the matter with regard to these). When there 
is a disagreement about these values, whether between us and the Martians, or between 
the Martians and themselves as well as amongst ourselves, it is about the real values of 
these variables.) 
The problem with this epistemic state is that without the values of the required 
variables, we simply cannot carry out the job. It is just impossible to determine the 
intension of “T” without this data, since different data, i.e., different values of the three 
variables, will result in different intensions. So, what do we do now? Is there a way out?  
Well, of course there is! We could provide the Martians with some well-defined 
procedure, which would enable them to calculate the intension of “T” once the values of 
the variables are determined. We could come up with some sort of a formula, that when 
filled in with the appropriate data would simply generate the exact intension. Such a 
general formula carries some important advantages. Firstly, with an appropriate re-
interpretation of its variables, such a formula can be used to calculate the intension of any 
term. Secondly, such a general formula would provide an understanding of the general 
regularity behind individual intensions of specific terms. After all, isn’t it what drives great 
scientists in their pursuit of theories? Admittedly, unlike us, Newton had methods for 
measuring weights, speeds, forces, and other values for the variables in his formulas, 
whereas we, regrettably, do not seem to possess such philosophical yardsticks. 
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Nonetheless, what Newton was really after was not so much the specific outcomes of his 
formulas, but rather the general rule that would expose the regularity connecting such 
values. And in this respect our formula should enjoy the same merit. And lastly, our 
difficulty in conclusively determining the exact values presupposes realism, i.e., the view 
that there is a fact of the matter regarding the above three variables, and that our mission 
is to discover these facts. Yet there seems to be nothing to prevent the possibility that there 
are no such facts at all (at least as far as the semantic function and the criteria of identity 
are concerned. Such antirealism is less likely to apply to the third variable – the properties 
of the actual referent – in relation to which realistic intuitions are rather strong). Under 
such antirealist assumptions the search for the values of these variables would be plainly 
absurd. As antirealism has it, we do not discover whatever it is that we are antirealist about; 
rather, we stipulate it. But if indeed such antirealisms hold, then applying the formula 
becomes a rather straightforward act; all one needs to do is input the stipulated values 
and get the resulting intension immediately.  
So it now seems that even if we knew beyond any doubt the exact values of the 
three variables, it would still be highly beneficial to deliberately assume a “veil of 
ignorance” and to consider the hypothetical values of each variable in order to find the 
general formula. Encouraged by these revelations about the importance of a general 
formula, we enthusiastically undertake the task.  
The main values that we considered are the following: (a) the values of the 
semantic function: either descriptive or nondescriptive; (b) the values of the actual 
referent (corresponding to our apparent P+M actual referent of “T”): P+M, or Q+M, or 
P+N, or Q+N;60 and (c) the values of the criteria of identity: either material or manifest.  
(We are aware that there are possibilities not covered by the ones mentioned – at 
least as far as the (properties of) the actual referent and the criteria of identity are 
concerned. For the sake of simplicity however, we shall construct our formula by first 
considering these options. After arriving at the principal formula, it shouldn’t be too 
difficult to extend it to include other options as well.)  
Apparently the logical space of possibilities here amounts to two (possibilities of 
the semantic function) times four (possibilities of the actual referent) times two 
(possibilities of the criteria of identity), which is sixteen. Fortunately, the options are 
considerably less than that. This is due to the fact that if the semantic function of “T” is 
descriptive, the values of the other variables play no part in fixing the intension. “T” will 
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simply designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, that which fits “T”’s 
descriptive content (allegedly, ‘being an M’) in that world – regardless of the criteria of 
identity, or the nature of the actual referent. Thus all eight combinations linked with a 
descriptive semantic function for “T” merge into one.  
Overall then, we end up with the following nine possible combinations:  
 Semantic 
function 
The actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
1 Descriptive (Whatever) (Whatever)      
2 Material        
3 
P+M 
Manifest        
4 Material        
5 
Q+M 
Manifest        
6 Material        
7 
P+N 
Manifest        
8 Material        
9 
Nondescriptive 
Q+N 
Manifest        
Table 1.4 
All we need to do now is to calculate the intension of “T”, i.e., “T”’s reference 
with respect to the different counterfactual worlds, for each of the nine rows. This is a 
fairly easy task, which we can quickly perform. 
In Row 1, “T” is descriptive and is linked with the descriptive content ‘have the 
(manifest) property M’; “T” thus designates, with respect to each type of counterfactual 
worlds, that which M’s (i.e., that which has the property M) in that type of world. Hence, 
the intension of “T” in that case is:  
 Semantic 
function 
The actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)  + + - - 
Table 1.5 
In all subsequent cases, “T” is nondescriptive, and therefore designates, with 
respect to every counterfactual world, that which it designates in the actual world. So in 
order to determine the reference of “T” in the given types of worlds, we need to 
determine first what is the nature of the actual referent of “T”. We can do that on the 
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basis of the other two variables: the criterion of identity, and the (properties of) the 
actual referent. Let us demonstrate this.  
In Row 2, “T” designates in the actual world stuff that is P+M (as we actually 
believe to be the case), and the criterion of identity is material, i.e., the world is inhabited, 
among other things, by things like P’s and Q’s, some of which happen to have manifest 
properties like M and N. Hence our actual referent is such a P that happens to have the 
manifest property M. So in this case, “T” designates, with respect to every counterfactual 
world, that which is P in that world. The intension is thus:  
 Semantic 
function 
Actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
2 Nondescriptive  P+M Material  + - + - 
Table 1.6 
Row 3 is like Row 2, only that now we have a manifest criterion of identity. So in 
that case, the same actual referent, P+M, is in fact an M that merely happens to have the 
material constitution P. In this case, “T” designates, with respect to every counterfactual 
world, that which is M in that world. The intension of “T” is therefore:  
 Semantic 
function 
Actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
3 Nondescriptive  P+M Manifest  + + - - 
Table 1.7 
In Rows 4 and 5, the actual referent is not P+M but rather Q+M. (I.e., in these 
rows we consider the possibility that our actual referent has different properties than we 
believe it to have.) Now if the criterion of identity is material, then the referent, Q+M, is 
primarily a Q that merely happens to have the manifest property M. So “T” will 
designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, that which Q’s (i.e., has the 
property Q) in that world. If, however, the criterion of identity is manifest, this actual 
referent is an M, and “T” will designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, that 
which M’s in that world:  
 Semantic 
function 
Actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
4 Material  - + -  + 
5 
Nondescriptive  Q+M 
Manifest  + + -  - 
Table 1.8 
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Similar considerations will determine the intension for the remaining four rows.  
Overall, we end up with the complete Table 1.9, which lists “T”’s intension 
relative to each combination of values of our three variables:  
 Semantic 
function 
The actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)  + + - - 
2 Material  + - + - 
3 
P+M 
Manifest   + + - - 
4 Material  - + - + 
5 
Q+M 
Manifest  + + - - 
6 Material  +  - + - 
7 
P+N 
Manifest  - -  + + 
8 Material  - + - + 
9 
Nondescriptive  
Q+N 
Manifest  - -  + + 
Table 1.9 
And so we’re done. Mission complete. (Well, at least an outline of our task is 
complete. For our account to be truly complete we would still need to include more 
possible options for each variable.)  
 One last comment is that although the values of the three variables determine the 
intension of a term, the converse does not hold; i.e., we cannot determine the values of 
the variables on the basis of some given intension. This is due to the fact that each type 
of intension recurs more than once in the table. In particular, our formula contains four 
different types of intensions, that we can call a, b, c and d:  
 Semantic 
function 
The actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1     
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N 
W4
Q+N 
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)  + + - - a
2 Material  + - + - b
3 
P+M 
Manifest   + + - - a
4 Material  - + - + c
5 
Q+M 
Manifest  + + - - a
6 Material  +  - + - b
7 
P+N 
Manifest  - -  + + d
8 Material  - + - + c
9 
Nondescriptive  
Q+N 
Manifest  - -  + + d
Table 1.10 
41 
 
Thus if we are told, for instance, that the intension of “M” is such that it 
designates the stuffs on W1 and W2, this fits Rows 1, 3 and 5, and hence this 
information alone underdetermines which of the three rows represents the true facts. In 
other words, it may be that “M” is descriptive; alternatively, it may be that “M” is 
nondescriptive and that the actual referent is P+M and the criterion of identity is 
manifest; but it may also be that “M” is still nondescriptive and the criterion of identity is 
still manifest, yet the actual referent is Q+M.  
Let us summarise. We were looking for the intension of “T”, i.e., the reference of 
“T” with respect to different counterfactual worlds, or simply, what would deserve to be 
called “T”. We have found the three factors upon which intensions depend. We have 
further considered possible values for each of these variables. We have listed the 
different possible combination of these values. Finally, we have calculated the resulting 
intension for each combination. Thus, using the corresponding values with regard to the 
term “T”, our Martian colleagues can now determine the intension of “T”. In fact, they 
can do more than that. By reinterpreting “P”, “M”, “Q” and “N”, our hosts are now in a 
position to determine the intension of any term, since the intensions given in Table 1.9 
remain fixed. Finally, they can also appreciate the common general rule underlying all 
such intensions.  
And, frankly, so can we.   
 
1.3 Rigidity 
We can now use our newly devised formula to gain some important insights about 
rigidity. 
 
1.3.1 Rigid/nonrigid  vs.  rigidified/non-rigidified  
A rigid term is defined as a term that designates the same referent in all counterfactual 
worlds, and nothing but that referent.61 A nondescriptive term was defined above as a 
term that is designed to designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, the same 
referent that it designates in the actual world. Thus it follows that a nondescriptive term 
is by definition a rigid term. A descriptive term, by contrast, carries no such entailment: 
recall that a descriptive term was defined as a term that is linked with a descriptive 
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content, and that designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, that which fits 
its descriptive content in that world. Thus, a descriptive term might be nonrigid – e.g., 
“the fourth planet from the sun” designates Mars in the actual world, Venus in another 
counterfactual world, etc. Yet a descriptive term might also be rigid – e.g., “the sum of 
2+2” designates 4 in every counterfactual world, and nothing else; likewise, “stuff with 
atomic number 79” (arguably) designates gold in every counterfactual world and nothing 
else.  
Thus, whereas a nondescriptive term is rigidified by the very semantic function 
that is attached to it, a descriptive term (which may or may not be rigid) is not thus 
rigidified. In Kripke’s terms, the difference between the two kinds of rigidity is that a 
nondescriptive term is rigid de jure, i.e., by stipulating a rule, whereas a descriptive terms is 
rigid, when it is rigid, de facto, i.e., as it happens in practice (without stipulation).62  
It follows that the distinction between rigid and nonrigid is not equivalent to the 
distinction between rigidified and not rigidified: while all rigidified terms are rigid, some 
non-rigidified (i.e., descriptive) terms are rigid and some are not. It is the distinction 
between rigidified and non-rigidified – rather than between rigid and nonrigid – which is 
the more important from a semantic point of view. The following quote from Kaplan 
expresses this idea.  
For me, the intuitive idea is not that of an expression which turns out to designate the 
same object in all possible circumstances [i.e., a rigid descriptive term], but an 
expression whose semantical rules provide directly that the referent in all possible 
circumstances is fixed to be the actual referent [i.e., a rigid nondescriptive term].63 
Nondescriptive terms are thus rigidified terms. Descriptive terms are not 
rigidified: they may turn out rigid or not rigid. We can thus replace the title 
“nondescriptive” with “rigidified”. This should be welcomed as some types of 
“nondescriptive” terms, as we shall see in Chapter 2, have nonetheless some descriptive 
element to them, and hence the term “nondescriptive” is somewhat misleading. Thus, we 
shall henceforth use “descriptive” vs. “rigidified” (rather than “nondescriptive”) to 
express the two types of semantic functions with which we were concerned so far.  
 
1.3.2 Rigidity and Metaphysics  
Thus all rigidified terms are rigid, whereas only some of the descriptive terms are rigid. 
However, what is it that makes a descriptive term rigid?  
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A rigid term is one that designates the same referent in all counterfactual worlds, 
and only that referent. Our intensions formula enables us to determine the referent of a 
term with respect to each counterfactual world; but in order to determine rigidity, we 
must also know whether these referents are identical or not. For instance, the formula 
entails that the intension of “T” when “T” is descriptive (and has the descriptive content 
‘being M’) is as follows:  
 Semantic 
function 
Actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity  
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)   + + - - 
Table 1.11 
I.e., the referents of a descriptive “T” across counterfactual worlds are P+M and Q+M. 
Yet in order to determine whether “T” is rigid or not, we have to further establish 
whether these referents, namely, P+M and Q+M, are identical or not.  
Now this depends on the criteria of identity (which is our metaphysical factor). 
The dependence works as follows: if the criteria of identity are material, i.e., two stuffs 
are the same iff they share the same material constitution, then the two stuffs P+M and 
Q+M, one being P (that happens to have the manifest property M) and the other being 
Q (that happens to have the same manifest property M) are in effect distinct. If, by 
contrast, the criteria of identity are manifest, i.e., two stuffs are the same iff they share 
the same manifest properties, then the two stuffs P+M and Q+M, being both M, are the 
same (despite having different material constitutions). As a consequence, material criteria 
of identity will entail that a descriptive “T” (with the descriptive content ‘being M’) is 
nonrigid, whereas manifest criteria of identity will entail that such a descriptive “T” is 
rigid; and this is despite the identical intension in both cases: 
 Semantic  
function 
Actual 
referent 
Criteria of 
identity  
W1  
P+M
W2 
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4 
Q+N 
Rigidity
1a (Whatever)  Material  + + - - Nonrigid 
1b 
Descriptive  
(Whatever)  Manifest  + + - - Rigid  
Table 1.12 
It turns out that the same term, with the same descriptive semantic function, may 
be rigid or nonrigid, depending on the criteria of identity, which is a metaphysical issue. 
Rigidity in general is thus not an exclusively semantic concept; it is no less a metaphysical 
concept.64  
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To generalise, what makes a descriptive term like “T” rigid, is that its descriptive 
content – in our case ‘being M’ – is linked with criteria of identity, since such 
metaphysics guarantees that all that fits that descriptive content is the same stuff. 
Whereas when the descriptive content is not so linked, then the term is rendered 
nonrigid, since there are different things that would fit this descriptive content.  
Given that all options in which “T” is rigidified render “T” rigid, it follows that 
there is but a single case in which “T” is rendered nonrigid. This happens only when “T” 
is descriptive and its descriptive content is not linked with criteria of identity. In all other 
cases, “T” comes out rigid (despite the difference in intensions): 
 Semantic  
function 
Actual referent Criteria of 
identity  
W1  
P+M
W2 
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4 
Q+N 
Rigidity
1a (Whatever) Material  + + - - Nonrigid 
1b 
Descriptive  
(Whatever)  Manifest + + - - 
Rigid  
(De facto)
2 Material  + - + - 
3 
P+M 
Manifest   + + - - 
4 Material  - + - + 
5 
Q+M 
Manifest  + + - - 
6 Material  +  - + - 
7 
P+N 
Manifest  - -  + + 
8 Material  - + - + 
9 
Rigidified  
Q+N 
Manifest  - -  + + 
Rigid  
(De jure) 
Table 1.13 
One important fact that Table 1.13 highlights is that the mere rigidity of a 
rigidified term is independent of criteria of identity, i.e., a rigidified rigid term is 
compatible with quite different criteria of identity. Hence, the mere rigidity of a rigidified 
term entails no specific criteria of identity. However, the mere rigidity of a rigidified term 
does entail that there are some criteria of identity.65  
Consequently, the mere rigidity of a rigidified term “T” entails no particular 
intension. A rigidified “T” is designed to designate the same referent in all counterfactual 
worlds. Being the same is determined by criteria of identity. Thus, different criteria of 
identity will result in different intensions of a rigidified term. So the fact that a certain 
term “T” is rigid is compatible with various, quite distinct, intensions that this term may 
have. 
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To summarise, the only nonrigid terms are descriptive terms whose descriptive content is 
not linked with criteria of identity. All other terms, namely, all rigidified terms, and all 
descriptive terms whose descriptive content is linked with criteria of identity, are rigid. 
Rigidified terms are rigid de jure, i.e., their rigidity follows from their semantic function, 
while descriptive terms, when rigid, are rigid de facto, i.e., it merely turns out that they are 
rigid. It follows that the rigid/nonrigid distinction and the rigidified/non-rigidified 
distinction are not identical: whereas all rigidified terms are rigid, not all rigid terms are 
rigidified: some rigid terms are not-rigidified, i.e., they are merely de facto rigid.  
Finally, one way to compare descriptive and rigidified terms is the following. As 
far as rigidified terms are concerned, their rigidity is guaranteed, regardless of criteria of 
identity or the actual referent. However, their intension is determined by the latter two, 
i.e., the mere rigidity of a rigidified term does not determine a specific intension, as that 
can only be determined by the criteria of identity and the actual referent. By contrast, 
when it comes to descriptive terms, their intension is determined irrespective of the 
metaphysical criteria of identity or the actual referent, yet their rigidity is dependent on 
the metaphysical criteria of identity. This is clearly demonstrated in Table 1.13.  
 
1.4 Applying the Intensions Calculator to the Initial Three Cases  
We return now to the initial three cases that were presented at the outset: the water case, 
the clay statue case, and the inventor of the Calculus case. Having developed our 
intensions formula, and the consequent account of rigidity, we can now apply those to 
the three cases.  
 
1.4.1 The “water” case revisited  
The generality of our intensions formula is generated due to the ability to reinterpret the 
letters in the formula. One such reinterpretation is the following: “T” stands for “water”; 
“P” for “H2O”; “M” for “watery”; “Q” for “XYZ”; and “N” for “non-watery”. Such 
reinterpretation generates a calculator for the intensions of “water”. This calculator 
shows that the intension of “water” (like the original “T”) has many more possibilities 
than those considered in the traditional debate over the semantics of “water” (as was 
detailed in Table 1.1): 
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 Semantic  
function 
Actual 
referent 
Criteria 
of 
identity  
W1   i
H2O+W
W2 
XYZ+W
W3
H2O+¬W
W4
XYZ+¬W 
Rig dity
1a (Whatever) Material  + + - - Nonrigid 
1b 
Descriptive  
(Whatever)  Manifest + + - - 
Rigid  
(De facto)
2 Material  + - + - 
3 
H2O+W 
Manifest  + + - - 
4 Material  - + - + 
5 
XYZ+W 
Manifest + + - - 
6 Material  +  - + - 
7 
H2O+¬W 
Manifest - -  + + 
8 Material  - + - + 
9 
Rigidified  
XYZ+¬W 
Manifest - -  + + 
Rigid  
(De jure) 
Table 1.14 
We will use the above calculator of the intensions of “water” to reject two 
common New-Theorist claims.  
The first New Theorist claim is that since “water” is rigid (or, more precisely, as 
we now understand, rigidified), i.e., since “water” designates in all counterfactual worlds 
that which it designates in the actual world, it follows that it designates H2O in all 
counterfactual worlds.66 Another New Theorist claim is that on the Frege-Russell view, 
since “water” designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, that which is watery, 
the term is thereby nonrigid on that view, i.e., “water” designates different stuffs in 
different counterfactual worlds. Both these claims need not be true, as they are based on 
unfounded metaphysical speculations. Let me explain.  
Consider the first claim; that if “water” is rigidified, then it designates H2O in 
every counterfactual world. This, indeed, is true when the criterion of identity of the 
actual referent of “water”, i.e., the watery H2O stuff, is material (Row 2 in Table 1.14). 
But what if the criterion of identity is not material but rather manifest? Namely, what if 
some stuff is identical to the watery H2O iff it is watery, i.e., if and only if it has the same 
manifest property (just as Burke would hold that David remains the same as long as it 
maintains its shape)?67 As the Martian case-study shows, in principle there is nothing in 
our knowledge – a priori or a posteriori (i.e., the way the world looks and behaves) – to rule 
out manifest criteria of identity. And if the criterion of identity is indeed manifest (Row 
3), then a rigidified “water” designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, that 
which is watery in that world. In fact the intension of a rigidified “water” under manifest 
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criteria of identity (Row 3) turns out identical to the intension of a descriptive “water” 
(Row 1); it designates watery XYZ.  
Thus, the New Theorists’ assumption that a rigidified “water” designates H2O in 
every counterfactual world, whether watery or not (Row 2), need not be true: under 
different metaphysical assumptions, the same rigidified “water” designates watery stuff in 
every counterfactual, whether H2O or not.  
Furthermore, even if the criterion of identity is indeed material, a rigidified 
“water” need not designate H2O in every counterfactual world. It may be that our 
scientists just got things wrong about the actual referent of “water”. As Chalmers 
exemplifies:  
Given that this world is actual, it turns out that ‘water’ refers to H2O, and its Kripkean 
intension [i.e., function from counterfactual (rather than actual) worlds to extensions] 
picks out H2O in all possible [i.e., counterfactual] worlds. But if another world had 
been actual (e.g. Putnam’s Twin Earth world in which XYZ is the clear liquid in the 
oceans), ‘water’ might have referred to something quite different (e.g. XYZ), and it 
might have had an entirely different Kripkean intension (e.g. one that picks out XYZ 
in all worlds). 68 
Thus, despite our scientists’ best judgement, it may be the case that our actual 
watery stuff is not H2O at all, but rather XYZ.69 In that case, a rigidified “water”, under 
material criteria of identity (which Chalmers, like Kripke, takes to be the case, with no 
absolute justification70), will designate XYZ in every counterfactual world, just like Row 4 
in Table 1.14 shows.  
It should be noted however, that Kripke formulates his claim in a conditional 
manner: if (by which I believe he means ‘if and only if’) “water” actually designates 
watery H2O, then “water” designates (all and only) H2O in every counterfactual world.71 
Thus, with respect to the last point, Kripke seems to be aware of the fact that if “water” 
in fact turns out to designate watery XYZ, then (given material criteria of identity) a 
rigidified “water” designates XYZ in every counterfactual world.  
Finally, the mistake can be on both fronts, i.e., it may be the case that the 
criterion of identity is manifest, and that the watery stuff in the actual world is other than 
what we take it to be, say, it is XYZ. As Row 5 shows, “water” in that case does not 
designate H2O in all counterfactual worlds. (In fact the intension of “water” in that case 
would be the same as that of a descriptive “water”.) 
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(The other four rows in the table relate to cases in which the actual referent is not 
watery. As it is highly unlikely that we should be mistaken here, these rows, although 
correct, are quite irrelevant here.) 
Thus overall, the claim that “water”, if rigidified, designates H2O with respect to 
every counterfactual world is far from being obviously true. As our formula of intensions 
shows, there are many cases in which this is simply not the case.  
The second claim of the New Theory was that on the Frege-Russell view, 
“water” is nonrigid. Specifically, since “water” designates, with respect to every 
counterfactual world, that which is watery, the term designates different stuffs in 
different counterfactual worlds. This, also, need not be true. A descriptive “water” indeed 
designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, that which is watery in that world. 
But how do we determine whether all those watery referents are identical or not? This 
can only be done with the aid of criteria of identity. Suppose that the criteria of identity 
of stuffs are manifest, i.e., that two stuffs are the same if and only if they share the same 
manifest properties. In that case (as Row 1b demonstrates), all the referents of a 
descriptive “water”, by virtue of being watery, are rendered identical. In other words, in 
this case “water” turns out a rigid (albeit de facto) designator. It is only relative to material 
criteria of identity that these referents are distinct. Hence, the New Theorists’ claim for 
the nonrigidity of “water” on the Frege-Russell view need not be true as well.  
 
1.4.2 The statue/lump case revisited  
The statue/lump case taught us that intension is dependent upon metaphysical criteria of 
identity. Specifically, relative to a manifest criterion of identity, “David” designates the 
same statue, whether it is constituted by clay or by bronze, whereas relative to a material 
criterion of identity, “David” designates the same lump of clay, whether it is statue-
shaped or not. Yet, we later understood that this was true only given the following tacit 
assumptions: (i) that “David” is a rigidified term, i.e., that “David” designates in all 
counterfactual worlds that which it designates in the actual world; and (ii) that the actual 
referent indeed has the properties of being constituted by a lump of clay (and not, say, by 
a clay-like plaster), and of being statue-shaped. Again, a complete account of the 
intension of “David” should take all alternatives to these assumptions into consideration. 
In other words, it should consider all possible values of these variables. An application of 
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our intensions-formula to the statue/lump case yields the following possible intensions 
of “David”:  
 Semantic 
function 
The actual 
referent 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1  
Clay 
statue 
W2 
Bronze 
statue 
W3
Clay 
ball 
W4 
Bronze 
ball 
…
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)  + + - -  
2 Material  + - + -  
3 
Clay statue 
Manifest   + + - -  
4 Material  - + - +  
5 
Bronze 
statue Manifest  + + - -  
6 Material  +  - + -  
7 
Clay ball 
Manifest  - -  + +  
8 Material  - + - +  
9 
Rigidified  
Bronze ball 
Manifest  - -  + +  
Table 1.15 
(As in the water case, the above intensions are based on the general formula for 
“T”; they are arrived at by simply inserting the values relevant to the David case into that 
formula). 
The original discussion concentrated merely on the metaphysical aspect, while 
presupposing that the term “David” is rigidified, and that the actual referent was indeed a 
statue-shaped lump of clay. By this, the original discussion considered merely two 
options, namely, those represented by Row 2 - a material criterion of identity, and by 
Row 3 – a manifest criterion of identity. Yet, again, other options are also possible in this 
case. E.g., if “David” is descriptive rather than rigidified term, its intension would be the 
one entailed by Row 1 (which, as it happens, entails the same intension as the one 
implied by Row 3). Also, if the actual referent was not a clay statue, but rather, say, a 
bronze statue, the intension would change as well. In other words, in order to determine 
the intension of “David”, in addition to considering the metaphysical issue, there is also a 
semantic issue to be considered, namely, whether “David” is a descriptive term or not, as 
well as actuality issues, namely, whether the properties of our actual object are really 
being a statue and being constituted by a lump of clay. These factors will also affect the 
intension.  
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1.4.3  “The actual inventor of the Calculus” case revisited  
Finally, the case of the actual inventor of the Calculus taught us that intension is 
dependent upon the actual referent of the term. Specifically, this case revealed that it 
makes a difference to the designation of “the actual inventor of the Calculus” in 
counterfactual worlds whether the actual referent was Newton or Leibniz. Yet we later 
appreciated that the intensions determined in that discussion were true only relative to 
two other crucial variables, namely, (i) that the semantic function of the actualised 
description “the actual inventor of the Calculus” is to designate, with respect to every 
counterfactual worlds, the individual who is the inventor in the actual world (and hence that 
the term is a rigidified one); and (ii) that the criterion of identity for people is not 
problematic. However, again, these need not be true.  
Firstly, in the original case, we were told that the term was “the actual inventor of 
the Calculus”. So we knew it was a rigidified term. However, the situation could be 
slightly modified in a way that would conceal this fact. Suppose, for instance, that we just 
heard someone referring to Newton in a foreign language using an expression Φ. Now 
this expression may be a rigidified one (like, “the actual inventor of the Calculus”, or, 
arguably, like “Newton”), or not rigidified – i.e., it may be descriptive (e.g., an 
abbreviation of the non-actualised description “the inventor of the Calculus”). This, we 
know well by now, may affect the intensions. In particular, with respect to Table 1.16, a 
descriptive Φ with the descriptive content “the inventor of the Calculus”, will designate 
Newton in counterfactual world W1, yet it will designate Leibniz in counterfactual W2, 
(regardless of criteria of identity, and, indeed, of the actual referent) – as specified in Row 
1. The intension of a rigidified Φ, by contrast, will be as specified in Rows 2 and 3.  
 Semantic 
function 
The actual 
inventor of the 
Calculus  
W1 
the inventor of the 
Calculus is 
Newton 
W2 
The inventor of 
the Calculus is 
Leibniz 
… 
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  Newton  Leibniz  … 
2 Newton  Newton Newton Newton
3 
Rigidified  
Leibniz  Leibniz  Leibniz  Leibniz
Table 1.16 
Secondly, the criteria for the identification of Newton and Leibniz in 
counterfactual worlds also play a crucial role in determining the intension of “the actual 
inventor of the Calculus”, i.e., the intension of the term is dependent upon this 
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metaphysical variable. Discussions of personal identity commonly involve thought-
experiments similar to ones like the statue/lump thought experiment, only that the 
shape-aspect is replaced with a psychological aspect. Such “body swapping” or “mind 
swapping” thought experiments date back at least to Locke’s much-discussed scenario:  
… should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s past 
life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul …72 
A similar thing could happen to the “soul”, i.e., the mental features, of the cobbler. And 
it could also happen to the mental features of Newton and Leibniz. Thus, in some 
counterfactual worlds it is possible to transfer mental features from one body to another. 
As a result, on some such “body-snatchers” world, lives, for example, someone with 
Newton’s body, but with someone else’s mental features, say, Leibniz’s. Similarly, on 
some other world lives someone with Leibniz’s body, but now with someone else’s 
mental features, say, Newton’s. So, among the people that we may encounter on 
counterfactual worlds, there are the following four. Newton’s actual mental features in 
Newton’s actual body (BN+MN); Newton’s actual mental features in Leibniz’s body 
(BL+MN); Leibniz’s mental features in Newton’s body (BN+ML); and Leibniz’s mental 
features in Leibniz’s body (BL+ML) (there are, of course, many more types of worlds in 
this respect): 
W1   
BN+MN 
W2
BL+MN 
W3
BN+ML 
W4 
BL+ML
…
Table 1.17 
Now suppose we know for certain that in the actual world it was Newton, i.e., a 
guy with Newton’s mental features and Newton’s body (BN + MN), who invented the 
Calculus. Thus, the term “the actual inventor of the Calculus” designates, with respect to 
every counterfactual world, just that guy, Newton. But now, how should we re-identify 
Newton on counterfactual worlds as described above? Is Newton identical to the guy 
who shares actual Newton’s mental features, but Leibniz’s body (BL+MN), or with the 
guy who shares actual Newton’s body but Leibniz’s mental features (BN+ML), or none? 
The same problem, of course, applies to the case in which the actual inventor was 
Leibniz; is he identical with the first, or second, or none?  
To determine whether a certain individual is Newton or not we need to have the 
criteria of identity of Newton, and generally, the criteria of identity of people – 
traditionally referred to as criteria of personal identity. Many philosophers advocate some 
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version of the so-called psychological criterion, according to which, roughly, two individuals 
are the same if and only if73 they share the same mental features.74 Others – admittedly 
far fewer - promote some version of the so-called somatic view, according to which two 
individuals are the same if and only if they share the same body75 (or are the same 
animal,76 or something like that).77 Thus, according to the psychological view, Newton is 
identical to the individuals on worlds W1 and W2 and not to the ones on W3 and W4 (in 
Table 1.17 above); whereas according to the somatic view, Newton is identical to the 
individuals on W1 and W3, but not to the ones on W2 and W4. In other words, the 
intensions of “the actual inventor if the Calculus”, in case Newton was the one are: 
Semantic 
function 
The actual 
referent’s 
properties 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1 
BN+MN
W2 
BL+MN
W3 
BN+ML 
W4 
BL+ML
Somatic   + - + - Rigidified Newton 
Psychological  + + - - 
Table 1.18 
On the other hand, Leibniz, according to the psychological view is identical to 
the guys in W3 and W4, who share his mental features, whereas according to the somatic 
view, he is identical to the guys on W2 and W4, who share his body. Thus, the intensions 
of “the actual inventor of the Calculus”, if Leibniz was the one, are:  
Semantic 
function 
The actual 
referent’s 
properties 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1 
BN+MN
W2 
BL+MN
W3 
BN+ML 
W4 
BL+ML
Somatic   - + - + Rigidified Leibniz 
Psychological  - - + + 
Table 1.19 
However, unbeknownst to us, the actual world may have body-snatchers as well. 
Thus, the actual inventor of the Calculus might be one of our four types of individuals, 
namely, a guy with Newton’s bodily and mental features; a guy with Newton’s body but 
with someone else’s mental features (say, Leibniz’s); a guy with Leibniz’s body but with 
someone else’s mental features (say, Newton’s); or a guy with Leibniz’s bodily and mental 
features. Table 1.18 and Table 1.19 specify the intensions of “the actual inventor of the 
Calculus” in case the actual inventor was either the former or latter individual, 
respectively. However, the actual inventor may be one of the other two guys as well. In 
which cases the intensions will change accordingly. Thus, the complete list of intensions 
is:  
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 Semantic 
function 
The actual 
inventor of 
the Calculus 
is 
Criterion of 
identity 
W1 
BN+MN
W2 
BL+MN
W3 
BN+ML 
W4 
BL+ML 
…
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)  + + - -  
2 Somatic    + - + -  
3 
BN+MN 
(Newton) Psychological   + + - -  
4 Somatic    - + - +  
5 
BL+MN 
Psychological  + + - -  
6 Somatic    +  - + -  
7 
BN+ML 
Psychological  - -  + +  
8 Somatic    - + - +  
9 
Rigidified  
BL+ML 
(Leibniz) Psychological  - -  + +  
Table 1.20 
And this, again, is just our general formula adapted to apply to the case of “the 
actual inventor of the Calculus”.  
 
1.5 Discussion: Challenging Kripke’s Essentialism 
Our analysis of intensions, and the subsequent account of rigidity, is at odds with three 
essentialist theses of Kripke’s. In what follows, I shall present arguments against these 
essentialist theses.  
Table 1.13 showed the following links between rigidity and criteria of identity: (a) 
a rigid term designates the same referent in all counterfactual worlds. Being the same is 
dependent upon criteria of identity. Hence rigidity presupposes that there are criteria of 
identity; (b) the rigidity of a rigidified term is independent of any specific criteria of 
identity; a rigidified term is compatible with any coherent criteria of identity. It follows 
that the mere rigidity of a certain term entails no specific criteria of identity. E.g., the 
mere fact that “water” is rigid is compatible with both material criteria of identity, 
according to which the criterion for being identical to water is being constituted by H2O; 
as well as with manifest criteria of identity, according to which the criterion for being 
identical to water is being watery.  
This analysis seems to conflict with three, closely related, theses in Kripke’s 
Naming and Necessity. The three theses are, (i) the intuition thesis: modal properties of a 
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referent can be derived from our modal intuitions. E.g., the intuition that Nixon might 
have lost the election implies that winning the election is a contingent property of Nixon; 
(ii) the necessity of origin thesis: objects have their origin necessarily. E.g., a table is 
necessarily originally made out of the hunk of wood from which it was actually made; 
and (iii) the stipulation thesis: possible worlds are “stipulated” rather than “discovered”; 
such stipulation is not in purely qualitative terms. E.g., we may stipulate a world in which 
Nixon lost the election; not just a world in which a guy with such and such properties lost the 
election. I believe Kripke is ultimately wrong in holding these three theses, although 
there is nonetheless something to say in these theses’ favour. The following sections aim 
to establish this.   
 
1.5.1 Kripke’s intuition thesis  
In accordance with Kripke’s view, we may intuitively stipulate a world in which 
Humphrey, who actually lost the 1968 election, wins. However, we cannot intuitively 
stipulate a world in which Humphrey is a dog. Thus, our intuitions teach us that 
Humphrey is contingently a loser of the election, yet he is necessarily, i.e., essentially, a 
person. In other words, our intuitions teach us that losing the election is not part of the 
criteria of identity of Humphrey, whereas being a person is. Thus in general, we can learn 
about an object’s essential and contingent properties – and thereby about its criteria of 
identity – from our intuitions about counterfactual worlds.78 This is Kripke’s intuition 
claim.  
However, as our Martian story reveals, there may be different intuitions regarding 
criteria of identity, and hence about the modal properties of things; e.g., we took the stuff 
to be necessarily P and only contingently M, yet our Martian colleagues intuit that the 
stuff T is necessarily M, and not necessarily P as we took it to be. Thus, what our 
intuitions teach us is merely what our (inter-)subjective view about criteria of identity is, 
which need not necessarily reflect reality (if there is a fact of the matter here at all). In fact, 
as Della Rocca (2002) ingeniously shows, some of Kripke’s own arguments seem to 
undermine his above intuition thesis. Della Rocca points to Kripke’s discussion of our 
intuitions about some contingent identities. For instance, we have an intuition that in 
1750, instead of finding out that water was H2O we might have found out that water was 
something else, say XYZ. I.e., that there is a counterfactual world in which water is not 
H2O, but rather XYZ, and hence that “water = H2O” states a mere contingent truth. Yet 
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in such a case, says Kripke, our intuitions fail us; the counterfactual world we are talking 
about is not one in which water is XYZ, but rather a world in which something that 
resembles water, i.e., something which is epistemically indistinguishable from water, namely, a 
watery stuff, is XYZ. Thus, it is “the watery stuff is H2O” which is contingent, and not 
“water = H2O”.79 Della Rocca charges as follows: what makes the intuition that 
Humphrey might have won, different from the intuition that water might have been 
XYZ? Why in the water case are we not talking about water but rather about something 
merely similar to water, whereas in the case of Humphrey, we are talking about 
Humphrey, and not about someone merely similar to Humphrey?: 
Perhaps the Humphrey intuition, the intuition that Humphrey might have won, also 
involves a similar understandable mistake. Perhaps it is the case that this intuition, too, 
is really about a person similar to Humphrey, and thus not particularly about 
Humphrey himself. 80  
We may add: a Martian may intuit that a criterion for being identical to 
Humphrey is losing the election, and hence that there is no counterfactual world in 
which Humphrey won the election, since that will not be Humphrey but rather someone 
merely similar to him.81 Likewise, they may intuit that water might have been XYZ; i.e., 
that there is a counterfactual world in which that same thing, i.e., an essentially watery 
thing, happens to be contingently constituted by XYZ rather than by H2O. We may 
therefore conclude, with Della Rocca, that the mere rigidity of a term together with our 
intuitions cannot determine criteria of identity and essential properties. There is 
something “arbitrary”, even “invidious”,82 in such intuitions. 
 
1.5.2 Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis  
As just pointed out, Kripke claims that some of our modal intuitions fail us. One such 
interesting case applies to the origin of objects. E.g., we may have the intuition that the 
Queen of England might not have been the daughter of George VI, or that this table 
might have been originally made out of ice. These, says Kripke, are false intuitions. The 
reason they are false is to do with the necessity of origin thesis. According to that thesis, 
objects have their origin necessarily, e.g., it is necessary for Kripke to be the product of 
the union of a particular sperm and a particular egg.83 Anyone whose origins are in a 
different gamete cannot be Kripke. Indeed, it seems not only necessary, but also 
sufficient. Anyone originating from this gamete is by that mere fact Kripke; no-one else 
could originate from this gamete. Similarly, it is necessary for a table to be originally 
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made from the hunk of wood from which it was made. Something is this table iff it is a 
table originally made out of that hunk of wood. (Although the table does seem to be 
allowed to undergo gradual part-replacement afterwards.) As in the case of water, we 
have some intuition that the table might have originated from a different hunk of wood, 
or even from ice, but, as we have seen above, Kripke dismisses this intuition as 
misleading: it is not this table that we are contemplating in this case but rather a 
qualitatively similar, i.e., an epistemically indistinguishable, table. Surely Della Rocca’s 
above objection applies to this case as well. However, this particular thesis of the 
necessity of origin came under a different attack much earlier by Salmon in his “How Not 
to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference”.84 Drawing on an argument of 
Chandler’s,85 Salmon raises a Sorites-style counterexample to Kripke’s necessity of origin 
thesis:  
Chandler asks us to consider a bicycle. We can agree with Kripke that that same 
bicycle might not have originally come into existence from entirely different parts. Yet, 
surely, it might have come into existence from the same parts, save for just one spoke, 
which might have been a different one. I.e., there is a counterfactual world W1 in which 
this bicycle came into existence with one different spoke. But the bicycle on W1 might 
have been originally made out of the same parts as it (i.e., the bicycle on W1) was, save 
for another different spoke. i.e., there is a counterfactual world W2 in which the bicycle on 
W1 (which is, arguably, identical to the actual bicycle,) came into existence with another 
different spoke. If we go on like this, we end up with a counterfactual world Wn with a 
bicycle that came into existence from entirely different parts than our actual bicycle in 
W0. Assuming the transitivity of identity, this seems to violate Kripke’s principle of the 
necessity of origin.86  
 
1.5.3 Kripke’s stipulation thesis  
Another closely related issue is the problem of transworld identity,87 and Kripke’s 
stipulation claim about counterfactual worlds.  
On Kripke’s view, we may simply stipulate a counterfactual situation in which 
Nixon lost the 1968 election. This presupposes that the guy in the counterfactual world 
under consideration is identical to actual Nixon. We, so to speak, “build it into” the 
counterfactual world. By contrast, Lewis’s view of modality involves no such 
presuppositions. According to Lewis’s view, rather than talking about a counterfactual 
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world in which Nixon lost the election, we should talk about a counterfactual world in 
which some guy, who is blond etc., lost the election; this requires to further establish 
whether that guy is Nixon or not. These two views represent two different paradigms of 
thinking about counterfactual situations. We can put the difference as follows. On 
Kripke’s view, we may discuss an individual in a counterfactual situation by specifying 
both the individual’s name and its properties.88 On Lewis’s view, by contrast, 
counterfactual worlds ought to be described in purely qualitative terms, i.e., we may only 
discuss individuals in counterfactual situations by specifying their properties, but we may 
not specify their names, unless we also provide criteria of (transworld) identity.89 (This 
view of Lewis should not be confused with his other claims about possible worlds, 
namely his modal realism, and his counterpart theory.90) 
Kripke and Lewis’s views came under mutual attack. As Kripke notes,91 
Lewisians object to his thesis by claiming that before referring to a guy in counterfactual 
situations as “Nixon”, one needs first to establish that that guy is indeed Nixon, i.e., one 
needs to know Nixon’s criteria of (transworld) identity. Kripke, in turn, charges that 
Lewis’s view involves a misguided conception of counterfactual worlds, which treats 
such worlds as if they were “distant planets” at which we look through a telescope.  
But what is entailed in this respect by our own proposed view?  
If we stipulate a counterfactual world in which Nixon lost the election, as Kripke 
does, we thereby speculate that winning the election is contingent to Nixon, and thus 
that winning the election is not part of Nixon’s criteria of identity.92 Similarly, holding it 
impossible that Nixon might not have been a person, as Kripke does, speculates that 
being a person is essential to Nixon. (Recall that the intuition that there is such a 
possibility is, for Kripke, a false intuition, which in fact involves someone who is merely 
qualitatively identical to, yet ultimately distinct from, Nixon.) However, as we have just 
seen above, such speculations are ultimately unfounded. There is nothing to prevent, in 
principle, the converse claim from being true, namely, that winning the election is part of 
Nixon’s criteria of identity, and that it is not part of his criteria of identity that he is a 
person. It is perfectly compatible both with our a priori knowledge, as well as with our a 
posteriori knowledge about the way the world looks and behaves. Thus, relative to strict 
metaphysical standards, our stipulations of counterfactual worlds ought not to involve 
both an object’s name and the object’s properties. E.g., we ought not to stipulate a 
counterfactual world in which Nixon lost the election. However, stipulations which 
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involve only names make no such metaphysical speculations about modal properties or 
about criteria of identity. Nor do stipulations that involve only properties. For instance, 
no such metaphysical speculations are involved in simply talking about Nixon in some 
counterfactual situation while mentioning no properties, or in talking about a blond guy 
losing the election in some counterfactual situation, without mentioning his name. As 
such, these latter two types of stipulations are perfectly valid, and should not be 
prohibited.  
Hence, if we wish to avoid making metaphysical speculations about modal 
properties in general, and about criteria of identity in particular, our view prescribes as 
follows. We may discuss objects in counterfactual worlds in purely qualitative terms, i.e., 
without specifying their names. We may also discuss objects in counterfactual worlds 
whilst only specifying their names, i.e., without specifying their properties or criteria of 
identity (contrary to Lewis). What we should refrain from if we wish to avoid 
metaphysical speculations, is discussing objects in counterfactual worlds whilst specifying 
both their names and their properties (contrary to what Kripke in fact does).  
We can now use these observations to address the mutual objections of the two 
views, starting with the Lewisians’ objection to Kripke’s view, and proceeding to Kripke’s 
objection to Lewis’s view.  
Adherents of Lewis’s notion of modality object to Kripke’s talk about Nixon in 
counterfactual situations on the grounds that in order to talk about Nixon in a 
counterfactual situation we first need to be able to identify Nixon in such a world, i.e., we 
need to know Nixon’s criteria of (transworld) identity. This criticism, I believe, is based 
on a confusion. Indeed, talk about Nixon in counterfactual situations presupposes some 
criteria of transworld identity for Nixon; yet it does not involve any such specific criteria of 
identity. When we talk about Nixon in a counterfactual situation, we talk about the guy 
who meets the criteria for being identical to Nixon, whatever these criteria may be. We need 
not know these criteria in order to say that. This, in fact, is one of the great advantages of 
using rigidified terms like “Nixon”; they allow us to talk about things before we have 
fully determined their criteria of identity (see Section  4.1 for discussion). We may talk 
freely about water before 1750, or about the clay statue David, and we may even ask 
whether they might or might not have such and such properties; by using “water”, 
“David”, as well as “Nixon”, we still talk about water, David and Nixon in those 
counterfactual situations. As Kripke rightly notes: 
59 
 
Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its 
properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it 
might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don’t have to 
identify it after seeing it through a telescope.93 
However, pace Kripke, the thing we are not entitled to is make assertions about these 
counterfactual situations in a way that involves both names and properties, e.g., that water 
might have been constituted by XYZ (or, alternatively, be non-watery); or that David 
might have been smashed into a ball (or, alternatively, come into existence from another 
piece of matter), or that Nixon might have lost the election (or might not have been an 
automaton). These assertions involve speculative, and hence ultimately illegitimate, 
presuppositions about these objects’ criteria of identity. Thus Kripke’s mere talk about 
Nixon in counterfactual situations is vindicated, although his talk about Nixon’s losing 
the election in counterfactual situations is not.  
Kripke’s objection to Lewis’s view is based on the claim that this picture treats 
counterfactual worlds as “foreign countries”, which we observe through a “telescope”.94 
Through this telescope, indeed, we can only describe the counterfactual world in purely 
qualitative terms: we can see a guy losing the election, but we cannot see that the guy is 
Nixon. It’s not part of what one can observe. And this picture, Kripke says, is misguided: 
Intuitively speaking, it seems to me not to be the right way of thinking about possible 
worlds. A possible world isn’t a distant country that we are coming across, or viewing 
through a telescope. Generally speaking, a possible world is too far away. Even if we 
travelled faster than light, we won’t get to it.95  
I believe we should agree with Kripke that the “foreign country” way of thinking 
about counterfactual situations is misguided. If only for the problem of the epistemic 
access to spatiotemporally distinct worlds, raised in the above quotation.96 However, I 
also believe that Kripke is not right to identify Lewis’s qualitative way of thinking with 
this “foreign country” way of thinking. We may accept Kripke’s contention that 
counterfactual worlds should be stipulated rather than discovered, and yet maintain that 
one way of making such stipulations is by means of purely qualitative descriptions.97 So 
the debate is not between stipulative vs. “foreign country” models, but rather between 
different ways of stipulating counterfactual worlds. Specifically, one way of stipulating 
counterfactual worlds would be purely qualitative; another way would be purely with 
names; and yet another involves both. As we have seen, the first and second ways are 
legitimate; the latter, strictly speaking, is not.  
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To recap, Lewis’s view is right to suggest that counterfactual worlds may be 
introduced in purely qualitative terms. It is nonetheless wrong to ban altogether talk of 
counterfactual worlds that involves names. Kripke is right to suggest that discussion of 
counterfactual worlds may involve names. He is wrong to suggest that such discussions 
may in addition involve properties. He is also wrong to claim that a purely qualitative 
description of counterfactual worlds is misguided.  
Finally, I would like to suggest some sense in which there is nevertheless some 
legitimacy, although not in a strict philosophical sense, to stipulate counterfactual worlds 
that involve objects with both names and specific properties (as Kripke suggests), despite 
the unfounded speculations about modal properties that such stipulation is bound to 
involve. In other words, I believe that Kripke is onto something when he insists that one 
can simply stipulate that “Nixon might have lost the election”, without having to go into 
issues of criteria of identity. An analogy might help to make my point here. One may ask 
whether a certain war is morally just. This is a perfectly legitimate question. However, a 
no less legitimate question is whether wars exist at all, i.e., whether wars are a genuine 
part of the fabric of the world, as opposed to, say, an abstract construct that we merely 
project onto collections of some empirical facts. This latter question is simply on a more 
fundamental level of philosophical doubt. Surely, in order to answer whether wars are 
just or not, one need not necessarily prove first that wars exist; in the context of the 
question of moral justification, it seems legitimate to simply presuppose the existence of 
wars. Every discussion has to start somewhere, and thereby make some assumptions. 
However, the fact that in the context of the moral question one need not provide a proof 
for the existence of wars does not entail that the existence of wars cannot be 
independently questioned on another level.  
Something similar, I believe, applies to discussion of counterfactuals. For some 
purposes, it makes perfect sense to discuss objects in counterfactual worlds by specifying 
both their properties and their names, e.g., a world in which Nixon lost the election, and 
not just some guy with such and such properties, who lost the election. However, this 
does not in itself rule out questions about cross-world identities and modal properties on 
another level. The latter questions are simply on a more fundamental level of discussion 
in the sense that we make fewer assumptions. E.g., we do not simply assume that the guy 
who lost the election is Nixon, i.e., that Nixon’s victory is contingent to him. On that 
level of doubt we simply raise the question whether Nixon might have lost or not.  
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Endnotes  
                                                 
 
1 We shall refrain in this dissertation from addressing the question of the existential status of 
counterfactual worlds, i.e., whether possible worlds are like other universes, spatiotemporally 
separated from one another (Lewis, 1986), or whether possible worlds are (maximal, i.e. complete) 
possible states of affairs, or, “ways the world might have been” (Plantinga, 1974). In other words, 
we shall not take sides in the modal realism vs. modal fictionalism debate.  
2 To address two-dimensionalist worries that might arise at this early stage, the possible worlds 
we discuss here are possible worlds considered as counterfactual; not as actual. In Jackson’s 
terminology, we discuss here the C-extensions and C-intensions, not A-extensions and A-
intensions (1998a, pp. 48-52); in Chalmers’s terminology, we discuss here secondary intensions 
and not primary intensions (1996, p.57). See Section  1.1.3 for discussion.  
3 Putnam (1975) 
4 The example is based on Steward (1990). In her discussion, the pink solid H2O has a different 
proton from the watery H2O. The purpose of this qualification is apparently to address worries 
of supervenience. The worry is that physicalism requires that the manifest supervenes upon the 
physical and hence that no change in the manifest is possible without a change in the physical. 
Non-watery H2O entails a change – although a modal one – in the manifest (from watery to non-
watery) without a change in the physical (both are H2O). Thus the proton difference guarantees 
that physicalism is not violated, while keeping both stuffs being H2O. However, I believe that as 
we are considering a counterfactual world, this qualification is not necessary in our case; it is 
commonly accepted that, for example, there might have been immaterial souls etc., but there actually 
aren’t. (However, as the possible world that Steward is considering is explicitly an epistemic one, 
“in the sense that, for all we know it could be the actual world” (p. 389, my italics), it does make 
sense to suppose that such a world should indeed conform to supervenience conditions, even if a 
metaphysically possible world, i.e., a counterfactual world, need not. For a discussion of this 
distinction see Section  1.1.3.) 
5 Frege (1892) 
6 Russell (1905) 
7 Overall, Kripke (1972/1980) takes the two views to be in essence the same. Although in one 
footnote he does acknowledge some difference between the two views (1980, p.27, n.4). For a 
discussion of the differences between the two views see Bach (online essay, 
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/FregeRus.html). See also Endnotes 13 and 14 in Chapter 2.  
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8 Throughout this dissertation, I shall be using “refer” and “designate” entirely interchangeably. 
Specifically, I take the designatum/reference to always be an object(s)/stuff, and never a 
property. 
9 Although Frege and Russell were more concerned with proper names like “Aristotle” than with 
natural-kind terms like “water”, Kripke thought it was natural to extend their descriptive view to 
natural-kind terms. See Section  2.2.4. 
10 By naming this theory of reference “descriptive”, we diverge from various other uses of this 
title, which apply the term to views that take singular terms to be abbreviation of rigidified definite 
descriptions, e.g., widescopism (Dummett, 1973) or actualised descriptivism (Plantinga 1985, 
pp.82-87). These views will be expounded in detail in Chapter 2. In fact such views, according to 
the definitions provided here, are closer to the view described in the next paragraph.  
11 Along with Kripke (1971; 1972/1980), Barcan-Marcus (1961), Putnam (1975), and Kaplan 
(1977/1989) advanced a similar view.  
12 We can avoid for the time being the question of whether terms like “water” on Kripke’s view 
are Millian, i.e., directly-referring, or rigidified description (this issue will be addressed in Chapter 
2). The above description of Kripke’s view is shared by both views, and at any rate, it is this 
shared aspect that seems to be the important one for him.  
13 There is some controversy over whether singular terms designate their actual referent in worlds 
in which that referent does not exist (a view favoured, for instance, by Plantinga (1985, p. 84)), or 
not. (Following a suggestion made by Salmon (1981, p. 34), Kaplan (1989, p. 571) calls a term of 
the latter kind obstinately rigid designator, while Kripke calls it strong rigid designator). Kripke (1980, 
p.21, n.21) himself seems to be reluctant to commit to either view, and leaves the matter 
unsettled. I tend to side with Brock (2004, p. 285 n.13) on this matter, in thinking that nothing 
too important bears on this. At the least, I believe this matter to be of little concern to our 
present interests, and hence will ignore this sensitivity here.  
14 Apparently, cross-world identity is problematic as it seems to be committed to modally 
extended individuals. For that reason, some regard the cross-world relation a counterpart relation 
rather than an identity relation (Notably, Lewis, 1971. More recent versions can be found in 
Stalnaker (1986); Sider (1996, 1999); and Forbes (1985; chs. 3 and 7)). In this dissertation, I shall 
ignore this sensitivity.  
15 In his discussion, Kripke does not consider non-watery H2O.  
16 Admittedly, not the best choice of title, since this category includes rigidified descriptions too 
(to be explained in detail in Chapter 2). Salmon (1981) uses nondescriptional, but acknowledges that 
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such nondescriptional terms need not lack any descriptive content: While discussing terms that he 
takes to be nondescriptional, like proper names and indexical singular terms, he notes: 
The theory that … these singular terms are entirely nondescriptional, should not be 
understood as involving the thesis that no descriptional concepts or properties, other than 
haecceities, are ever semantically associated with names or indexicals. (p. 31) 
An alternative title for such nondescriptive terms in the literature is de jure rigid terms 
(Kripke 1972/1980, p. 21 n. 21). E.g., Sidelle (1992) draws a distinction between de jure rigid 
terms that refer in other worlds “through identity” – this corresponds to our nondescriptive terms – 
and terms that refer in other worlds “through sense” – this corresponds to our descriptive terms. 
However, since this title requires quite a bit of explanation, I will spare it for a later stage (Section 
 1.3.1). For want of a better title at this stage, we shall stick to “nondescriptive” for a while.  
17 The way to accommodate such worlds would be to replace the +/- signs in the table, that 
apply to the whole world, with a specification of what is designated by “water” in that world.  
18 Rea (1997). For some good surveys of the problems, as well as analyses of the relations 
between them, see Geach (1962); Wiggins (1967); Lowe (1989); Rea (1997); and Noonan (2006) 
19 I use “David” rather than the commonly used “Goliath” in this context – following Gibbard’s 
(1975) famous thought experiment – in order to distinguish our example from Gibbard’s. The 
main difference is that in Gibbard, “Goliath” names only the statue, while “Lumpl” names only 
the lump of clay; in our discussion, by contrast, “David” names that thing, whatever it is, that has 
a statue-shape and a clay material constitution.  
20 The extension is based on the notorious puzzle of The Ship of Theseus (See Plutarch, Life of 
Theseus) – the wooden-planked ship that was maintained by replacing the worn planks with new 
ones until it underwent a complete part replacement. Hobbes’s (1839) version of the original 
puzzle adds the reassembling of the discarded planks to form another ship, so that we end up 
with two ships.  
21 E.g., Chisholm (1976) 
22 It is assumed throughout this dissertation that identity relations require criteria of identity. 
Sometimes philosophers say that there may be facts about identity without there being criteria of 
identity. E.g., those who believe in bare particulars may claim that the clay statue, and, say, the clay 
ball, are identical in virtue of sharing the same bare particular, regardless of any properties that 
they may happen to have. I believe that this view may be easily paraphrased in terms of criteria of 
identity: “the criterion for being identical to A is having the same bare particular as A.” 
23 “Criteria of identity” is sometimes used as an epistemic notion – i.e., the criteria for recognising 
whether two entities are identical or not – and sometimes as a metaphysical notion – i.e., as 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of an identity statement (Mackie, P., 2006). It is 
the latter sense that we shall be concerned with in this dissertation.  
24 The relation between sortals and criteria of identity is discussed in Chapter 3. For the time 
being, we can use the intuitive relation given here.  
25 Burke (1994/1997, p. 252) 
26 Burke (1994/1977, p. 253) 
27 Note, however, that this view does not violate Kripke’s thesis of the essentiality of origin, 
according to which an object has its (material) origin necessarily (whether that thesis is true or 
not). All it allows is that David undergoes a part replacement; not that it is originally made of 
different parts. (Kripke’s thesis is discussed in Section  1.5.2.)  
28 Note that this criterion of identity need not be in conflict with supervenience. For the mere 
fact (if it is a fact) that the manifest supervenes upon the material, does not by itself entail that 
the criteria of identity are material; it seems perfectly consistent to assume that the world is 
inhabited by, e.g., animals, that merely happen to have the material constitution they have – i.e., 
some specific collection of molecules – and yet at the same time that these animals supervene 
upon their material constitution. (See Section  3.4 for discussion)  
29 Wiggins (1980)  
30 Wiggins (1980; 2001) 
31 Quine (1961) (see also Endnote 3 in Chapter 3); Della Rocca (2002). Geach (1962) is talking 
about sortal relativity in this context.  
32 Quine (1963b); Lewis (1971; 1986: Ch. 4). This view can be seen as a four-dimensionalist 
version of the sortal-relativity view: there are different ways to unite stages into a whole; different 
descriptions/sortals/intentions will determine different such unities.  
33 Formally, (x=y)≡∀Φ(Φx↔Φy) 
34 Stevenson (1972, pp. 155-158). According to Stevenson’s view, the relation between the clay 
statue and the other two objects is merely that of equivalence, and not of identity, as the latter 
relation must obey Leibniz’s Law.  
35 For a detailed survey of proposed solutions see Rea (1997) 
36 For the sake of simplicity, let us ignore cases of partial change. 
37 Indeed, the modal version faces problems peculiar to trans-world identity which do not apply 
to identity over time – e.g., re-identifying the same lump of clay in a counterfactual world – but we 
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shall ignore this for the time being. We shall however elaborate on the dis-analogy between the 
temporal and the modal in Section  3.2.1.2. 
38 For some classical discussions, see Evans (1977); Stalnaker (1978); Kaplan (1977/1989) 
Jackson (1998a); and Chalmers (2002). 
39 The following is a variation on Evans’s (1977) “Julius” example, where “Julius” is the name of 
whoever invented the zip. Evans called such names descriptive names.  
40 We shall ignore here uses of “actual” in natural language that do not have this semantic 
function. E.g., using “actually” merely to stress something, as in “I actually mean it”.  
41 Some prefer talk about “possible worlds considered as counterfactual” vs. “possible worlds 
considered as actual” (Davies and Humberstone, 1981) rather than about counterfactual worlds vs. 
actual worlds; thereby suggesting that it is the same set of worlds considered differently, and not 
two separate sets of worlds. As our use of “possible worlds” is agnostic with respect to the 
question of realism, talking about “two sets of worlds” amounts to neither two distinct sets of 
worlds, nor to one such set considered in two ways. Therefore, for brevity, we shall stick to the 
latter terminology, interpreted neutrally.  
42 The two types of possibilities are commonly referred to in terms of the conceivable vs. the 
possible, or in terms of epistemic possibilities vs. metaphysical possibilities (e.g., Chalmers, 2002. 
Although Kripke clearly distinguishes epistemic from metaphysical possibilities, it is unclear 
whether his distinction indeed amounts to the one between possibilities of the actual vs. 
possibilities of the counterfactual). Another interpretation is in terms of contexts of utterance vs. 
circumstances of evaluation (Kaplan, 1977/1989). These interpretations of the two sets of worlds are 
quite contentious. However, the distinction between the two sets of worlds stands independently 
of these interpretations, and hence need not be committed to any of them. We shall thus use the 
neutral distinction, without the further epistemic vs. metaphysical load. See also Endnote 47.  
43 Similar conflicting intuitions that Kripke (1972/1980) raises are: that Nixon might have been 
an automaton, but also that he might not have (p. 47); that Queen Elizabeth might have been the 
daughter of someone other than George VI but also that she might not have (p. 112, p. 141); that 
heat might have been distinct from molecular motion, but also that it might not have (p. 140); 
that gold might have been an element with an atomic number other than 79, but also that it 
might not have (p. 140); and, that Hesperus might have been distinct from phosphorus, but also 
that it might not have (p. 141). However, Kripke himself accounts for the difference in terms of 
epistemic possibilities as opposed to metaphysical possibilities. Yet, as noted in Endnote 42, it is far 
from obvious that this distinction and the distinction between actual and counterfactual worlds 
amount to the same thing (pace Chalmers’s strong urge).  
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44 The function from counterfactual worlds to extensions is represented in the table by the 
horizontal rows. Supposing that the “real” actual world is the top left one, this intension is 
represented by the top row. The function from actual worlds to extensions is represented in the 
table by the diagonal.  
45 E.g., Chalmers (2002)  
46 Jackson (1998a)  
47 This last claim appears to conflict with Kripke’s (1972/1980) view, (as well as Chalmers’s 
(2002; 2006) view), according to which possibilities such as that the actual inventor might have 
been Leibniz (or Newton), are (merely) epistemic. We can respond to this as follows. There are 
different ways to understand “epistemically possible” here. One is as what is possible for all we 
know, i.e., for all we know a priori and a posteriori. On this interpretation, the space of possibilities 
diminishes as we make more a posteriori discoveries. Some of what Kripke says seems to support 
this interpretation. E.g., (Kripke, 1972/1980, p. 47) : 
Suppose Nixon actually turned out to be an automaton. That might happen. We might need 
evidence whether Nixon is a human being or an automaton. But that is a question about our 
knowledge. The question whether Nixon might have not been a human being, given that he is 
one, is not a question about knowledge … It’s a question about, even though such and such 
things are the case, what might have been the case otherwise. 
Thus, on this interpretation, the above passage suggests that for all we know – a priori and a 
posteriori – Nixon may turn out to be an automaton, but, if we discover that Nixon was in fact a 
person, then it is no longer a possibility that he actually wasn’t. With respect to this conception of 
epistemic possibility, our above analysis stands in conflict; our analysis shows that even if we 
know beyond doubt that Nixon is actually human, it still makes perfect sense to consider a case 
in which Nixon was actually an automaton.  
Another interpretation of knowing what is possible is as only a priori knowledge; on this 
interpretation, for something to be epistemically possible is (arguably) simply for it to involve no 
contradiction. In other words, a posteriori knowledge that we gain makes no difference to the 
space of possibilities. Others things that Kripke says seem to support this interpretation 
(1972/1980, p. 112):  
Could the Queen – could this woman herself – have been born of different parents from the 
parents from who she actually came? Could she, let’s say, have been the daughter of Mr. and 
Mrs. Truman? There would have been no contradiction, of course, in an announcement that 
… she was indeed the daughter of Mr and Mrs Truman.  
Likewise, it makes no contradiction to say that Nixon was an automaton. But it would still make 
no contradiction to say it even if we discovered that he was a person. Thus this latter 
interpretation is in no conflict with our above analysis.  
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48 Note: criteria of identity of stuffs like water, and of individual objects like David, appear to 
have some important differences (see Section  3.2.1.2). However, it remains true that the intension 
of terms – whether of mass-nouns that designate stuffs like water, or of singular terms that 
designate individual objects like David – is dependent, at least partially, on the criteria of identity 
of their actual referent. Whatever those criteria of identity are, i.e., regardless of any such 
differences.  
49 These factors are slightly different from what was presented in the introduction. We shall arrive 
at the formulation as presented in the introduction at the end of Chapter 2 (see Section  2.4).  
50 Some may be already worried at this stage about Kripke’s stipulation claim – i.e., that a 
counterfactual world in which Newton invented the Calculus first is stipulated, and hence that 
there is no worry about criteria of identity. However, we shall have to postpone discussion of this 
worry to Section  1.5.3. 
51 Indeed, in the case of descriptive terms, the intension is dependent on neither of the other two 
criteria (we shall soon see why exactly, in Section  1.2.1). However, I believe that we are 
nonetheless right to assert the general claim, namely, that intentions do depend on the three 
factors, based on the following analogy. A formula of the form Z=XY expresses the dependence 
of Z on X and Y. However, surely when X equals 0, Z is no longer dependent on Y; whatever Y 
is, Z will turn out 0. Yet this special case does not seem to undermine the general dependency of Z 
on Y. Similarly, it is true that when the value of the factor “the semantic function of the term” is 
“descriptive” the intension is independent of the other two factors. But this does not seem to 
undermine the general dependency of the intension on those factors.  
52 A revised version of this section was published as Pelman (2006)  
53 True, the task of re-identification of entities in other possible worlds is at odds with Kripke’s 
famous contention that such identities are stipulated rather than discovered (1972/1980, p. 46). 
Although I agree with Kripke that possible worlds may be thus stipulated, I am nonetheless not 
convinced that an alternative, purely qualitative introduction of possible worlds – i.e., in which no 
such stipulation of identity is involved – is not as permissible. However, as Kripke’s claim is 
related to his specific essentialist assumptions, we shall postpone the discussion of this matter to 
Section  1.5.3, after we’ve discussed these essentialist assumptions of his.  
54 Again, to avoid confusion: our mission is to determine the intension of “T” on other possible 
worlds taken as counterfactual, and not as actual (see Section  1.1.3). 
55 As defined in Section  1.1.1. 
56 As defined in Section  1.1.1. 
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57 As in the pink-solid H2O case discussed in Section  1.1.1, one may object that this option 
violates physicalism. Our response to the objection applies in this case as well (see Endnote 4). 
58 For the sake of simplicity, we suppose homogeneity within a world, i.e., we ignore here worlds 
that contain more than one of these stuffs. 
59 There are various other metaphysical alternatives in another sense as well (some of which were 
listed in Section  1.1.2): E.g., that the world contains both types of stuffs, namely P’s (and Q’s) as 
well as M’s (and N’s), that simply coincide; or, that what the stuff is is sortal-relative; and more. 
However, I believe that such alternatives should not be too difficult to incorporate in the final 
analysis, once such an analysis is attained.  
60 Indeed the last two possibilities are not very probable, since they suggest a different manifest 
property from M, and given that we seem to perceive such properties quite directly we are most 
likely not to be mistaken about them. However, in order for our formula to be general, we’d do 
better to consider those options as well, as it will make the formula applicable to cases in which 
the property M is not manifest and directly perceived, but rather has to be discovered.  
61 Kripke, who introduces the term, actually uses only the first part of the above definition, 
namely, that a rigid term designates the same referent in all possible worlds; yet much of what he 
says indicates the other part as well, i.e., that a rigid term designates nothing but that referent (Cf. 
Stanley (1997)).  
62 Kripke (1980, p.21, n.21) 
63 Kaplan (1977/1989), p. 493. Others who stressed the distinction between rigidified (i.e., de jure 
rigid) and non-rigidified designation instead of the one between rigid and nonrigid designation 
are Smith (1984), and Sidelle (1992).  
64 Sidelle (1992) makes a similar point. He introduces a descriptive term “Prez”, whose 
descriptive content is “The President of the U.S.”, and a corresponding entity Prez, that  
is [in 1992] composed by George Bush, was composed in 1790 by George Washington, and in 
1863 by Abraham Lincoln. In some other worlds, Prez is [in 1992] composed by Michael 
Dukakis, and in others by Elizabeth Dole.  
(p. 417) 
In other words, the criterion of identity of Prez is occupying the role (i.e., the office). By contrast, 
the criterion of identity of an occupant of the presidential role, say, of Lincoln, is that of a 
person, i.e., a criterion of personal identity. Sidelle’s conclusion about rigidity is the following:  
On a permissive ontology [i.e., ontology that accepts unusual entities like Prez], descriptions 
used to refer through sense [i.e., descriptive terms like “the President of the U.S.”], without 
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further specification, are indeterminate between rigidly denoting unusual entities [like Prez], 
and nonrigidly denoting the particulars that constituted them at a given time [like Lincoln].  
(p. 418) 
There is, however, a small, yet important, difference between our discussion and Sidelle’s. 
Sidelle’s conclusion is based on one “permissive” ontology, that admits both “usual” entities, like 
Bush, and unusual entities, like Prez. Both these entities simply happen to Spatio-temporally 
overlap in the actual world, and hence the descriptive term “the President of the U.S.” may pick 
out either: if it picks out Bush in the actual world, Dukakis in another, etc., it turns out nonrigid; 
if, however, it picks out Prez in the actual world, Prez in another counterfactual world, etc., it 
turns out rigid (de facto). In the above discussion, by contrast, we assume no such spatio-temporal 
overlap; rather, we consider different ontologies: the same descriptive term will come-out rigid on 
some such ontologies and nonrigid on others.  
65 The difference between the two is very important, and I believe it to be at the heart of much of 
the debate between essentialists and anti-essentialists. See Section  1.5.1 for some related 
discussion. 
66 E.g., Kripke (1972/1980, p. 128-9) 
67 See Section  1.1.2. 
68 Chalmers (2006)  
69 For a more realistic mistake consider the following: there may be a more fundamental nature to 
the liquid that we call “water”, say, some FN. Thus, a stuff is identical to our liquid iff it is FN. 
Now, although in actuality all H2O is FN and vice versa, still, in principle, it is possible for 
something to be FN and not H2O and vice versa, viz., some counterfactual worlds contain FN 
which is not H2O, and some others contain H2O which is not FN. Consequently, a rigidified 
“water”, under material criteria of identity, will not designate non-FN H2O, and thus will not 
designate H2O in all counterfactual worlds. 
70 Shortly after the above quotation, Chalmers writes:  
if the H2O-world turns out to be actual (as it has), then ‘water’ will have a Kripkean intension 
that picks out H2O in all worlds; but if the XYZ-world turns out to be actual (as it has not), 
then “water” will have a Kripkean intension that picks out XYZ in all worlds. 
Thus Chalmers, like Kripke, presupposes material criteria of identity.  
71 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 143) 
72 Locke (1689, II xxvii 15) 
73 Different versions of this view are divided on this relation, namely, whether it is just ‘if’, or 
‘only if’, or, indeed, ‘if and only if’. 
70 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
74 Locke (1689), who introduced the prince/cobbler thought experiment, in fact used it to argue 
for such a psychological criterion. Among contemporary defenders of some version of that view, 
Olson (2002) lists Garrett (1998), Johnston (1987), Lewis (1976), Nagel (1986, p. 40), Noonan 
(1989), Nozick (1981), Parfit (1971; 1984, p. 207), Perry (1972), Shoemaker (1970; 1984, p. 90; 
1997; 1999), and Unger (1990, ch. 5; 2000). As popular as it may seem, it has it’s strong 
opponents. Among such opponents, Olson lists Ayers (1990, pp. 278-292), Carter (1989), 
Feldman (1992), Mackie D. (1999), Olson (1997), van Inwagen (1997) and Williams B. (1956-7; 
1970). 
75 Williams B. (1956-7) is a known representative of such a view. Olson (2002) mentions 
Thomson (1997), and Ayer (1936, p. 194) as advocates of some versions of that view.  
76 E.g., Snowdon (1990) 
77 As in the case of David, there are, of course, quite a few other metaphysical views, e.g., a four-
dimensionalist view according to which there is a temporal stage which is shared by two different 
collections of stages – a psychological-collection and a bodily-collection (Hudson 2001, ch. 4) 
and more. However, again, we are not so much concerned here with taking sides in this debate; 
rather, we look for the lessons that can be drawn from the debate to the determination of 
intensions.  
78 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 42)  
79 Kripke’s discussion includes a long list of such false intuitions (Kripke, 1972/1980, p. 142-4). 
See also Endnote 43.  
To recall, in Section  1.1.3 we have shown how handy the distinction between actual 
worlds and counterfactual worlds comes in reconciling such seemingly conflicting intuitions: E.g., 
the intuition that water might have been XYZ can be simply accounted for by the existence of a 
possible world considered as actual in which water is XYZ, whereas the intuition that water might 
not have been XYZ can be accounted for by the absence of a counterfactual world in which water is 
XYZ, since in all counterfactual worlds (that correspond to the “real” actual world) water is H2O. 
However, as noted above (Footnote 42) it is not clear that Kripke’s distinction between epistemic 
and metaphysical possibilities is equivalent to the one between actual worlds and counterfactual 
worlds.  
80 Della Rocca (2002, p. 239). Della Rocca’s positive claim, however, is that criteria of identity are 
determined by the way the term is described, or thought of, or referred to. As our discussion 
shows, this need not be the case. It may be that there are mind-independent criteria of identity. 
In which case, these are independent of the way the object is thought of, referred to, or 
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described. Thus, one may be right in the way they think about the object, if the criteria of identity 
they ascribe to the object fit reality, or wrong if they don’t. If, however, there is no fact of the 
matter, i.e., there are no mind-independent criteria of identity out there, then Della Rocca is of 
course right. But I can see no way in which we, humans, can prove this. It simply appears to be 
beyond our ken. So our discussion joins Della Rocca only as far as claiming that specific criteria of 
identity (whether mind-independent or not) should not be derived from rigidity and intuitions.  
81 Sidelle’s (1992) Prez is in fact a version of such an object. (See Endnote 64)  
82 As Della Rocca notes (2002, p. 230) a version of this “arbitrariness” worry goes back to Quine 
(1961/1976, p. 184). 
83 Interestingly, contemporary biologists indeed delimit kinds historically, i.e., according to 
evolutionary history. In other words, they take the historical origin to be necessary (and, indeed, 
sufficient) to the kind (LaPorte, 2004). This seems to fall in line with Kripke’s intuition about 
individuals. However, when it comes to natural-kinds, like tigers, Kripke seems to be more in 
favour of internal structure (presumably DNA) as the essential feature, rather than the historical 
origin.  
84 Salmon (1979) 
85 Chandler (1976). Indeed, Chandler’s main concern is epistemological (in particular, he wishes 
to claim that the accessibility relation between possible worlds is not transitive). However, 
Salmon (1979, pp. 722-5) uses Chandler’s argument to dismiss Kripke’s metaphysical thesis of 
the necessity of origin.  
86 Salmon’s positive conclusion is, however, that rigidity does not entail essentialism. As our 
formula shows, this is one step too far. We can agree with Salmon that the necessity of origin 
does not follow from rigidity. Moreover, we can even accept that no other specific necessary 
properties can be derived from rigidity. But this is as far as we should go. We can still hold that 
rigidity does entail that referents have some essential properties, without committing to what these 
essential properties are (whether we know them or not; and whether they are mind-independent 
or not). As mentioned earlier, a rigid designator, by definition designates the same referent in all 
counterfactual worlds; the notion of “the same” involves criteria of identity; and criteria of 
identity involve essential properties. Hence, the very notion of rigid designation does presuppose 
some (although not specific) essential properties.  
87 For a discussion about the special problems of transworld identity of individuals (as opposed 
to transworld identity of stuffs and kinds) see Section  3.2.1.2. 
88 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 44)  
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89 E.g., Lewis (1986)   
90 Even though some mutual support between these three Lewisian theses can be shown, the 
three stand independently of one another. E.g., counterfactual worlds described qualitatively, can 
have identity relations between their inhabitants – for instance, between the brown haired guy 
who actually won the election, and the blond guy who won the election in that world; or 
counterpart relations – between the same two guys. The same holds for worlds described with 
name-tags: actual Nixon and counterfactual Nixon may be held identical or counterparts.  
91 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 42)  
92 For a more detailed discussion about the relation between criteria of identity and modal 
properties, see Chapter 3. Note however that the above metaphysical commitment is the only one 
made by such stipulation. For instance, such stipulation is not committed to the fact that Nixon 
is necessarily a person.  
93 Kripke (1972/1980, pp. 52-3) 
94 Similarly, Kaplan (1967/1979, p. 93) mentions “Jules Verne-O-scope”.  
95 Kripke (1972/1980, pp. 43-4) 
96 See also Plantinga (1974, p. 94)  
97 Attributing the objection to such stipulation to Kripke is further supported by Kripke’s 
discussion of probability in his introduction to Naming and Necessity (1980, pp. 15-20). In his 
discussion, Kripke points to the following disadvantage of introducing counterfactual worlds in 
purely qualitative terms. With respect to two dice, there are 36 different possibilities as regards 
the numbers they show on top. In other words, there are 36 different possible worlds in this 
respect. However, on the qualitative view, the following two possible worlds are qualitatively 
identical: (1) die A: 6; die B: 5; and, (2) die A: 5; die B: 6. It thus follows that, on the purely-
qualitative paradigm, the two worlds are in fact the same world. And the same applies to 2/4 vs. 
4/2 etc. Kripke concludes as follows:  
The ‘possibilities’ simply are not given purely qualitatively (as in: one die, 6, the other, 5). If 
they had been, there would have been just twenty-one distinct possibilities, not thirty six. And 
the states are not phantom dice-pairs, viewed from afar, about which we can raise epistemically 
meaningful questions of the form ‘Which die is that?’  
 2 INTENSIONS: SOME SEMANTICAL ASPECTS  
 
 
Overview 
Our general formula of intensions includes three variables: (a) the semantic function of 
the term; (b) the actual referent; and (c) criteria of identity. This chapter focuses on the 
first of these three. In what follows, we shall examine more closely the relation between 
intensions and the semantic function of terms. The main thesis of this chapter is a 
proposed classification of semantic functions, which provides a more fine-grained insight 
into the mechanism of reference across possible worlds. This classification is based on 
two distinctions: (a) designation in the actual world vs. designation in counterfactual 
worlds; and (b) designation via fitting a descriptive content vs. designation regardless of 
such content. These two distinctions give rise to a fourfold classification of semantic 
functions. Based on this classification, we define three basic semantic functions (the 
fourth turns out to be un-instantiated).  
The proposed classification is put to work in two ways.  
First, the classification is being used to compare and contrast competing views 
about the semantics of natural-language terms. Specifically, we will be looking at: proper 
names, definite descriptions, complex demonstratives and natural-kind terms. Different 
views ascribe different semantic functions to these types of term. Thus, altogether, there 
appear to be many semantic functions on offer. However, it will be argued that all these 
different semantic functions boil down to merely three basic semantic functions, which 
were defined by our proposed classification.1 I.e., it is argued that every proposed 
semantic function for a certain type of term is, ultimately, equivalent to one of these 
three basic functions. As this part involves presentation of the different views, it will 
naturally have some literature-review air to it. 
Next, we illustrate the unique pattern of intensions that characterises each of the 
three basic semantic functions. These unique patters are used to clearly illustrate the 
differences between the proposed formal semantic functions, and thereby, between the 
natural-language terms.  
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The second use of the proposed classification is for fine-graining the intensions 
formula. We shall see that our initial dealing with semantic functions, whereby we 
distinguished descriptive from rigidified terms, was exclusively concerned with 
designation in counterfactual worlds. The classification offered in this chapter adds the 
aspect of taking into account designation in the actual world. Surprisingly, this added 
input will prove to be closely linked to the second factor in the formula – the actual 
referent. In particular, it will be shown that the factor of the actual referent can be 
replaced by two other factors that determine it: designation in the actual world and the 
state of the actual world. In other words, a more fine-grained version of our formula 
includes four variables. 
 
2.1  A Fourfold Classification of Semantic Functions  
So far, we have been dealing with two semantic functions: descriptive and rigidified. A 
descriptive term was defined as a term that has a descriptive content and that designates, 
with respect to every counterfactual world, that which fits that content. A rigidified term 
was defined as a term that designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, the 
same referent that it designates in the actual world. Hence the distinction between 
rigidified and descriptive terms is concerned with designation in counterfactual worlds; 
specifically, terms may designate in counterfactual worlds via fitting a descriptive content 
or regardless of such content. But what about the actual world? Can’t we apply the same 
distinction to the actual world, namely, isn’t it the case that a term may designate in the 
actual world via fitting a descriptive content or regardless of such content?  
This idea seems to fit some strong intuitions about two types of rigidified terms. 
With respect to counterfactual worlds, all rigidified terms designate the same referent that 
they designate in the actual world. However, how do such terms pick out their referent in 
the actual world? Kripke proposes two such ways:  
An initial baptism [i.e., designation in the actual world] takes place. Here the object 
may be fixed by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a 
description.2 
Naming by ostension is pretty much self-explanatory. For the latter case, Kripke provides 
the instructive example of the name “Neptune”; it was fixed by the astronomer Leverrier 
to name “the planet which caused such and such discrepancies in the orbits of certain 
other planets”.3 Following the “baptising” event – whether by ostension or via a 
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descriptive content – all rigidified terms designate that same baptised object in all 
counterfactual worlds. For example, if “water” is indeed a rigidified term, then whether 
“water” baptised H2O directly by ostension, or via the descriptive content “the watery 
stuff”, when it comes to counterfactual worlds, “water” designates H2O in all those 
worlds. In other words, although all rigidified terms designate the same referent in all 
counterfactual worlds, there are indeed two ways of picking out their referent in the 
actual world. The first is directly, regardless of any descriptive content; the second is via 
fitting a descriptive content. 
 Let us call rigidified terms that designate in the actual world directly, directly-
referring terms (following Kaplan4), and terms that designate in the actual world via fitting 
a descriptive content reference-fixing (following Kripke5). Accordingly, we may say that the 
category of rigidified terms has two sub-categories: directly-referring terms and 
reference-fixing terms.  
These observations lead to the following structure. We have two basic 
distinctions: (a) designation in the actual world vs. designation in counterfactual worlds; 
and (b) designation via fitting a descriptive content vs. designation regardless of 
descriptive content. Each referring term designates in both the actual world and in 
counterfactual worlds. In each of these realms, the term may designate by virtue of fitting 
its descriptive content or regardless of such descriptive content. This generates the 
following fourfold classification of semantic functions:  
Designation in  
the actual world  
Designation in  
counterfactual worlds  
By fitting a descriptive content  By fitting a descriptive content  
By fitting a descriptive content  Regardless of descriptive content 
Regardless of descriptive content  By fitting a descriptive content  
Regardless of descriptive content  Regardless of descriptive content 
Table 2.1 
Table 2.1 generates four categories. The three semantic functions discussed 
above, namely, descriptive, directly-referring and reference-fixing, each fit into one of 
these categories: a descriptive term is a term that designates by virtue of its descriptive 
content in both the actual world and in counterfactual worlds. It therefore belongs in the 
first category. Directly-referring terms designate regardless of descriptive content in both 
the actual and counterfactual worlds. They therefore belong in the fourth category. A 
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reference-fixing term designates in the actual world by means of its descriptive content, 
whereas in counterfactual worlds it designates regardless of descriptive content, i.e., it 
simply designates the same referent that it designates in the actual world. It therefore 
belongs in the second category. Note that there is one more possible category (the third 
one in our table): a term that designates regardless of descriptive content in the actual 
world, and by virtue of fitting its descriptive content in counterfactual worlds. Yet I 
could find no example for such a term.6 In sum,  
 Designation in  
the actual world  
Designation in  
counterfactual worlds  
 
1 By fitting a descriptive content  By fitting a descriptive content  Descriptive  
non-rigidified 
2 By fitting a descriptive content  Regardless of descriptive content Reference-fixing  
rigidified  
3 Regardless of descriptive content By fitting a descriptive content  --- 
4 Regardless of descriptive content Regardless of descriptive content Directly-referring 
rigidified  
Table 2.2 
(We can see now why the title “nondescriptive” is not very suitable to cover the 
group of rigidified terms: some rigidified terms are reference-fixing; they have a 
descriptive element to them, namely, designating in the actual world via descriptive 
content. However, calling such terms “descriptive”, as various philosophers do,7 is also 
misleading, as it may confuse this category with the “pure” descriptive one. Calling these 
terms “rigidified” thus better serves its purpose.)  
 
 
2.2 Natural-language terms – the Controversy over their Semantic  
Function  
Our categories of semantic functions – descriptive, reference-fixing and directly-referring 
– are defined formally. They are not, as such, categories of terms in natural languages. As 
regards natural-language terms, it is a matter of controversy what their semantic 
functions are. However, it is proposed that the above classification of formal types of 
terms, based on the distinction between designation in the actual world vs. designation in 
counterfactual worlds, is essential to the analysis of natural-language terms.  
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We shall examine four types of referring terms: definite descriptions; proper 
names; complex demonstratives and natural-kind terms. The first three are types of 
singular terms; the latter is a type of a general term. Our discussion of the first type of 
terms (as it happens, proper names) will be relatively elaborate, whereas discussions of 
subsequent terms will, to a large extent, build on ideas stated in this first discussion, and 
will thus be considerably shorter.  
 
2.2.1 Proper names 
Let us briefly sketch some of the arguments that led to the main views about proper 
names.  
Since it is natural to see the different views about the semantics of proper names 
as developing historically, in the form of responses to each view’s predecessor, we shall 
deviate from our custom of not engaging in the arguments for or against views, and will 
briefly present them. Nevertheless, we shall, as usual, refrain from taking sides.  
 
2.2.1.1 The main views about the semantics of proper names  
2.2.1.1.1 Millianism and its discontents  
Mill famously held that, 
...proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by 
them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those 
individuals.8  
Thus, according to Mill, names are something like “labels”, which simply apply to their 
referents directly, and any descriptive content is left completely out of the process.9 As a 
theory of meaning, Millianism is the view that the meaning of a name is simply its bearer. 
This invited the following main objections to Millianism, initially raised by Russell:10 (a) 
Frege’s puzzle: if Millianism is true, then the terms “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” have 
the same meaning, and hence are substitutive salva veritate. It follows that “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus” amounts just to “Hesperus is Hesperus”. But the latter, unlike the former, 
is trivial and uninformative; (b) Empty names: the sentence “Santa Claus lives in the 
North Pole” seems meaningful and false, yet if Millianism is true, then “Santa Claus” 
refers to nothing, i.e., means nothing, and hence the sentence is just meaningless; (c) 
Negative existentials: “Vulcan does not exist” seems meaningful and true. However, 
according to Millianism, the sentence comes out absurd: it denies the existence of 
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something the existence of which it presupposes; and (d) Propositional attitude reports: 
the sentence “Fred believes that Cicero, but not Tully, was Roman” seems to express a 
mistaken, yet nonetheless rational, belief. Millianism will simply render it a self-refuting, 
and hence irrational, belief.  
Millians commonly respond to these objections by recourse to Gricean speech-
acts.11 Thus, a sentence in a speech act may pragmatically communicate an informative, or 
meaningful, or rational proposition, whereas at the same time, what it semantically expresses 
is trivial, or meaningless, or absurd, or irrational.12  
Many were not impressed by these types of solutions. Thus these problems (as 
well as other considerations) led to the development of descriptive accounts of proper 
names.  
 
2.2.1.1.2 Frege-Russell descriptivism  
Frege (1892) held that names have sense, and that they designate their referents via their 
sense. Russell (1917) held that a proper name is a disguised definite description, and that 
it designates its referent by means of fitting the definite description.13 Thus, both Frege 
and Russell held that proper names designate their referents not directly, but rather via a 
mediating descriptive content. By virtue of this common feature, and despite some 
important differences,14 their views are commonly referred to as the “Frege-Russell” 
view.15 Thus (to follow Kripke’s example), on a Frege-Russell descriptivist view, 
“Aristotle” abbreviates something like “The last great philosopher of antiquity” (or a 
conjunction of some such descriptions). Such a descriptivist view easily avoids the above 
problems that Millianism faces: by substituting each name with the description that it 
abbreviates, all the above objections are barred.   
However, this view, as Kripke showed, is not free from problems as well. Kripke 
launches two main arguments against this view, both based on the fact that although 
Aristotle actually fits the above description, he might not have fitted it; e.g., Aristotle 
might have chosen a different career and not become a philosopher at all. In other 
words, it is a contingent fact about Aristotle that he was a philosopher.  
The first argument – sometimes called unwanted necessity,16 or the epistemic argument 
– is the following. Consider the sentence:  
(1) Aristotle might not have been a philosopher. 
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Given the contingency of the fact that Aristotle was a philosopher, (1) is true. However, 
if Aristotle abbreviates “the last great philosopher of antiquity”, then (1) amounts just to  
(2) The last great philosopher of antiquity might not have been a philosopher. 
Yet surely any person who satisfies the relevant description is thereby a philosopher, and 
hence (2) seems false. So descriptivism seems false.  
The second argument – sometimes called the modal argument – states that if 
Aristotle had not become a philosopher, the description “the last great philosopher of 
antiquity” would apply to Plato, and thus descriptivism implies that “Aristotle” would 
just name Plato, which seems no less problematic for the theory.17 These problems led to 
the development of the New Theory of reference.  
 
2.2.1.1.3 The New Theory of reference  
The central feature of the New Theory is that names are (de jure) rigid designators. A 
name is designed to designate the same referent in all counterfactual worlds. Kripke, an 
exponent of the theory, is less concerned about designation in the actual world. As was 
stated above (Section  2.1) This may be either in a direct way, i.e., not mediated by 
descriptive content, or by fitting a description. 
As a mechanism to achieve the rigidity of names, Kripke (as well as Putnam) 
offers a causal theory. A name is causally “hooked” onto its referent (in the above 
baptising event), and then that link is preserved by a process of “reference borrowing”, 
i.e., passing the name from one speaker to another in the community. Thus when using 
the name, speakers designate the original referent by virtue of the causal chains that track 
it, regardless of any description that that referent may fit:  
When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the name must, I think, 
intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he 
heard it.18  
The strength of the New Theory is that it conforms to some strong intuitions, by 
rendering names rigid designators. Accordingly, Kripke’s main criticism of the Frege-
Russell type of descriptivism is that it entails that names are nonrigid designators. Thus, 
in order to avoid Kripke’s criticism, descriptivists need to find a way of rigidifying the 
descriptions that names are said to abbreviate, so that such descriptions designate, with 
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respect to all counterfactual worlds, the same object that they designate in the actual 
world.  
 
2.2.1.1.4 Actualised descriptions  
One way to rigidify descriptions, and thus to avoid Kripke’s criticism of descriptivism, is 
to actualise them, i.e., to hold names to abbreviate not just descriptions, but actualised 
descriptions.19 As Kaplan puts it,  
A Fregean who takes the name “Aristotle” to have as its sense the pupil of Plato and 
teacher of Alexander the Great need only add something like actuality to the content 
in order to account for the rigidity of proper names.20  
Such an actualisation device will avoid Kripke’s arguments against a Frege-Russell 
descriptivism. An actualised description referring to Aristotle designates Aristotle not 
only when discussing the actual world, but also when discussing counterfactual situations, 
in which Aristotle was not a philosopher. Thus, whereas (2) may sound false, it makes 
perfect sense to say that,  
(3) The actual last great philosopher of antiquity might not have been a 
philosopher. 
In sum, since the “actualised” operator guarantees the rigidity of a description, a 
name that abbreviates such a description is thereby rigid, and avoids Kripke’s 
objections.21 
 
2.2.1.1.5 Widescopism  
Another attempt to avoid Kripke’s criticism, famously suggested by Dummett22 (inspired 
by Russell23) is by using scope-distinction. Definite descriptions, when embedded in 
intensional context (e.g., modal, temporal, or propositional attitude contexts) are subject 
to a de re/de dicto ambiguity.24 Let me explain this distinction. The above  
(2) The last great philosopher of antiquity might not have been a philosopher 
is ambiguous between a de dicto reading, and a de re reading. On the de dicto reading, the 
sentence expresses the inconsistent claim according to which it is possible that there was 
someone who was the last great philosopher of antiquity and was not a philosopher; on 
the de re reading, the sentence expresses the consistent claim that it is possible that a 
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certain person, Aristotle (who happened to be the last great philosopher of antiquity), 
was not a philosopher.  
It is customary to analyse this ambiguity in terms of scope.25 On this analysis, the 
de dicto reading of (2) is  
(2’) it is possible that: there is someone such that, that someone was the last great 
philosopher of antiquity and was not a philosopher 
whereas the de re reading of (2) is, 
(2’’) there is someone who was the last great philosopher of antiquity, and it is 
possible that: that someone was not a philosopher.  
Thus, on the interpretation (2’) of (2), the existential quantifier “there is 
someone” is within the scope of the modal operator “it is possible that”, and thus has a 
narrow scope; this is a de dicto reading of (2), which, in this case, is inconsistent. On 
interpretation (2’’) of (2), by contrast, the existential quantifier is outside the scope of the 
modal operator, and thus has a wide scope; this is a de re reading of (2), which, in our case 
is consistent. Thus the ambiguity is between a narrow and a wide scope of the existential 
quantifier relative to the intensional operator (which, in this case, is a modal operator).26  
Kripke’s criticism is based on reading (2) as expressing the de dicto statement (2’); 
thus read, the sentence is indeed false. However, when taken to express the de re 
statement (2’’), (2) comes out true, and as a consequence Kripke’s objection is blocked. 
Hence, all the descriptivist needs to do in order to avoid Kripke’s criticism is restrict the 
existential quantifier involved in the relevant definite description to have a wide-scope.  
The problem with this solution is, that names are frequently embedded in no 
context, let alone a modal context, and in these cases no scope analysis is available.27 
Adherents of such widescopism propose further modification to address this problem.28  
 
2.2.1.2 Analysis of views on proper names in terms of the fourfold 
categorisation  
In the outset of this chapter, we introduced a fourfold categorisation of semantic 
functions that gave rise to three formal semantic functions (the fourth logical possibility 
was deemed un-instantiated); descriptive, reference-fixing and directly-referring, as 
detailed below.  
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Designation in  
the actual world  
Designation in  
counterfactual worlds  
 
By fitting a descriptive content  By fitting a descriptive content  Descriptive  
By fitting a descriptive content  Regardless of descriptive content Reference-fixing  
Regardless of descriptive content  By fitting a descriptive content  --- 
Regardless of descriptive content  Regardless of descriptive content Directly-referring  
Table 2.3 
In the previous section five views on the semantics of proper names were 
presented: the Millian view, the Frege-Russell view, the New Theory, actualised 
descriptions, and widescopism. The purpose of this section is to analyse these views by 
using our proposed categorisation. In order to thus analyse them, we will need to extract 
from each view its implications with regard to designation in possible worlds, i.e., actual 
and counterfactual. This will prove rather straightforward in the case of the first four 
views. Widescopism will require a slightly longer discussion.  
 
2.2.1.2.1 Analysis of Millianism    
According to Millianism, at least with respect to the actual world, a proper name 
designates regardless of descriptive content. How does it designate in counterfactual 
worlds? Although, understandably, Mill did not consider counterfactual worlds, direct-
reference theorists, who share the spirit of Mill’s view, did. With respect to the sentence  
(4) John is suspicious  
Kaplan formalises it as  
(5) <John,P>  
where P is a function “which assigns to each possible world w and each time t the set of 
all those individuals in w which, in w, are suspicious at t.”29 Sentence (5), says Kaplan,  
will determine that function F which assigns Truth to w and t if and only if John is a 
member of P(w,t). If John is an individual of w at time t (i.e., John exists in w and is 
alive at t) but is not a member of P(w,t), then F(w,t) is falsehood.30  
Thus, the guy who is checked for suspicion in each world, actual or counterfactual, is John, 
regardless of any description that may apply to him. “John” therefore designates just John in 
both the actual world and in all counterfactual worlds.   
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If this analysis is sound, then with respect to our fourfold categorisation, the 
above view of proper names belongs in our fourth formal category – that of directly-
referring terms.  
 
2.2.1.2.2  Analysis of Frege-Russell descriptivism  
Frege and Russell took names to designate their referent via a mediating descriptive 
content. Thus, with respect to the actual world, a proper name designates that which fits 
its descriptive content. What about counterfactual worlds? Like Mill, Frege and Russell 
did not discuss designation in counterfactual worlds. Kripke, however, did (as noted in 
Chapter 1). He took the Frege-Russell view to imply that names designate in the same 
way in counterfactual situations. Namely, a name designates, with respect to each 
counterfactual world, that which fits its descriptive content in that world. Thus, on this 
interpretation of the Frege-Russell view, a proper name designates, with respect to both 
the actual and to each counterfactual world, that which fits the name’s descriptive 
content.  
If this analysis is sound, then the Frege-Russell descriptivist view of names falls 
under our first formal category, the descriptive category. In other words, on the Frege-
Russell view, proper names are descriptive terms (according to our formal definition of 
“descriptive”).  
 
2.2.1.2.3 Analysis of the New Theory’s view 
As Kripke states his view in terms of possible worlds, there is no need in this case to 
extrapolate from the actual to the counterfactual, like we did in the above two cases. 
With respect to counterfactual worlds, Kripke explicitly takes names to designate the 
same referent that they designate in the actual world. As for the actual world, some 
names designate by directly “labelling” their referents, whereas others (like “Neptune”) 
designate by fitting a description. Thus, with respect to our fourfold categorisation, some 
names are directly-referring, i.e., belong to our fourth category, whereas others are 
reference-fixing, i.e., belong to our second category. No proper name belongs to either 
the first or third category. In other words, on Kripke’s view names are rigidified terms – 
a category that encompasses both the directly-referring and the reference-fixing sub-categories.  
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2.2.1.2.4 Analysis of the actualised descriptions view 
According to the actualised descriptions view, names abbreviate not descriptions but 
actualised descriptions, and hence are also rigid designators. In terms of possible worlds 
semantics, this should be analysed as follows. Proper names have descriptive content. 
Each proper name designates in the actual world that which fits its content. It then 
designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, that same actual referent, i.e., 
whether or not it fits the descriptive content in that world.  
If this analysis is sound, then the actualised description view of proper names 
belongs in our second category, namely, the reference-fixing category. In other words, 
proper names, according to the actualised description view, are reference-fixing terms 
(according to our formal definition).31 
 
2.2.1.2.5 Analysis of widescopism  
As discussed above, a standard analysis of the de re/de dicto ambiguity is in terms of scope-
distinction. Based on this analysis, widescopism is the view that a name abbreviates a 
definite description whose existential quantifier has a wide scope relative to an 
intensional operator (rather than a narrow scope). The problem with this suggestion, as 
noted, is that names also occur in sentences that are not embedded in an intensional 
context, or, indeed, in any context at all. Thus this account, if successful, can only apply 
to the very limited number of cases, namely, cases of clauses embedded in intensional 
contexts.  
However, it has been suggested that the de re/de dicto ambiguity applies directly to 
the definite description, and in fact, it is this ambiguity of the definite description which 
account for the ambiguity of the whole embedded clause. Such ambiguity of the definite 
descriptions is accounted for in terms of possible worlds semantics. Kripke (1977) puts it 
very clearly (although in the context of discussing definite descriptions and not proper 
names):   
If definite descriptions, ιxφ(x), are taken as primitive and assigned reference, then the 
conventional non-rigid [i.e., not de jure rigid32] assignment assigns to such a description, 
with respect to each possible world, the unique object, if any, which would have φ’d in 
that world. … Another type of definite description, ιxφx, a ‘[de jure] rigid’ definite 
description, could be introduced semantically by the following stipulation: let τxφx 
denote, with respect to all possible worlds, the unique object that (actually) φ’s. Both 
kinds of definite descriptions can obviously be introduced, theoretically, into a single 
formal language, perhaps by the notations just given. Some have suggested that 
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definite descriptions, in English, are ambiguous between the two readings. It has been 
further suggested that the two types of definite descriptions, the nonrigid [i.e., non de 
jure rigid] and [de jure] rigid, are the source of the de dicto – de re distinction…33  
Kripke himself, by the way, says he has “an open mind on the subject”34 and 
hence neither endorses nor opposes such ambiguity.  
So the idea is that the de re/de dicto ambiguity applies directly to the definite 
description, and hence the ambiguity is not confined to embedded clauses. In fact, it is 
not confined to any type of clause, as it equally applies to independent definite 
descriptions, i.e., outside any clause or sentence. In other words, it is suggested that a 
definite description is ambiguous between a de re and a de dicto readings of it.35  
The implication of this to the analysis of proper names is that a proper name can 
be simply said to abbreviate a de re definite description.  
Recall that widescopism suggested a way of rigidifying the description that a 
proper name allegedly abbreviates by invoking the de re/de dicto distinction. The above 
possible-worlds analysis similarly provides a way of rigidifying the relevant definite 
description by invoking the de re/de dicto distinction. Thus, the two suggestions share the 
same spirit. In this sense, the above possible-worlds analysis can be seen as an extended 
version of widescopism, with the advantage of having fewer limitations.  
This suggestion fits very well within our fourfold categorisation of semantic 
functions. On this suggestion, a proper name is said to abbreviate a de re definite 
description. In terms of our categorisation, a de re definite description is just a reference-
fixing term, i.e., it designates in the actual world that which fits its descriptive content 
(i.e., the definite description that it is said to abbreviate), and then designates, with 
respect to every counterfactual world, that same referent. It is therefore a rigidified term. 
Thus, widescopism, or better, the de re view of proper names, belongs in our second 
category – the reference-fixing category.  
Now if this is correct, then we have discovered that widescopism is, in essence, 
just the actualised descriptions view. Both views simply take proper names to be 
reference-fixing terms, i.e., terms that designate in the actual world that which fits their 
descriptive content, and then designate, with respect to all counterfactual worlds, that 
same referent.36  
Interestingly, this, so-called by many descriptivist, view, now becomes very similar 
to Kripke’s view. For Kripke is happy to admit that at least some proper names fix their 
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reference in the actual world by fitting a description (see quote in Section  2.2.1.1.3). 
Thus, both views agree that names designate in counterfactual worlds that which they 
designate in the actual world; both views also agree that some names designate in the 
actual world by fitting a description. The disagreement narrows down to whether some 
names designate in the actual world directly (as is suggested by Kripke), i.e., regardless of 
descriptive content, or not (as is implied by the de re/widescopism view of proper 
names).  
Finally, I would like to suggest a further support for the claim that the de re/de 
dicto ambiguity exists outside intensional contexts. This, I believe, can be achieved by 
acknowledging a very simple fact that is implicit in every sentence, namely, that it is 
uttered (or at least entertained). Once this is acknowledged, each un-embedded sentence 
of the form ‘The F is G’ can be transformed into an embedded one, in the form of ‘it is 
uttered (/entertained) that, the F is G’, which is thereby subject to a scope-distinction. 
Specifically, the de dicto reading of ‘the F is G’ is to be paraphrased as, ‘it is uttered that, 
there is an x such that x is F and x is G’; whereas the de-re reading of ‘the F is G’ is to be 
paraphrased as: ‘there is an x such that x is F, and it is uttered that it is G’. Thus, by 
adding the “utterance” operator, the existential quantifier can have a wide or narrow 
scope relative to this operator. Specifically, in the de re case the existential quantifier has a 
wide scope, whereas in the de dicto case the existential quantifier has a narrow scope. Just 
like in all intensional contexts.  
 
2.2.1.3 Proper names: summary 
In sum, there were five main views about the semantics of proper names: the Millian 
view, the Frege-Russell view, the New Theory view, actualised descriptions and 
widescopism, or the de re view. We have introduced a fourfold semantic categorisation, 
which is based on the distinction between designation in the actual world vs. designation 
in counterfactual worlds. Based on this categorisation, we came up with three basic 
semantic functions: descriptive, reference-fixing and directly-referring. Using our categorisation to 
analyse the above five views resulted in the following conclusion: the Millian view takes 
proper names to be directly referring terms. This view thus belongs in our fourth 
category. The Frege-Russell view takes proper names to be descriptive; it thus belongs in 
our first category. The New Theory takes proper names to be directly-referring or 
reference-fixing. In short, proper names belong to the higher rigidified category, which 
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includes both these sub-categories. The actualised descriptions view takes names to be 
reference-fixing; and so is widescopism, or the de re view of proper names. These views 
thus belong in our second category. The following Table 2.4 summarises this: 
 
Designation in  
the actual world  
Designation in  
counterfactual worlds  
 
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
Not rigidified  
Descriptive  
names according to Russell-Frege 
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
Regardless of descriptive 
content  
Rigidified  
Reference-fixing  
names according to actualised 
descriptions;  
names according to widescopism;  
some names according to the New 
Theory  
Regardless of descriptive 
content  
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
Not rigidified  
--- 
Regardless of descriptive 
content  
Regardless of descriptive 
content 
rigidified  
Directly-referring  
names according to Millianism  
some names according to the New 
Theory 
Table 2.4 
 
2.2.2 Definite descriptions  
As we have already discussed definite descriptions at some length in the course of our 
examination of the semantics of proper names, our examination of the semantics of 
definite descriptions will, to a large extent, rely on the above discussion, and as a result 
will be significantly shorter. Consequently, we shall join the presentation of each view 
with its analysis in terms of our proposed fourfold categorisation.  
 
2.2.2.1 The main views about the semantics of definite descriptions   
2.2.2.1.1 The Frege-Russell view of definite descriptions  
Both Frege and Russell intended their theory to apply to all singular terms, i.e., terms that 
designate an individual. In particular, both Frege and Russell believed that all singular 
terms designate their referent by fitting a descriptive content. Proper names are one 
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instance of singular terms; definite descriptions are another instance. According to the 
Frege-Russell view then, definite descriptions have a descriptive content, and they 
designate that which fits their descriptive content.  
As previously mentioned, Frege and Russell did not discuss designation in 
counterfactual worlds. But it is customary to take the Frege-Russell view to imply that 
singular terms – definite descriptions included – designate in the same way in 
counterfactual worlds as they are said to designate in the actual world; namely, a definite 
description designates, with respect to each counterfactual world, that which fits the 
description in that world. If this analysis is sound, then, in terms of our fourfold 
categorisation, definite descriptions on the Frege-Russell view (just like proper names) 
belong in our first category, i.e., the descriptive category.  
 
2.2.2.1.2 The de re/de dicto ambiguity view of definite descriptions  
As we have seen in Section  2.2.1.1.5, it is commonly believed that sentences involving 
definite descriptions, when embedded in intensional context, are subject to a de re/de dicto 
ambiguity. This fact alone does not entail an ambiguity in the definite description itself. 
As Russell himself ingeniously demonstrated, the ambiguity can be elegantly expressed in 
terms of scope analysis, while preserving a descriptive account of definite descriptions. 
However it was demonstrated above (Section  2.2.1.2.5) that when analysing the same 
ambiguity in terms of possible worlds semantics, the ambiguity is shown to be 
independent of intensional contexts, and in fact, even independent of any sentence. Viz., 
the de re/de dicto ambiguity seems to apply directly to definite descriptions, regardless of 
any sentence. In detail, a definite description is ambiguous between a de dicto definite 
description, which designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, that which fits 
the description in that world, and between a de re definite description, which designates, 
with respect to every counterfactual world, that which fits the description in the actual 
world. While the Frege-Russell view only expresses the de dicto reading of definite 
descriptions, there is also the de re reading of it.  
Thus, in terms of our fourfold categorisation, according to the de re/de dicto 
ambiguity view, definite descriptions belong in both the first and the second categories, 
i.e., they may be descriptive or reference-fixing.37  
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2.2.2.1.3 Referential definite descriptions  
Some philosophers thought that definite descriptions have another use, which is neither 
descriptive (i.e., de dicto) nor reference-fixing (i.e., de re) in the above sense.  
Consider the following example from Linsky. Observing a certain couple, a 
bystander says, “her husband is kind to her”.  It so happens that the two are not married. 
In this case, says Linsky, “the speaker might very well be referring to someone using 
these words, for he may think that that someone is the husband of the lady (who in fact 
is a spinster).”38 Donnellan provides a well-known similar example:  
Suppose one is at a party and, seeing an interesting-looking person holding a martini 
glass, one asks, "Who is the man drinking a martini?" If it should turn out that there is 
only water in the glass, one has nevertheless asked a question about a particular 
person, a question that it is possible for someone to answer.39  
Donnellan calls definite descriptions that function in this way referential (which he 
distinguishes from attributive definite descriptions that are used to state “something about 
whoever or whatever is the so-and-so”40). Thus, in both Linsky and Donnellan’s cases, it 
is claimed that the definite description succeeds to refer to the individual intended by the 
speaker, despite the fact that that individual fails to fit the description. In other words, an 
alleged referential definite description picks out its referent directly, regardless of any 
descriptive content.41  
The standard objection to referential definite descriptions is that in cases like the 
above “the man drinking a martini”, the success of the reference is merely pragmatic and 
not semantic. i.e., although the speaker has managed to communicate a referent that fails to 
fit the description, the definite description failed to express such reference.42 This, 
however, has been contested.43 
This alleged referential use is clearly different from both the de dicto use and the de 
re use discussed above, as in both those uses the actual referent is picked out by means of 
fitting the description. So we have here a third use of definite descriptions.  
This third use can be clearly distinguished from the above two uses in terms of 
our fourfold categorisation. A referential definite description may44 designate in the actual 
world that which is intended, regardless of any descriptive content. Since it is meant to 
refer to a certain individual, it thus designates that same individual in all counterfactual 
worlds as well, i.e., again, regardless of descriptive content. Thus referential definite 
descriptions fit in our fourth category – that of directly-referring terms. By contrast (as was 
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pointed above), De dicto definite descriptions and de re definite descriptions, by contrast, 
fall within our first and second categories respectively.  
 
2.2.2.2 Definite descriptions: summary 
The ambiguity view of definite descriptions suggests that definite descriptions are 
ambiguous between a de re reading and a de dicto reading. Donnellan’s view suggests that 
definite descriptions have a referential reading. The Frege-Russell view suggests that 
definite descriptions are not ambiguous, and that they only have their de dicto reading.  
Applying our fourfold categorisation to these claims yields the following results: 
on the ambiguity view, a definite description is ambiguous between being descriptive and 
reference-fixing, i.e., it may belong in either our first or second category; on Donnellan’s 
view, a definite description may also be directly-referring, i.e., it may belong in our fourth 
category. On the Frege Russell view, a definite description may only be descriptive, i.e., it 
may only fall in our first category:  
Designation in  
the actual world  
Designation in  
counterfactual worlds  
 
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
Not rigidified  
Descriptive 
All definite descriptions according to the 
Frege-Russell view;  
Only de dicto definite descriptions 
according to the ambiguity view 
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
Regardless of descriptive 
content  
Rigidified  
Reference-fixing  
Only De re definite descriptions according 
to the ambiguity view 
Regardless of 
descriptive content  
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
Not rigidified  
--- 
Regardless of 
descriptive content  
Regardless of descriptive 
content 
rigidified  
Directly-referring 
Referential definite descriptions according 
to Donnellan 
Table 2.5 
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2.2.3 Complex demonstratives  
The next type of natural-language term that we will be looking at is complex 
demonstratives - terms that have the general form, “that/this F” (as opposed to definite 
descriptions that have the form “the F”, and to simple demonstratives such as “she”).  
Frege has a short discussion of demonstratives.45 As with other singular terms, 
Frege takes demonstratives to have both sense and reference, where the sense determines 
the reference. Thus, a demonstrative has a descriptive content, and designates that which 
fits that content, e.g., “that guy” (pointing at Aristotle) abbreviates something like “the 
last great philosopher of antiquity”, and designates Aristotle by virtue of fitting the 
description. As expected, objections to this Fregean view are similar to the ones directed 
at Frege-Russell views of proper names: the problem is that the sentence “that guy is a 
philosopher” is contingent, whereas “the last great philosopher of antiquity is a 
philosopher” seems to be necessary.46 In other words, the problem is that on such a view, 
demonstratives become nonrigid. Whereas people may be in different minds about the 
rigidity of definite descriptions, demonstratives are widely agreed to be rigidified terms. 
E.g., whereas the simple definite description “the last great philosopher of antiquity” may 
be taken to designate, with respect to each counterfactual world, the individual who is the 
teacher of Alexander in that world, the complex demonstrative “that teacher of Alexander 
the Great” (pointing at Aristotle,) is widely agreed to designate the actual teacher, 
Aristotle, in every counterfactual world.  
In terms of our fourfold categorisation, it turns out that a complex demonstrative 
designates, with respect to counterfactual worlds, that which it designates in the actual 
world, i.e., regardless of descriptive content. But what about the actual world? How does 
a complex demonstrative picks out its referent there – is it via descriptive content or 
independently of descriptive content?  
Syntactically, what distinguishes a complex demonstrative from a simple definite 
description is the word “that”. Thus, it must be the operator “that” that rigidifies the 
description. But how exactly? One natural view is that the operator “that” functions 
somewhat similarly to the operator “actual” in actualised descriptions. This seems to be 
Kaplan’s view in his “Dthat”.47 Thus understood, the semantic function of “that teacher 
of Alexander”, as opposed that of “the teacher of Alexander”, is that of a reference-fixing 
term; it designates, in actual world, that which fits the description, and then designates 
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with respect to all counterfactual worlds, just that same actual referent (whether it fits the 
description or not in the counterfactual world). 
This view, however, quickly runs into trouble. For consider a case in which that 
which actually fits the description is not the one gestured at, e.g., I use “that man drinking 
a martini” while pointing at Jones, who happens to have water in his glass. In that case, 
the above view entails that the actual referent of “that man drinking a martini” is not 
Jones, but Smith in the other room, who indeed has a martini in his glass, and this is a 
counterintuitive result (indeed, even more counterintuitive than in the case of a definite 
description “the man drinking a martini”). 
Others took the operator “that” to effectively annul the description.48 David 
Braun calls theories of this sort minimal theories, which he characterises as follows:  
The common noun phrase in a complex demonstrative plays no semantic role in 
determining the referent of the complex demonstrative; so a person could be the 
referent of an utterance of “that crook” even if she is not a crook. Furthermore, this 
type of view says that the content of the common noun phrase is not a constituent of 
the content of the complex demonstrative; the content of the utterance of a complex 
demonstrative is just its referent.49 
It follows that according to this view, complex demonstratives are in essence like 
referential descriptions. I.e., a complex demonstrative “that F” designates in the actual 
world that which is demonstrated (gestured at, or intended50), and then designates, with 
respect to all counterfactual worlds, that same referent. In our terminology, such a view 
takes complex demonstratives to belong to the directly-referring category.  
But now Kripke’s objection to referential definite descriptions resurfaces: in cases 
like that of “that crook”, the success of the reference can be said to be merely pragmatic 
and not semantic. I.e., although the speaker has managed to communicate a referent that fails 
to fit the description, the complex demonstrative failed to express such reference. Kripke 
here expresses our intuitive discomfort in the face of reference to a man who has water 
in his glass by using, “that man drinking a martini”.  
The objection to the first view suggests that the description is not enough to 
determine the reference of a complex demonstrative in the actual world. The objection to 
the second view shows that the gesture is not enough to determine the reference of the 
complex demonstrative in the actual world. Consequently, an additional view is a 
conjunction of these two views. It suggests that in order for an object to be designated 
by a complex demonstrative in the actual world, it needs to satisfy both conditions, 
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namely, it has to be the one gestured at, and it has to fit the description. As Emma Borg 
puts it:  
An object cannot be the referent of “that cat” unless it is both the speaker’s 
demonstrated referent and it is a cat. If no object meets both criteria, then the 
demonstrative utterance fails of reference: it is literally empty, lacking a truth 
condition.51 
In other words, generally speaking, a complex demonstrative “that F” comprises two 
elements: the “that”-element and the “F”-element. Each generates a condition for 
designation in the actual world. The condition set by the “that”-elements is that of being 
gestured at; the condition set by the “F”-element is that of fitting the description “F”. In 
order for an object to be designated by the complex demonstrative “that F” in the actual 
world, it has to satisfy both conditions.  
We can use the example of “that man drinking a martini” to contrast the three 
views: someone is uttering “that man drinking a martini” while pointing at Jones, but the 
person gestured at, Jones, does not fit the description, and the person that fits the 
description, Smith, is not gestured at. In this case, the combined view holds that the 
complex demonstrative does not designate Smith, for it is Jones who is gestured at, 
(contrary to the reference-fixing view), nor does it designate Jones, for it is Smith who 
has a martini in his glass, and not Jones (contrary to the above “minimal view”). Rather, 
since in this case no candidate both fits the description and is gestured at, the complex 
demonstrative simply fails to refer. 52,53  
 
2.2.3.1 Complex demonstratives: summary 
We can summarise the different views by referring to our fourfold categorisation. On a 
Frege-Russell view, a demonstrative has a descriptive content and designates that which 
fits that content. Thus on this view, a complex demonstrative designates, with respect to 
each world (actual and counterfactual) that which fits its descriptive content in that 
world. It follows that complex demonstratives, on this view, belong in our first category 
– descriptive terms. Contrary to what such a Frege-Russell view entails, complex 
demonstratives are widely agreed to be rigidified terms, i.e., they designate, with respect 
to each counterfactual world, that which they designate in the actual world. Yet views are 
divided about the designation of complex demonstratives in the actual world. Kaplan’s 
(1978) view takes them to be reference-fixing, i.e., to designate in the actual world that 
which fits the descriptive content of the demonstrative. By contrast, the “minimal” 
 
 
94
theory takes complex demonstratives to be directly-referring, i.e., to designate in the 
actual world that which is gestured at, i.e., regardless of the description. These two views 
seem problematic. The problem that the first view appears to have is that the description is 
not enough to determine the reference of a demonstrative in the actual world. The 
problem that the second view appears to have is that the gesture is not enough to 
determine the reference of the demonstrative in the actual world. Thus, an alternative 
view is that a complex demonstrative “that F” designates in the actual world that which 
both fits the description “F”, and which is also gestured at by “that”. This additional view 
does not fit into our original categorisation, and in fact generates a new, conjunct, 
category:  
Designation in  
the actual world  
Designation in  
counterfactual 
worlds  
 
By fitting a 
descriptive content  
By fitting a 
descriptive content  
Not rigidified  
Descriptive  
Complex demonstratives according to a Frege-
Russell style view 
By fitting a 
descriptive content  
Regardless of 
descriptive content  
Rigidified  
Reference-fixing  
Complex demonstratives according to Kaplan 
(1978) 
Regardless of 
descriptive content  
By fitting a 
descriptive content  
Not rigidified  
--- 
Regardless of 
descriptive content  
Regardless of 
descriptive content 
rigidified  
Directly-referring  
Complex demonstratives according to the 
“minimal” view  
 
Directly and by 
fitting a descriptive 
content 
Regardless of 
descriptive content 
rigidified 
Combined 
Complex demonstratives according to Borg  
Table 2.6 
 
2.2.4 Natural-kind terms 
The last type of natural-language terms that we will examine is natural-kind terms. So far 
we have discussed natural-language terms which are singular terms. Natural-kind terms 
are general terms. However, due to various important similarities between proper names 
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and natural-kind terms, views on proper names are commonly extended to natural-kind 
terms as well.  
Natural-kind terms are terms like “tiger”, “gold”, (arguably) “water”, “lemon”, or 
“heat”. They are contrasted with terms of non-natural-kinds, typically human 
constructions, such as “city”, “ten-pound note”, and “bachelor”.  
A Millian-style view of natural-kind terms is that they designate their referents 
directly, regardless of any descriptive content. “Gold” for instance simply designates the 
stuff gold, regardless of any description that may be true of gold.  
This view is subject to the same types of objections that Millianism faced with 
regard to proper names:54 (a) Frege’s puzzle: if Millianism is true, then the terms “Furze” 
and “Gorse” have the same meaning, and hence are substitutive salva veritate. If follows 
that “Furze is Gorse” amounts just to “Furze is Furze”. But the latter, unlike the former, 
is trivial and uninformative; (b) Empty natural-kind terms: the sentence “gnomes are 
mythical creatures” seems meaningful. Yet if Millianism is true, then “gnomes” refers to 
nothing, i.e., it means nothing, and hence the sentence is just meaningless; (c) Negative 
existentials: “unicorns do not exist” seems meaningful and true. However, according to 
Millianism, the sentence comes out absurd: it denies the existence of something the 
existence of which it presupposes; and (d) Propositional attitude reports: the sentence 
“Fred believes that filberts, but not hazelnuts, are sweet” seems to express a mistaken, 
yet nonetheless rational, belief. Millianism will simply render it a self-refuting, and hence 
irrational, belief.  
A version of the Frege-Russell view that applies to natural-kind terms will avoid 
these objections. According to such a view a natural-kind term has some descriptive 
content by virtue of which it designates its referent. Replacing each natural-kind term 
with the alleged abbreviated description will bar the above objections.  
However, such a descriptive view faces the modal charges raised by the New 
Theory of reference: suppose that the descriptive content of “tiger” is, “a large 
carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny yellow in colour with blackish transverse stripes 
and white belly.”55 Yet the fact that, for example, tigers have stripes seems contingent. 
Tigers might not have been striped. But if “tiger” abbreviates the above description, then 
the claim that tigers are striped comes out necessary, which is false. Hence descriptivism 
is false.  
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Thus the problem with Frege-Russell descriptivism about natural-kind terms is 
that it renders such terms nonrigid (or better, non-rigidified), thus lending this view to 
Kripke’s modal arguments. As in the case of proper names, a remedy to descriptivism 
seems to require a rigidification of the alleged descriptive content of natural-kind terms. 
Again, such rigidification can be achieved by actualising the description, E.g., “gold” 
stands for “the actual golden stuff”, or simply by taking natural-kind terms to be de re 
terms, i.e., abbreviations of de re descriptions. 56  
The New Theory of reference extended to natural-kind terms simply claims that 
natural-kind terms are rigid (or better, rigidified) designators. “Tiger” designates just 
tigers in every counterfactual world, regardless of any description that may apply to them 
in that world. There is, however, an important difference between the New Theory of 
reference as applied to proper names and as it is applied to natural-kind terms. The 
difference is that whereas it is clear what a proper name rigidly designates, it is less clear 
what a natural-kind term rigidly designates. “Aristotle” rigidly designates Aristotle, yet 
what does “tiger” rigidly designate? “tiger” cannot rigidly designate the set of individual 
tigers that it actually designates, since in other counterfactual worlds “tiger” designates a 
different set of individuals.57 As an alternative, it has been suggested that “tiger” 
designates an abstract entity, the kind, or property, of being a tiger. And it designates that 
kind, or property, in every counterfactual world. However, this suggestion seems to allow 
too much. Artificial kinds like “city”, “bachelor”, and even general terms like “watery”, 
“hot”, and “red” also each designate a kind, or property, in every possible world, and are 
thus rendered rigid by that view. In fact, some claim that according to this view, any 
kind-term, or property-term, turns out rigid. In other words, the charge is that this view 
trivialises rigidity.58 As a response, Devitt (2005) suggests the following alternative sense 
for the rigidity of natural-kind terms:  
A general term ‘F’ is a rigid applier iff it is such that if it applies to an object in any 
possible world, then it applies to that object in every possible world in which the 
object exists. Similarly for a mass term 
… 
Clearly, if ‘F’ is a rigid applier then any individual F must be essentially F. So the view 
that there are any such ‘F’s entails a fairly robust metaphysical thesis. Still, that thesis 
has been popular from ancient times to the present and I think that it is plausible.59 
It seems to me that this suggestion can be paraphrased as follows: a natural-kind 
term designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, objects of the same (natural) 
kind that it designates in the actual world. (Although I believe Devitt’s definition is 
entailed by the paraphrase, I am not entirely sure that they are equivalent). Thus the 
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referent of a natural-kind term is a set, but it is not the same set in every counterfactual 
world. Now surely, being of the same natural-kind involves criteria of identity, but the 
same is true of proper names as well: a rigid name designates, with respect to every 
counterfactual world, the same individual that it designates in the actual world. So 
involving criteria of identity is no special feature of natural-kind terms, but rather a mark 
of rigidified designators in general. And it is this link to criteria of identity that restores 
the distinction between natural-kind terms, and other predicates. If this last proposal of 
Devitt’s is successful, (as I believe it is,) then the New Theory of reference can be 
extended to natural-kind terms.  
As mentioned in our discussion of proper names, the New Theory is primarily 
concerned with designation in counterfactual worlds, and not so much with how the 
referents are picked out in the actual world. Designation in the actual world can be either 
by ostension or by fitting a description. Thus, to take a mass natural-kind as an example, 
“gold” may initially be “baptised” either by pointing at a sample (or some samples) of 
gold (a directly-referring term), or it can be fixed to name “that which is the (actual) 
golden stuff” (a reference-fixing term). Both terms – the directly-referring “gold” and the 
reference-fixing “gold” – designate the same stuff in all counterfactual worlds. The 
difference between the two however, is the following: whereas a directly-referring “gold” 
designates the same stuff in all actual worlds as well, a reference-fixing “gold” will 
designate different stuffs in different actual worlds. 
 
2.2.4.1 Natural-kind terms: summary  
The analysis of views about natural-kind terms in terms of our fourfold categorisation is 
as follows. On a Millian-style view, natural-kind terms designate in the actual world 
directly some individuals, i.e., regardless of any descriptive content, and then designate, 
with respect to every counterfactual world, objects of the same (natural) kind. Thus, 
according to this view, natural-kind terms belong in our fourth category, directly-referring 
terms. According to a Frege-Russell style descriptivism, a natural-kind term designates in 
all worlds (actual and counterfactual) that which fits its descriptive content. Thus 
according to that view, natural-kind terms belong in our first category – descriptive terms. 
According to rigidified descriptions views, a natural-kind term designates in the actual 
world those referents which fit the term’s descriptive content, and it then designates, 
with respect to all counterfactual worlds, referents of the same kind as the actual ones. So 
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on this view, natural-kind terms belong in our second category – reference-fixing terms. 
Lastly, according to the New Theory, a natural-kind term designates, with respect to 
every counterfactual world, referents of the same (natural) kind as the referents that it 
designates in the actual world. In the actual world, natural-kind terms may either 
designate directly, or via fitting the term’s descriptive content. Thus, according to this 
view, natural-kind terms belong both in the second category – reference-fixing terms, and in 
the fourth category – directly-referring terms. In other words, natural-kind terms are simply 
rigidified terms. Table 2.7 summarises this:   
Designation in  
the actual world  
Designation in  
counterfactual worlds  
 
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
Descriptive  
All natural-kind terms according to a 
Russell-Frege descriptivism 
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
Regardless of descriptive 
content  
Reference-fixing  
All natural-kind terms according to 
rigidified descriptivism 
Some natural-kind terms according to the 
New Theory  
Regardless of 
descriptive content  
By fitting a descriptive 
content  
--- 
Regardless of 
descriptive content  
Regardless of descriptive 
content  
Directly-referring  
All natural-kind terms according to 
Millianism  
Some natural-kind terms according to the 
New Theory 
Table 2.7 
 
2.2.5 Summary of the proposed analysis of natural-language terms 
We have been discussing the semantics of natural-language terms; specifically, we have 
discussed proper names, definite descriptions, complex demonstratives and natural-kind 
terms. We have presented different views about each of these terms. We aimed at 
comparing and contrasting those view. For this purpose, we have suggested a fourfold 
categorisation of semantic terms, based on two distinctions: (a) designation in the actual 
world vs. designation in counterfactual worlds; and (b) designation by fitting a descriptive 
content vs. designation regardless of such content. Based in this categorisation, we have 
defined three basic semantic functions: descriptive, reference-fixing, and directly-
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referring. The comparison of the different semantic views about the various natural-
language terms culminates in an interesting overall picture. The obvious thing is that 
different views ascribe to a given term different semantic functions. But more 
interestingly, these semantic functions were shown to always be one of our three 
proposed basic functions (Borg’s view on complex demonstratives combines two of 
these functions). More interestingly still is that with respect to each type of term, for each 
of the three basic functions, it turned out that there is always a view that takes the term 
to have that basic function (or at least to be able to, in the case of ambiguity views). 
Table 2.8 specifies this: 
 Proper names  Natural-kind 
terms 
Definite 
descriptions 
Complex 
demonstratives 
Descriptive  Frege-Russell 
 
Frege-Russell  Frege-Russell; 
ambiguity views (de 
dicto definite 
descriptions)  
Frege-Russell   
Reference-
fixing  
Rigidified 
descriptivism;  
New Theory 
(some names) 
Rigidified 
descriptivism;  
New Theory (some 
natural-kind 
terms) 
Ambiguity views 
(De re definite 
descriptions) 
Kaplan (1978) 
Directly-
referring  
Millianism;  
New Theory 
(some names) 
 
Millianism;   
New Theory (some 
natural-kind 
terms)  
 
Donnellan 
(Referential definite 
descriptions) 
“Minimal” view 
Combined 
view   
   Borg 
Table 2.8 
An important lesson to draw from this analysis is that there is no use in talking 
about the semantics of a certain kind of term, as this is a matter of much controversy. 
Rather, it is more constructive to talk about formal terms, namely, about descriptive 
terms, reference-fixing terms or directly-referring terms. If this is sound, then it follows 
that once we’ve discussed the formal language terms, we’ve thereby discussed the 
semantics of all these natural-language terms. (Whatever these semantics turn out to be).  
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2.3 Intension as a Means to Distinguish among Semantic Functions  
We could hope to compare the different referring terms in our natural-language by 
means of differences in their intensions. But, as we have seen, there are ongoing 
controversies about the semantics of these natural-language terms, and want of a 
consensus about the semantics of a term, how can we determine its intension?  
The above analysis of these views in terms of our fourfold categorisation can 
solve this problem.  
Some views regard proper names as descriptive, others as reference-fixing, and 
yet others as directly-referring. Something similar holds for the other natural-language 
terms: definite descriptions, demonstratives and natural-kind terms. Thus, since all views 
fit into our categorisation, we can simply compare our formal categories – descriptive, 
reference-fixing, and directly-referring. The semantics of these formal types of terms are 
well defined, and thus can be easily compared and contrasted by means of their different 
intensions. In other words, rather than comparing the natural-language terms directly, we 
shall compare the underlying semantic structures that they may have.  
Note: as this chapter’s main concern is semantics, we shall assume, for the sake 
of simplicity, that there is no problem with criteria of identity, and hence will ignore this 
factor in the present discussion.  
Suppose Jones is Taylor’s neighbour. There are various types of terms that we 
can use to refer to him. We can refer to Jones by using a descriptive term (e.g., a de dicto 
definite description “Taylor’s neighbour”), or by using a reference-fixing term (e.g., a de re 
definite description “Taylor’s neighbour”, or an actualised description “Taylor’s actual 
neighbour”), or by using a directly-referring term (e.g., a referential definite description 
“Taylor’s neighbour”, or a Millian-name “Jones”).  
The descriptive term - e.g., a de dicto “Taylor’s neighbour” – designates, with 
respect to every possible world, that which fits the descriptive content, i.e., the person 
who is Taylor’s neighbour, in that world. Thus, the designation of a descriptive term in 
counterfactual worlds is entirely independent of its designation in the actual world. In 
other words, the designation of a descriptive term is constant across actual worlds, but 
varies across counterfactual worlds. E.g., in the case of a descriptive term whose 
descriptive content is “Taylor’s neighbour”, the intension of that term is,  
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Designation in 
the actual 
world 
Designation in 
counterfactual 
worlds  
State of the 
actual world 
W1  
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Jones 
W2
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Smith 
W3 
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Brown 
W1 
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Jones  
Jones Smith Brown 
W2 
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Smith 
Jones Smith Brown 
Via fitting a 
descriptive 
content  
Via fitting a 
descriptive 
content  
W3 
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Brown 
Jones Smith Brown 
Table 2.9 
By contrast, the intension of a reference-fixing term for Jones – e.g., the 
actualised definite description “Taylor’s actual neighbour” – designates, with respect to 
every counterfactual world, that which fits the description – e.g., the person who is 
Taylor’s neighbour – in the actual world. Viz., a reference-fixing term designates in the 
actual world that which fits the descriptive content, and then designates, with respect to 
all counterfactual worlds, that same individual. Hence, the designation of the reference-
fixing “Taylor’s actual neighbour” in counterfactual worlds is entirely dependent on its 
designation in the actual world. The intension of such a reference-fixing term, e.g., 
“Taylor’s actual neighbour”, is thus constant across counterfactual worlds, yet it varies 
across actual worlds:60 
Designation 
in the actual 
world 
Designation in 
counterfactual 
worlds  
State of the 
actual world 
W1  
Taylor’s 
neighbour 
is Jones 
W2 
Taylor’s 
neighbour 
is Smith 
W3
Taylor’s 
neighbour 
is Brown 
W1 
Taylor’s 
neighbour 
is Jones  
Jones Jones Jones 
W2 
Taylor’s 
neighbour 
is Smith 
Smith Smith Smith 
Via fitting a 
descriptive 
content  
Regardless of a 
descriptive 
content 
W3 
Taylor’s 
neighbour 
is Brown 
Brown Brown Brown 
Table 2.10 
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Finally, a directly-referring term for Jones – e.g., a Millian-name “Jones” - 
designates, with respect to every possible world, simply Jones, i.e., regardless of fitting 
any descriptive content. The intension of “Jones” is thus constant across the board:61 
Designation in 
the actual 
world 
Designation in 
counterfactual 
worlds  
State of the 
actual world 
W1  
Taylor’s 
neighbour 
is Jones 
W2
Taylor’s 
neighbour 
is Smith 
W3 
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Brown 
W1 
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Jones  
Jones Jones Jones 
W2 
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Smith 
Jones Jones Jones 
Regardless of 
a descriptive 
content 
Regardless of a 
descriptive 
content 
W3 
Taylor’s 
neighbour is 
Brown 
Jones Jones Jones 
Table 2.11 
In conclusion, there is a clear structural pattern that emerges here: a descriptive 
term is one that is constant across actual worlds, yet varies across counterfactual worlds; 
a reference-fixing term is constant across counterfactual worlds, yet varies across actual 
worlds, and a directly-referring term is constant across the board, i.e., both across actual 
worlds and across counterfactual worlds.  
 
2.4   Fine-Graining “The Actual Referent” Factor in the Formula  
How does our fourfold classification of semantic terms relate to our “calculator of 
intensions”?  
Recall that our general formula of intensions accepts three arguments that 
together determine the intension of a term: (a) the semantic function; (b) the actual 
referent; and (c) criteria of identity. Thus, one evident way in which the fourfold 
classification contributes to such a formula is that it fine-grains the semantic function 
factor. The initial distinction, between descriptive and rigidified terms was shown to be 
focused on designation in counterfactual worlds: where the former designates via fitting a 
descriptive content, and the latter designates regardless of such content. Yet we found 
that the same distinction applies to the actual world as well: with respect to the actual 
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world, terms may designate via fitting a descriptive content or regardless of such content. 
In particular, this latter distinction divided the category of rigidified terms into two sub-
categories: reference-fixing terms and directly-referring terms.  
However, this fine-graining may at first seem to have little impact on intensions. 
The intension of a term is the reference of the term with respect to counterfactual 
worlds. Thus, given that, as far as the semantic function is concerned, the intension of a 
term can be determined on the basis of the way a term designates in counterfactual 
worlds, why bother finding the way the term designates in the actual world as well?  
Interestingly, it will be argued that the way a term designates in the actual world 
does play a crucial role in determining intensions, but it does so through another factor: 
the actual referent. Specifically, the actual referent is determined by two other factors: (i) the 
way the term designates in the actual world; together with (ii) the state of the actual 
world. Therefore, since the intension of a term is dependent upon its actual referent, it is 
thereby dependent upon the two factors that determine this actual referent, one of which 
is the way the term designates in the actual world. Let me demonstrate this.  
As in the previous section, we shall initially assume, for the sake of simplicity, 
that there is no problem about re-identification, and hence no need for criteria of 
identity. E.g., we shall take the intension of a rigidified “Newton” to simply assign 
Newton to each counterfactual world (i.e., assuming no problem in re-identifying 
Newton in other possible worlds). We shall thus initially develop our discussion while 
ignoring the factor of criteria of identity, and will incorporate it only at a later stage.  
When the semantic function of a term is descriptive, the effect of the actual 
referent on intension is cancelled out, i.e., the intension of a descriptive term is in fact 
independent of the actual referent. However, the intension of any rigidified terms is 
determined by its actual referent. In other words, changing the actual referent of a 
rigidified term will result in a change of its intension. But what could make an actual 
referent be something other than it is?  
I shall defend the following: the actual referent of a term is determined by both 
the way in which the term picks out its referent in the actual world, and by what the 
actual world is like. Changing each of these may result in a change of the actual referent. 
This breaks down into the following two claims. On the one hand, (holding the actual 
world constant) different ways the term designates in the actual world will yield different 
actual referents. On the other hand, (holding the way of designation in the actual world 
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constant) different states of the actual world will result in different actual referents as 
well. Let me illustrate these two claims in order.  
The first claim is that (while holding the actual world constant) different ways the 
term designates in the actual world will yield different actual referents. There are two 
ways in which a rigidified term can pick out its referent in the actual world: by directly 
“labelling” (a directly-referring term), or by fitting a descriptive content associated with 
the term (a reference-fixing term). A directly-referring term “T” and a reference-fixing 
“T” will pick out the same referent in an actual world, as long as the thing “labelled” is 
the same as the thing that fits the descriptive content. For example, considering our 
world as the actual world, both a directly-referring “Aristotle” (i.e., a term that directly 
“labels” Aristotle), and a reference-fixing “Aristotle” (say, an abbreviation of the 
rigidified description “the actual last great philosopher of antiquity”) will designate 
Aristotle in this actual world. Both being rigidified terms, they will also designate 
Aristotle in all counterfactual worlds. But now consider the possibility that the actual 
world is such that Aristotle was not so bright, and that it was his wife, Pythias, who 
secretly wrote all the books and prepared his lectures for him. Holding this actual world 
constant, each of the two semantic functions will yield a different actual referent. A 
directly-referring “Aristotle” will still yield Aristotle as the actual referent, and hence will 
designate Aristotle in all counterfactual worlds, whether he is a philosopher there or not; 
whereas a reference-fixing “Aristotle” will yield Pythias as the actual referent, and hence 
will designate Pythias in all counterfactual worlds, whether she is a philosopher there or 
not. Thus, changing the way that the term designates in the actual world may result in a 
change of the actual referent, and consequently, a change in the intension. (Recall that for 
simplicity we initially assume no problem with criteria of identity, of people or anything 
else, and hence ignore this factor in the formula for now.) The intension of a rigidified 
“Aristotle” is thus:  
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Designation in 
counterfactual 
words  
 
 
Designation 
in the actual 
world  
 
 
+ 
 
 
The state of 
the actual 
world  
 
 
=
 
 
Actual 
referent
W  1
The last 
great 
philosopher 
of antiquity 
is Pythias 
W2 
The last 
great 
philosopher 
of antiquity 
is Aristotle 
… 
Via fitting a 
descriptive 
content 
(“reference-
fixing”) 
+ = Pythias Pythias Pythias Pythias 
Regardless of 
descriptive 
content 
(“rigidified”) 
Regardless 
of 
descriptive 
content 
(“directly-
referring”) 
+ 
The last 
great 
philosopher 
of antiquity 
is Pythias 
= Aristotle Aristotle Aristotle Aristotle
Table 2.12 
The second claim was that (while holding the designation in the actual world 
constant) different states of the actual world will result in different actual referents as well 
(and, consequently, different intensions). However, as reference-fixing terms and 
directly-referring terms pick out their referent in the actual world in different ways, the 
contribution of the state of the actual world to determining reference is different in the 
two cases. We shall thus examine those separately.  
Let us begin by looking at the reference-fixing term. We have seen that if the 
actual world is such that Pythias came up with all the ideas ascribed to Aristotle, a 
reference-fixing “Aristotle” whose descriptive content is “the last great philosopher of 
antiquity” picks out Pythias as the actual referent (and, consequently, as the referent in all 
counterfactual worlds). However, if the actual world is as we believe it to be, the same 
reference-fixing “Aristotle” yields Aristotle as the actual referent (and, consequently, also 
as the referent in all counterfactual worlds). Thus, changing the actual world may result in 
a change of the actual referent of a reference-fixing term. (As above, we assume that 
there is no problem with criteria of identity, and hence we ignore this third factor.) The 
intension of a reference-fixing “Aristotle” is thus:  
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Designation in 
counterfactual 
words  
 
 
Designation 
in the actual 
world  
 
 
+ 
 
 
The state of 
the actual 
world  
 
 
=
 
 
Actual 
referent
W1 
The last 
great 
philosopher 
of antiquity 
is Pythias 
W2 
The last 
great 
philosopher 
of antiquity 
is Aristotle 
… 
+ 
The last 
great 
philosopher 
of antiquity 
is Pythias 
= Pythias Pythias Pythias Pythias 
Regardless of 
descriptive 
content 
(“rigidified”) 
Via fitting a 
descriptive 
content 
(“reference-
fixing”) 
+ 
The last 
great 
philosopher 
of antiquity 
is Aristotle 
= Aristotle Aristotle Aristotle Aristotle
Table 2.13 
A similar dependency holds for directly-referring terms, i.e., terms that designate 
their referent in the actual world directly, regardless of any descriptive content. Such a 
directly-referring “Aristotle” simply “labels” Aristotle. Now consider the possibility that 
Aristotle was not a human being, but rather a super-sophisticated robot from outer space 
(how else could one person contemplate and write this entire profound corpus in one 
lifetime?) For convenience, let us refer to this robot as “Rob”. In that case, “Aristotle” 
picks out in the actual world a robot, Rob. Thus “Aristotle” will designate Rob in all 
counterfactual worlds. (Consequently, in a counterfactual world where the guy referred to as 
“Aristotle” is exactly like who we think of as Aristotle (i.e., human, philosopher, etc.) our 
directly-referring term “Aristotle” will not designate him.) However, the actual world may 
be as we believe it to be, i.e., Aristotle is a human being. For convenience, let us refer to 
this guy as “Hum”. In case Aristotle is a human being, a directly-referring “Aristotle” will 
pick out that person, Hum, in the actual world, and, consequently, it will pick out that 
same human in all counterfactual worlds. It thus follows that changing the actual world 
results in a change of the actual referent of a directly-referring term as well. (Again, for 
simplicity, we assume that there is no problem with criteria of identity of people or, for 
this matter, of robots; hence we ignore that factor.) The intensions of a directly-referring 
“Aristotle” is thus:  
 
 
107
 
 
Designation in 
counterfactual 
words  
 
 
Designation 
in the actual 
world  
 
 
 
+
 
 
The state 
of the 
actual 
world  
 
 
=
 
 
Actual 
referent
W1 
The last great 
philosopher of 
antiquity is the 
person, Hum, 
referred to as 
“Aristotle” 
W2 
The last great 
philosopher of 
antiquity is a 
robot, Rob, 
referred to as 
“Aristotle” 
… 
+ Aristotle is human = Hum Hum Hum HumRegardless of descriptive 
content 
(“rigidified”) 
Regardless of 
descriptive 
content 
(“directly-
referring”) 
+ Aristotle is a robot = Aristotle Rob Rob Rob
Table 2.14 
To conclude, the intension of a rigidified term is dependent upon the actual 
referent of a term. So different possibilities of the actual referent of a term will generate 
different intensions. Having fine-grained semantic functions, we came to realise that the 
actual referent of a term is itself determined by two factors: (i) the way in which the term 
designates in the actual world (directly or via fitting a descriptive content), and (ii) the way 
the actual world is like. Changing the values of any of these variables results in a change 
of the actual referent of the term, and, consequently, in the counterfactual referents of 
the term; in other words, changing the values of these variables results in a change of the 
intension of the term.  
In this sense, therefore, considering the way in which terms designate in the 
actual world (apart from the way they designate in counterfactual worlds), is in fact a 
fine-graining of the factor of the actual referent: it provides insight into the elements 
which determine this factor. We could refine our formula of intensions by replacing the 
variable of the actual referent, with the following two variables: the way of designation in 
the actual world, and the state of the actual world. The factor we called “the semantic 
function” should more accurately be called “designation in counterfactual worlds”: 
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Designation in 
counterfactual words  
Designation in the 
actual world  
The state of the 
actual world  
Criteria of 
identity 
W1 
 
W2 
 
…
Via fitting a 
descriptive content 
(descriptive) 
(Whatever) (Whatever) (Whatever)    
    W1 
    
    W2 
    
    
Via fitting a 
descriptive content 
(reference-fixing) 
… 
    
    W1 
    
    W2 
    
    
Regardless of 
descriptive content 
(rigidified) 
Regardless of 
descriptive content 
(directly-referring) 
… 
    
Table 2.15 
Put it differently, we may conclude by saying that the intension of a term depends 
on the following three factors: (a) the semantic function of the term, i.e., the way the term 
picks out its referent in possible worlds (distinguishing picking out in actual vs. picking 
out in counterfactual worlds); (b) the state of the actual world; and (c) criteria of identity. 
Thus, overall, the intension of the term is dependent upon semantics, metaphysics and 
actuality. (This is in fact the formulation of the “calculator” as presented in the 
introduction to this dissertation).  
Lastly, for simplicity, we so far ignored the metaphysical issue of re-identifying a 
referent in counterfactual worlds in this discussion. What if we did not ignore it?  
If we want to take the further factor of criteria of identity on board, the intension 
of a rigidified term will be determined as follows. As we have just established, the actual 
referent of the terms is determined by the way the term designates in the actual world, 
together with the state of the actual world. E.g., if “Aristotle” is a reference-fixing name 
that is designed to designate in the actual world the last great philosopher of antiquity, 
and the state of the actual world is that the last great philosopher is Aristotle, then the 
actual referent of “Aristotle” is Aristotle. Once determined, the actual referent needs to 
be checked for its properties. Suppose Aristotle is human, and has certain mental features 
M and a body B. Once these have been fixed, then together with the criteria of personal 
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identity, we can re-identify the actual referent on counterfactual worlds. E.g., suppose the 
criteria of identity for people are psychological. In that case, Aristotle is identical to 
whoever has his mental features, i.e., he is identical to a guy in some counterfactual world 
who has mental features M yet another body C, but not to a guy on some counterfactual 
world who has body B but mental features N, or no mental features at all.   
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1 With the exception of one “hybrid” view of complex demonstratives; but even this view takes 
complex demonstratives to be a combination of two of the above three. 
2 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 96) 
3 Kripke 1972/1980, p. 79, n. 33). Evans’s (1977) descriptive name “Julius”, that is stipulated to 
designate the (actual) inventor of the zip, is a similar case.  
4 Kaplan (1977/1989, p. 483)  
5 Kripke (1980, pp. 55, 135). There is a sense in which this title is not completely suitable; all 
rigidified terms have their reference fixed across possible worlds, and all have a way of fixing the 
reference in the actual world; e.g., directly-referring terms may be said to fix their actual referent 
by an act of ostension, or “labelling”. Thus, our use of “reference-fixing” here is restricted to 
fixing the reference by means of fitting a descriptive content. 
6 Nathan Salmon (1981 p. 33 n.35) says that there is nothing to logically prevent directly-referring 
terms from being nonrigid, e.g., due to some device that makes them designate different referents 
in different possible worlds. However, in the case of semantically simple terms like proper names, 
such device is not likely to be a description, and hence such terms will not fit into our third 
category. And at any rate, Salmon admits that “to do so [i.e., to vary designation in counterfactual 
worlds] seems arbitrary and artificial”, thus partly explaining why there are no such terms in 
English (and presumably in any other natural languages).   
7 Notably Dummett (1973; 1981). See Section  2.2.1.2.5. 
8 Mill (1867, reprinted in 1949, p. 20) 
9 Notable contemporary proponents of the Millian view of names include Kaplan (1989); Salmon 
(1986), and Soames (2002, p. 240, 243). 
10 Russell’s (1905) original version involved definite descriptions rather than proper names, yet it 
is widely accepted that the objections equally apply to a Millian view of any singular term. It is a 
matter of controversy whether ordinary names in our natural language are indeed directly-
referring or not. As regards names, Russell (1910) called such Millian names logically proper names, 
and thought that ordinary proper names, in natural language, are not such logically proper 
names.10 The adaptations to proper names brought here are due to Reimer (2003). 
11 Grice (1975) 
12 See, for example, Salmon (1986) and Soames (1989).  
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13 More specifically, Russell’s theory of descriptions (1905) argues that sentences containing 
definite descriptions of the form “the F is G” are equivalent to “there is an x such that, x is 
uniquely an F, and it is G”. Thus, definite descriptions should be understood in terms of 
quantifiers (Russell took this to be an advantage over Frege’s model. See Endnote 14). In that 
initial introduction of his theory, however, there was not yet mention of proper names.   
14 Two main differences between the views, which Russell (1905) stressed, are, (1) Frege’s view 
entails that the referent of a name is a constituent of the proposition that involved the name, 
whereas on Russell’s view the referent is not a constituent of the proposition; (2) Frege’s view is a 
two-layer view: it involves references and sense. Russell’s view, by contrast, is a one-layer view. It 
involves no sense, i.e., it has less metaphysical commitment (which Russell of course considered 
an advantage).  
15 Notably Kripke (1972/1980).  
16 Devitt and Sterelny (1999, p. 49) 
17 Another objection to descriptivism which is frequently raised (mainly stressed by Putnam 
(1975)) is based on the fact that different people associate different descriptions, or senses, with 
the same proper name. This leads to two related problems. Firstly, names become ambiguous, 
hence, the problem of unwanted ambiguity (Devitt and Sterelny, 1999, p. 49). Secondly, some 
people may associate an entirely wrong description with a name, for instance, some people may 
associate with the name “Einstein” the definite description “the scientist who invented the 
atomic bomb” (Kripke, 1980); for those people, the name “Einstein” refers not to Einstein but 
to Oppenheimer. This is known as the problem of ignorance and error. However, on some versions 
of descriptivism, the description that the name abbreviates is not “in the head” of the speaker, 
but rather an objective abbreviation, independent of the speaker. Such versions are therefore 
immune to these objections, and thus I believe these types of objections not to be principal.   
18 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 96) 
19 Searle (1983); Nelson (2002). For a detailed discussion of this proposal see Stanley (1997).  
20 Kaplan (1989, p. 577). Kaplan, however, does not endorse this view. Rather, he sees proper 
names as directly-referring. (For exact references, see Endnote 61 in this chapter).   
21 Ludlow (2005) mentions attempts to rigidify the descriptions that names are said to abbreviate 
by means of restricting the descriptions to a very particular kind: one such kind is that a name 
“Aristotle” abbreviates something like the description “the individual designated by the name 
‘Aristotle’” (Ludlow lists Loar (1976), McDowell (1977), and Schiffer (1978) as proponents). The 
weakness of the suggestion is evident in the title it received, circular descriptivism – “Aristotle” is 
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abbreviated by a description that involves the name “Aristotle”. Another such kind is that 
“Aristotle” abbreviates something like “the individual linked by a causal chain to Aristotle”, 
which Lewis (1984) called causal descriptivism (Ludlow lists Kroon (1987) and Jackson (1998b) as 
supporters). As these suggestions become much closer to Kripke’s view than to the Frege-Russell 
descriptivism, I do not see them as interesting candidates for rescuing descriptivism.  
22 Dummett (1973, pp.111-135, 1981) 
23 Russell (1905/2001, p. 217) 
24 The distinction dates back to medieval philosophy. Literally, “de dicto” means “of, or 
concerning, a dictum”, i.e., concerning a bearer of representative content (something like a 
sentence, a statement, or a proposition), whereas “de re” means “of, or concerning, a thing” 
(Galois, 1998). The example to follow should clarify this distinction.  
25 However, Quine (1956) has famously objected to the scope analysis of the de re/de dicto 
distinction, on grounds that the wide scope reading involves quantifying into an opaque (i.e., 
intensional) context (as is demonstrated below), which he considered illegitimate.   
26 This, however, does not mean that the two distinctions – de re/de dicto and narrow/wide scope 
– are interchangeable. As Kripke (1977) demonstrated, whereas the de re/de dicto distinction can 
be accounted for in terms of scope, the converse does not hold. The reason is that there are 
more than two scopes, and hence “no twofold distinction can do the job” (1977, p. 10).  
27 Kripke (1980,  pp. 11-15) 
28 LaPorte (2006) mentions such suggestions made by Sosa (2001); Hunter (2005); Caplan (2005) 
(who actually argues against this view); and Everett (2005). 
29 Kaplan (1978/2001, p. 328)  
30 Kaplan (1978/2001, p. 329). Kaplan expresses this view elsewhere as well. E.g., (1977/1989; 
1979). See also Endnote 61 below. 
31 I thus believe that Chalmers’s two-dimensionalist view of names (e.g., 2002; 2006) also fits 
here: “Hesperus” stands for “the actual evening star”, and thus designates Hesperus in every 
counterfactual world; yet it designates different stars (more correctly, planets) in different actual 
worlds. See also Endnote 60 below. 
32 As noted above, a term with the semantic function specified here by Kripke, may be de facto 
rigid, i.e., it nay turn out to designate the same referent in all counterfactual worlds, e.g., “the sum 
of 2+3”. Hence, I believe that instead of rigid/nonrigid, Kripke should have used “rigidified” (or 
de jure rigid)/non-rigidified (or, not de jure rigid).  
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33 Kripke (1977, pp. 10-11). For a more recent similar analysis, see Sidelle (1992, p.412).  
34 Kripke (1977, p. 11)  
35 With relation to the above quote, Kripke simply states “some” philosophers that hold this view 
without naming any. Kaplan (1978) proposes a de re/de dicto ambiguity of un-embedded sentences, 
which he accounts for in terms of possible worlds. (Kaplan devises a dthat operator, whose job is 
to rigidify descriptions):  
…the verbal form of [“the spy is suspicious”] might have been adopted by one who lacks 
“dthat” to express what is expressed by [“dthat (the spy) is suspicious”]. We seem to have here 
a kind of de re – de dicto ambiguity in the verbal form of [“the spy is suspicious”] and without 
benefit of any intensional operator. No question of an utterer’s intentions has been brought 
into play. There is no question of an analysis in terms of scope, since there is no operator.  
(my italics) 
But Kaplan stops short of ascribing the ambiguity to the definite description itself, rather than to 
the whole sentence. A similar line of reasoning is suggested by Partee (1970), where she suggests 
a de re/de dicto ambiguity in the non-embedded sentence, “The man who murdered Smith is 
insane”. However, she takes this ambiguity to be the same as Donnellan’s referential/attributive 
distinction – an assimilation that Kripke (1977) argued against. For details see Sections  2.2.2.1.3 
and (in particular)  5.2.3. 
36 There is, however, one important difference to note between de re terms and actualised 
descriptions despite both having the same semantic function. The difference is that an actualised 
description, like “the actual spy”, is distinguished syntactically from a descriptive term, like “the 
spy”, but a de re definite description is not so distinguished from a de dicto definite description; the 
latter two look exactly the same – just “the spy”. This, in fact, is the source of the ambiguity 
involved in the de re/de dicto distinction. 
37 Versions of this ambiguity view of definite descriptions are held, for example, by Kaplan 
(1978), Wettstein (1981) and Reimer (1998a; 1998b).  
38 Linsky L. (1963, p.80) 
39 Donnellan (1966/2001, p. 250) 
40 Donnellan (1966/2001, p. 249). We shall discuss this problematic distinction at considerable 
length in Section  5.2. 
41 It should be noted though that although both Linsky and Donnellan agree that the definite 
descriptions succeed in referring to the intended object, they are less committed to the truth of such 
statements. When it comes to the proposition as a whole, Linsky says that since the subject does 
not fit the description, the proposition itself lacks a truth-value – it is neither true nor false. By 
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holding such a view, he pretty much follows P. F. Strawson’s (1950) intuition with regard to 
vacuous terms, who believed that “the present king of France” is neither true nor false. (As 
opposed to Russell (1919), who, in the light of his theory of description, took propositions that 
included such terms to be plainly false.) Donnellan is less clear on this matter. Discussing 
Linsky’s example he intuits,  
it seems to me that we shall, on the one hand, want to hold that the speaker said 
something true, but be reluctant to express this by “It is true that her husband is kind 
to her.”  
(1966/2001, p. 256)  
At any rate, whatever the truth value of the proposition as a whole is, it is quite clear that both 
Linsky and Donnellan thought that definite descriptions may in some cases designate referents 
that fail to fit the description. Thus, it follows that a definite description on its own, is subject not 
only to a de re and a de dicto reading of it, but also to a referential reading of it.  
42 E.g., Kripke (1977); Salmon (1981; 1991); Bach (1987) and Neale (1990). 
43 E.g., Larson and Segal (1995, p. 348-9) argue that Donnellan’s distinction is, pace Kripke, 
semantic, i.e., that a referential use expresses, semantically, reference to the man with the water in 
his glass. Quite a few others support a semantic interpretation, but most of them add a 
requirement, pace Donnellan, that in addition to being intended by the speaker, the referent also 
fits the description. This seems easier to defend for it does not involve designation of a referent 
that does not actually fit the description, as the above referential use allows. See Section  5.2.2. 
44 I.e., on some interpretations of the distinction it need not. That is to say, some take the 
referential to simply be rigidified (i.e., either directly-referring or reference-fixing). On such 
interpretation, a referential definite description designates, with respect to every counterfactual 
world, that which it designates in the actual world (however the actual referent is being picked-
out). See discussion in Section  5.2.5.  
45 Frege (1918) 
46 E.g., Kaplan (1977/1989). For a non-modal version of the objection see Perry (1977).  
47 Kaplan (1978; 1989, p. 580). Similar views are held by Wettstein (1981); Devitt (1981a, who 
later, 2004, retracts from this view, and adopts a version of the “combined” view, to be presented 
shortly. See Endnote 53 below for a detailed description of his later view); and Neale (1993, p. 
108).  
48 Notable defenders of this view are Larson and Segal (1995, p. 213). 
49 Braun (2001)  
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50 There is a controversy whether it is the demonstration, e.g., gesturing, or the intention that 
does the picking-out job, and, as one can expect in philosophy, there are other controversies 
within each camp as well. Adherents of the demonstration thesis include Kaplan in his 
“Demonstratives” (1977/1989, pp. 589-91), McGinn (1981) and Stanley and Szabo (2000, pp. 
220-1), whereas those favouring the intention thesis include Kaplan in his “Afterthoughts” (1989, 
pp. 582-4), Bach (1992a, 1992b), (arguably) Wettstein (1984), and Devitt (2004) who also presents 
arguments against the demonstration thesis. In want of a covering term, we shall use, for brevity, 
“gesture” to include both. 
51 Borg (2000, p. 242) 
52 As Borg (2000) indicates, Kaplan seemed to be attracted by such a view (see Kaplan, 
1977/1989, p. 515). Others who also seem to broadly endorse a view of this type are Braun 
(1994), Richard (1993), King (2000) and Lepore and Ludwig (2000). The latter explicitly formalise 
“that F is G” as [the x: x = that and x is an F](x is G). 
However, as Braun (2001) indicates, members of this camp are divided with regard to 
the question of whether the content of the noun phrase F is or is not a constituent of the content 
of the demonstrative: whereas Borg and Braun think it is not, Richard and King think it is.  
53 Devitt (2004) presents a somewhat different version of this view. On his view, a complex 
demonstrative designates, with respect to every possible world (actual and counterfactual), that 
which is intended in the actual world, and which fits the description in that world (actual or 
counterfactual). Thus, Devitt agrees with Borg on the designation in the actual world; yet he 
disagrees on the designation in counterfactual worlds: whereas on Borg’s view a complex 
demonstrative, like any rigid designator, designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, 
that which it designates in the actual world, Devitt insists that it should also fit the description in 
that counterfactual world. Consequently, according to Borg, “that teacher of Alexander” will 
designate Aristotle in counterfactual worlds in which he is not Alexander’s teacher, whereas on 
Devitt’s view the term will fail to refer in such worlds. Accordingly, Devitt defines weak rigidity:  
e is weakly rigid iff it contains, implicitly or explicitly, an element that designates the same 
object in every possible world in which that object exists and any descriptive element of e applies to 
that object.  
(p. 296) 
In other words, whereas a rigid term designates all and only things identical to the actual referent, 
a weakly rigid term designates only, but not all, objects identical to the actual referent. Devitt thus 
concludes that “‘that F’ is not rigid but only weakly rigid. (Devitt holds a similar view about 
referential definite descriptions.) However, Borg (2000, pp. 232-3) objects that since on such a 
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view “that philosopher” designates only philosophers, the sentence, “that philosopher might not 
have been a philosopher”, which seems to be true, comes out false.  
54 The following examples are collected in Reimer (2003).  
55 Kripke’s derivation from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
56 This seems to be Chalmers’s view (see quotation in Section  1.4.1). “Water” stands for 
something like “the actual watery stuff”. Since the actual watery stuff is (watery) H2O, “water” 
designates H2O (assuming materialist criteria of identity) in all counterfactual worlds. However, 
had the actual watery stuff been different, say, XYZ, “water” would designate XYZ in that actual 
world, and, subsequently, in all counterfactual worlds.  
57 Bernard Linsky (1984); Soames (2002)  
58 Salmon (1982); Linsky B. (1984); Schwartz (2002, pp. 268–9); Soames (2002, pp. 250–1). For 
recent defences of the rigidity of property terms see Marti (2004) and LaPorte (2006) but see 
Lopez de Sa (forthcoming 2007) and Devitt (2006) for respective counterattacks.  
59 Devitt (2005, p. 146). This definition, says Devitt, is a slight modification of the idea presented 
in Devitt and Sterelny (1999, pp. 85–6). A similar idea was advanced by Cook (1980).  
60 The following table expresses exactly Chalmers’s account of names, such as “Hesperus”, and 
of natural-kind terms, such as “water” (which he expresses in terms of such a two-dimensional 
apparatus). Thus, in our terminology, Chalmers takes names to be reference-fixing rather than 
directly-referring (e.g., Chalmers, 2006). 
61 The following exactly represents Kaplan’s (1977/1989, p. 562; 1989, pp. 597-9; 1979, p. 404) 
view of names (which he expresses in a roughly similar two-dimensional apparatus. In his terms, 
names have constant character, where character is a function from contexts of utterance (that can be 
represented by possible actual worlds) to content (that can be represented as intensions – for 
Kaplan, a function from circumstances of evaluation to extensions.). In short, in our terminology, 
Kaplan takes names to be directly-referring rather than reference-fixing. Some of what Evans 
says about proper names makes it plausible to take him to hold a similar view (Cf. Chalmers, 
2006, p. 585).  
 3 INTENSIONS: SOME METAPHYSICAL ASPECTS  
 
 
Overview  
This chapter is dedicated to an elaboration of the metaphysical aspect of intensions. At 
the centre of the discussion stands the notion of sortal property.  
We begin by realising that the joint role of the factor of the criteria of identity 
and of the factor of the actual referent in our intensions-formula is in fact to determine 
together the sortal property of the actual referent.1 In particular, the criteria of identity 
single-out one of the properties of the actual referent, and render it sortal. This is an 
instantiation of a more general relation between second-order properties and first-order 
properties: a second-order property, such as “the material constitution of the object” 
“homes-in” on some first-order property, such as being H2O. The notion of sortal is 
dominant in the metaphysical tradition (ever since Locke, and mostly during the 1960’s 
and 1970’s). Thus, using the notion of sortal serves to highlight ways in which our 
discussion links to that tradition.  
We then discuss two problems concerning sortal properties. The first is that 
sortal properties seem to be un-analysable ad hoc properties (e.g., the sortal property of 
H2O appears to be just being H2O.) This seems of little explanatory value. The second is 
the problem of criteria of identity for individual objects (as opposed to kinds, like tiger, 
or masses, like water), where sortal properties, although necessary, are not sufficient. E.g., 
whereas the criterion for being identical to water is having water’s sortal property (on a 
material view, being constituted by H2O), it seems not true that the criterion for being 
identical to Fido is having Fido’s sortal property – which is, presumably, being a dog. 
Something can be a dog without being Fido. The notion of individual essence is discussed in 
this context.  
Next, a classification of (first-order) properties is proposed, which is based on an 
analysis of properties in terms of sufficiency and necessity. This analysis leads to a 
possible-worlds account of the differences between various types of properties, such as 
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essential properties, sortal properties, secondary substances, contingent properties, and 
others. 
Lastly, we shift to discuss supervenience, and in particular, whether physicalism is 
consistent with non-physical criteria of identity. Physicalism is the view that the manifest, 
as well as all other aspects of the world, supervenes upon the physical. The view that 
criteria of identity are physical is the view that the physical accounts for what objects 
ultimately are, whereas the manifest, as well as other aspects of objects, merely accounts 
for what objects are like. It is argued that despite appearance the two theses are distinct 
and mutually independent.  
 
3.1 Coarse-Graining the Intensions Formula   
A rigidified term designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, the same referent 
that it designates in the actual world. E.g., if “water” is a rigidified term, then it 
designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, that which is identical to its actual 
referent, the watery H2O stuff. However, we have seen that being the same is dependent 
upon the following two factors: the criteria of identity for that referent, and (the 
properties of) the actual referent.2 E.g., on the “material view”, the criterion for being 
identical to the watery H2O stuff is having the same material constitution as that stuff, 
namely, being constituted by H2O (whether watery or not); on the “manifest view”, by 
contrast, some stuff is identical to the watery H2O stuff iff it has the same manifest 
properties as that stuff, namely, iff it is watery (whether it is constituted by H2O or not). 
It follows that a criterion of identity somehow singles out one (or a certain collection) of 
the properties of the actual referent, and gives it a special status: whatever has that 
property is identical to the actual referent. For instance, in the case of the watery H2O: on 
the material view this property is ‘being constituted by H2O’, whereas on the manifest 
view this property (or, more accurately, this collection of properties) is ‘being watery’.  
Thus out of all of an object’s properties, one (or a certain collection of 
properties) is privileged; it is strongly linked with what it is to be the same as that object. 
Different views differ on what this property is. (Realists on this issue hold the special 
status of such properties to be real, i.e., independent of description or perspective, 
whereas others relativise it to description or to perspective.3 However, relativised or not, 
the special status of such properties remains.) Due to its privileged status, this type of 
property has gained enormous attention throughout the history of philosophy. The 
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traditional concepts which are used with relation to this privileged property are notably 
substance, essence, and sortal.  
The concept of “sortal” was introduced by Locke,4 but is strongly related to 
Aristotle’s key distinction between the category of substance on the one hand, and the 
rest of the categories on the other.5 It is thus generally associated with: criteria of identity6 
(across times – i.e., persistence conditions; and across worlds – i.e., transworld identity); the what-
is-it question (as opposed to what-is-it-like questions); and, essence (as opposed to accident).  
However, as is not uncommon with important philosophical notions, 
philosophers vary considerably in their application of the term. One such important 
difference is to do with what “sortal” is taken to stand for. Grandy observes that,7 P. F. 
Strawson takes “sortal” to stand for universals;8 Quine takes it to stand for predicates;9 
Wiggins takes it to stand for concepts (indeed, he also admits sortal-predicates);10 and 
Geach uses his alternative term substantival term, which, like Quine, he takes to stand for 
linguistic expressions.11 Another important difference is that many philosophers restrict 
the term to countable kinds of objects like people and trees (or, accordingly, to count-
nouns), whereas others extend its use to apply to stuffs as well, such as water and gold 
(or, accordingly, to mass-terms).12  
Where do we stand in relation to these differences? Our interest in intensions 
(and in particular, our interest in the intension of rigidified terms) incline us as follows: 
firstly, we are concerned with the privileged properties that are linked with criteria of 
identity, no less that we are concerned with concepts or predicates; secondly, we are 
interested in referents in general, i.e., in masses like water and gold just as much as in 
countable objects like dogs and people; and thirdly, we are interested in identity in 
counterfactual worlds in general, i.e., in being the same kind as Fido, or as water, as well 
as in being the same individual as Fido.  
That said, should we use the term “sortal” for this purpose?  
I believe we should. Fashioning new terms increases the terminology beyond 
necessity on the one hand, and conceals the striking resemblance of the corresponding 
terms’ subject matter on the other hand. In addition, using “sortal” embeds our present 
discussion appropriately within the metaphysical tradition. 
Thus, we shall use the term “sortal” in the following way: (a) to include not only 
count-nouns like “dog” and “tree”, but also mass-terms like “gold” and “water”; (b) to 
apply to terms as well as to properties; thus, ‘being a dog’ and ‘being gold’ are considered 
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here sortal properties; and (c) We shall introduce the notion of individual sortal property (by 
which we extends the traditional use of “sortal”): the property of “being a dog” may be 
said to make Fido the kind of thing that it is; having this property guarantees being of the 
same kind, or of the same essence, as Fido is. It does not guarantee numerical identity. An 
individual sortal property may be said to make Fido the particular individual that it is; having 
this individual sortal property guarantees being numerically identical to-, i.e., having the 
same individual essence as-, Fido.  
We shall now state the difference between different metaphysical views about 
criteria of identity in terms of sortals.  
Take water again. On the material view, being the same stuff as the watery H2O 
simply amounts to being constituted by H2O; we may conclude then that on that view, 
the sortal property of the watery H2O is ‘being constituted by H2O’. On the manifest 
view, by contrast, being the same stuff as the watery H2O amounts to just being watery; 
hence, the sortal property of the watery H2O stuff is ‘being watery’. Overall then, the 
intension of a natural-kind mass-term like “water”, which is a rigidified term, is simply 
determined by the sortal property of the actual referent. (The case of singular rigidified 
terms, like proper names and (de re) definite descriptions, is slightly different, as we shall 
shortly see.)  
As we have noted at the beginning of this section, the sortal property is somehow 
determined by the criteria of identity together with (the properties of) the actual 
referents: the criteria of identity single out one of the properties of the actual referent, 
and render it sortal. Thus, as far as intensions are concerned, the job of the former two 
factors can be seen as simply that of determining the sortal property. In other words, we 
could replace these two variables in our formula with just the one variable of the sortal 
property. This would be a “coarse-grained” version of our formula. Yet using the two 
variables makes explicit how this sortal property is exactly determined. At any rate, the 
two versions are, of course, versions of the same formula.  
In the next section, we expose the structure of the relations between these three 
elements: the sortal property, and the two factors that determine it: criteria of identity 
and (the properties of) the actual referent.  
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3.2 Sortal Properties: An Analysis in Terms of First-Order and 
Second-Order Properties  
According to an appealing view inspired by Aristotle, properties of objects “fall under” 
some fixed categories, e.g., the object’s height; its weight; its colour; its function etc.13 So 
if a given object’s colour is white, then the property under the category of ‘being the 
object’s colour’ with respect to this object, is ‘(being) white’.  
‘Being a colour’ is a property of (being) white; hence it is a property of a property. 
In other words, ‘being a colour’ is a second-order property. It follows that, ‘being the 
object’s height’; ‘being the object’s weight’; ‘being the object’s function’ etc. are all 
second-order properties. Accordingly, ‘(being) white’ is a first-order property. Thus we may 
say that an object’s first-order properties fall under second-order properties. 
Correspondingly, a second-order property, with respect to a certain object, homes-in on 
some first-order property.  
Now the same second-order property may be applied to different objects and 
thus home-in on different first-order properties.  For instance, the second-order property 
‘being the object’s colour’, when applied to Mars, homes-in on the first-order property 
‘(being) red’, but when applied to the moon, homes-in on the first-order property 
‘(being) white’. We may thus ask what first-order property falls under a given second-
order property when that second-order property is applied to a certain object.  
We can use this structure to analyse the relations between sortal properties and 
criteria of identity.  
A material criterion of identity for x states that y is identical to x iff it shares with 
x the same material constitution; now ‘being the object’s material constitution’ is a 
property of a property, e.g., with respect to the watery H2O, it is a property of the 
property ‘(being constituted by) H2O’. Thus ‘being the object’s material constitution’ is a 
second-order property. It follows that some second-order properties are linked with 
criteria of identity (for example, on the material view, ‘being the material constitution of 
an object’), whereas others are not (on that same view, ‘being an object’s colour’ for 
example).  
Second-order properties, when applied to objects, home-in on first order 
properties. The special feature of the second-order properties that are linked with criteria 
of identity is that the first-order properties on which they home-in are the sortal first-
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order properties of their objects. Or, to follow the tradition, simply, they are the objects’ 
sortal properties. For example, on the material view, the second-order property ‘being 
the object’s material constitution’ when applied to watery H2O, homes-in on the first-
order property ‘(being constituted by) H2O’, thereby rendering it sortal. We can thus call 
this type of second-order property, a “sortal second-order property”, to distinguish it 
from other second-order properties.  
From a rigorous philosophical point of view, in principle, any second-order 
property may be the sortal one. E.g., considering the second-order property ‘the object’s 
function’ to be sortal suggests that the object is primarily a functional object, which merely 
happens to have both its manifest properties, and its material constitution (we seem to 
have such strong intuitions when attending to artefacts or to organisms). In other words, 
on this view, the object’s material constitution and manifest properties are merely what 
the object is like and not what it is. Similarly, (and highly counter-intuitively,) considering 
the second-order property ‘being the object’s colour’ to be sortal suggests that the object 
is primarily a coloured object, which merely happens to have manifest, material and 
functional properties.  
In sum, it is proposed that the relation between (i) criteria of identity; (ii) the 
actual referent; and (iii) the referent’s sortal property, are the following. A metaphysical 
view is characterised by the second-order property that it takes to be sortal. Like any 
other second-order property, this sortal second-order property homes-in on one of the 
object’s first-order properties. This first-order property is thereby rendered a sortal (first-
order) property. (Another way to put it is to say that a sortal-second order property is 
simply a function from objects to (first-order) sortal properties. It assigns to each object its 
first-order sortal property.) Being the same as that referent (at least as far as kinds and 
mass-objects are concerned) is simply having that sortal property. Different metaphysical 
views take different second-order properties to be sortal, and, consequently, different 
first-order properties to be sortal.  
This structure has the following implications with respect to intensions. The 
intension of a rigidified term is determined by the sortal property of the actual referent. 
The sortal property is one (or a collection) of the first-order properties of the referent. 
Which of the object’s first order properties is the sortal one is fixed by two factors: the 
list of the object’s first-order properties, and the criteria of identity, as detailed above. 
Different metaphysical views differ in the second-order property which they take to be 
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sortal. And that entails difference in the (first-order) sortal properties of objects. 
Eventually, such differences result in different intensions.  
(It follows that there are in fact two ways to specify an object’s criteria of identity. 
One way is in terms of second-order sortal properties, e.g., on the material view, the 
criterion for being identical to water is having the same material constitution as water. 
Another way is in terms of first-order properties, e.g., on the same view, the criterion for 
being identical to water is being constituted by H2O. The first is indirect, implicit and 
more general; the second is direct, explicit and particular. (This difference is significant 
from an epistemological point of view; to be discussed in Section  4.1.3). However, both 
ways are but different descriptions of the same criterion of identity.) 
 
3.2.1 Two problems concerning sortal properties  
3.2.1.1 The ad hoc-ness of sortal properties  
One may object to sortal properties on the following grounds. What is the sortal 
property of this dog? Well, it is the property ‘is a dog’… but this seems hardly 
informative. In fact it is trivial. Putnam expresses this worry thus: 
If we are allowed to invent unanalysable properties ad hoc, then we can find a single 
property – not even a conjunction – the possession of which is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for being a lemon, or being gold, or whatever. Namely, we just 
postulate the property of being a lemon, or the property of being gold, or whatever 
may be needed.14 
(Although Putnam is talking about these properties in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions rather than in terms of sortals, we shall soon demonstrate the close link 
between the two in Section  3.3.5. For the time being, we can rely on an intuitive sense of 
this link.) 
In other words, the worry is that those who use sortal properties to account for 
what an object is, are committing the so-called virtus dormitiva fallacy, termed after 
Moliére’s doctor in The Hypochondriac, who explains that opium makes one sleep “because 
there is a dormitive virtue in it whose nature is to cause the senses to become drowsy.”15  
Thus, it seems that instead of postulating that the sortal property of gold is ‘being 
gold’ we should come up with something more informative, like, say, ‘having an atomic 
number 79’ (or, alternatively, contrary to the consensus, ‘being golden’). Similarly, instead 
of postulating that the sortal property of water is ‘being water’ we are better off 
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suggesting something like ‘being H2O’ (or, alternatively, ‘being watery’, i.e., drinkable, 
potable, etc.’). Thus, when it comes to dogs, we may simply expect a sortal property to 
tell us what being a dog consists in, i.e., to reveal the underlying nature, or “essential 
nature”,16 of our subject. Yet however appealing this may sound, the suggestion has its 
limits. Consider the view according to which the sortal property of water is ‘being H2O’. 
But what is the sortal property of H2O? It seems that there is very little to say more than, 
again, ‘being H2O’ (i.e., ‘being stuff compounded of molecules each of which is 
composed of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms’). Thus the problem is that after 
some recursive applications of the question “what is the sortal property of …?” it seems 
we are bound to arrive at a stage in which the sortal property of an F is simply ‘being F’.  
However, as I understand Putnam’s worry here, it is not about the mere fact that 
the sortal property of F is ‘being F’. It seems that Putnam will have little trouble with the 
fact that the sortal property of H2O is ‘being H2O’. I.e., Putnam seems not too 
concerned with a rock-bottom sortal property, as long as this property is informative 
(however ‘being informative’ is to be cashed out). What seems to be worrying Putnam is 
rather “abusing the system”. I.e., abusing the fact that we accept rock-bottom sortal 
properties by introducing uninformative properties as sortal properties. E.g., ‘being a 
lemon’ is uninformative (for Putnam, but maybe not for the Martians), and hence should 
not be introduced as the sortal property of lemons; whereas ‘being H2O’ is informative 
(again, for Putnam), and hence may be introduced as a sortal property of water, or, 
indeed, of H2O.17  
Overall then, the mere fact that the sortal property of some F is ‘being F’ does 
not in itself indicate that ‘being F’ is an ad hoc property. It is only when this property is 
uninformative, and is introduced as a pseudo criterion of identity, that it can be blamed 
of being introduced ad hoc. The problem remains, of course, how to clearly define what 
being informative amounts to. We shall not pursue this here however.  
 
3.2.1.2 The problem of criteria of numerical identity  
The criterion for being identical to water – the watery H2O stuff – is having the sortal 
property of that watery H2O stuff. Some believe this sortal property to be ‘(being 
constituted by) H2O’; others may take it to be ‘(being) watery’. In general, the criterion 
for being identical to certain stuff is having the sortal property of that stuff. The same 
seems to hold for (natural) kinds. The criterion for being of the same (natural) kind of 
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Fido, is having the sortal property of Fido, namely, ‘being a dog’. But what about 
individual objects? What about numerical identity? Could we say that the criterion for 
being numerically identical to a certain object is having that object’s sortal property? It 
seems that although this is a necessary condition for identity, it is by no means a 
sufficient one: merely having the property ‘(being a) dog’ does not guarantee being Fido; 
for something that instantiates this property may be any old dog. We therefore need 
something more here. In other words, having the sortal property of an object is a necessary 
condition for being identical to it, yet it is not sufficient. Something additional is required 
to make it sufficient.  
In the case of identity over time, there seems to be a relatively simple solution at 
hand. Consider the clay statue David again. Or, more neutrally, the object that has a 
David shape and that is made out of clay. On a temporal version of the puzzle, David is 
smashed, so that at t2, we have a clay ball. Is the clay ball at t2 identical to the clay statue 
David at t1? If we hold the manifest view (and hence think that David is distinct from the 
clay ball), we cannot simply say that an object is identical to David as long as it has 
David’s shape, for that will entail that any David-shaped statue is identical to David.18 
However, we can say instead that an object remains the same so long as it continuously 
keeps its shape, which will get us where we want. Similarly, on the ‘material view’, we may 
say that an object remains the same as long as it continuously keeps its material 
constitution (hence on this view David is indeed identical to the clay ball). Thus, whereas 
the criterion for being the same stuff as S is merely having the sortal property of S (and 
similarly, the criterion for being of the same (natural) kind as object O is having the same 
sortal property of O), the criterion for being numerically identical at t2 to an object O at t1 
is continuously keeping the sortal property of O from t1 to t2 (and not merely having it).  
This solution, however, cannot be applied to transworld identity. Since it seems 
to make little sense to talk about continuously keeping the sortal property from one 
counterfactual world to another. Worlds do not succeed each other like moments in 
time, and are not causally related to one another like the temporal stages of an object.  
The difficulty to provide criteria of transworld identity and the need to find such 
criteria are nicely manifested in Chisholm’s role-switching puzzle:19 The puzzle is about 
Adam and Noah. There is a counterfactual world in which Adam is a bit more like actual 
Noah than in the actual world, and Noah is a bit more like actual Adam than in the actual 
world. In another counterfactual world, Adam is even more like actual Noah, and vice 
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versa. Continuing like this, we shall arrive at a counterfactual world in which Adam is 
entirely like Noah and vice versa. It follows that there is a counterfactual world which is 
exactly like ours in every respect, apart from the fact that Adam and Noah have switched 
roles, i.e., that the guy that is called “Adam” in the counterfactual world, and has all the 
attributes of our Adam (including the relational ones, like being coupled with Eve etc.), is 
in fact distinct from our actual Adam; in other words, that that guy and our Adam are 
indiscernible in every respect yet are numerically distinct; and, furthermore, that that guy 
and our Noah, who are different in almost every respects, are nevertheless numerically 
identical.20 Similarly, the guy called “Noah” in the counterfactual world and our Noah, 
although qualitatively-identical, are numerically distinct, whereas that guy and our Adam 
who are different in almost every respects are nonetheless numerically identical. 
Moreover, it seems that the same can be applied to any two objects in the world. Which 
entails that there is a counterfactual world that is qualitatively entirely identical to ours, 
and yet that all objects have switched roles; e.g., you are identical to the Eiffel tower, I 
am identical to your bicycle, etc. This seems like a very unfortunate consequence that 
needs to be somehow avoided.21  
One may hope to avoid this consequence by alluding to essential properties. E.g., 
Adam cannot switch roles with an apple since Adam is essentially a person, and the apple 
is essentially not. So in the move from a world in which Adam is a man to the world in 
which he is an apple, and thus not a person, we left an essential property of Adam “(and 
therefore Adam himself) behind.”22 But this is of little help, since Adam can still switch 
roles with Noah, who is also essentially a person (as well as with any other person). Thus, 
in order to completely block any role-switching possibility, Adam has to have some 
essential property (or collection of properties) which no other individual has. In other 
words, Adam has to have a property which is not only necessary but also sufficient for him. 
In Chisholm’s words, in order to block the possibility of role-switching with an object x, 
x has to have a property E, such that: “x has E in every possible world in which x exists; 
and, moreover, for every y, if y has E in any possible world, then y is identical with x.”23 
Thus, this property (or collection of properties) is fundamentally a unique essential 
property of Adam; something like ‘Adamness’24.  Some called this property individual 
essence. A version of this view, which takes individual essences to be non-qualitative, i.e., a 
primitive thisness, dates back to Duns Scotus (1266-1308), who famously called such an 
individual essence haecceity.25 Whatever you call it, such individual essences in fact provide 
criteria of transworld identity. In other words, in order to block role-switching scenarios 
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as described above, we need criteria of numerical transworld identity, and these seem to 
take the form of individual essences.  
(This is the reason why the same problem does not arise for stuffs: stuffs, like 
water, have a unique essential property, which is just their sortal property. We cannot 
construct a series of counterfactual worlds in which water and gold switch roles, since the 
moment water ceases to posses its sortal property (e.g., being H2O according to the 
material view), it stops being water; the same goes for gold. So a similar role-switching 
scenario is barred.)  
Kripke proposed something like an individual essence, in the form of his 
necessity of origin thesis (discussed in Section  1.5.2).26 Thus, for instance, it is essential 
for Noah to be the product of the union of a particular sperm and a particular egg. 
Anyone who originated from a different gamete cannot be Noah. Indeed, it seems not 
only essential, i.e., necessary, but also sufficient. Anyone originating from this gamete is 
by that mere fact Noah; no-one else can originate from this gamete. However, as we have 
seen, this suggestion came under heavy attack from Salmon (Section  1.5.2. Note that 
Salmon’s objection is in fact a version of Chisholm’s argument).  
Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of origin is a specific thesis about the individual 
essence of objects. It may be wrong. Refuting it, however, does not refute the claim that 
objects have some individual essences. A rigidified term that refers to an object, 
designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, the same object that it designates in 
the actual world. The notion of “the same object” presupposes some criteria of 
numerical identity. It is hard to think of any such numerical criteria of identity that do 
not involve some individual essence. Admittedly, however, it is extremely difficult to come 
up with suggestions for such non-primitive individual essences; e.g., with what 
“Adamness” consists in.  
Given the equivalence between essences and sortal properties, we may call such 
individual essences, “sortal individual properties”. 
 
3.3 First-Order Properties: An Analysis in Terms of Necessary and 
Sufficient Conditions  
Sortal properties are but one category of first-order properties. Other types of first-order 
properties are, for example, essential properties and contingent properties. In this 
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section, I propose a classification of (first-order) properties, based on their analysis in 
terms of necessary/not necessary and sufficient/insufficient conditions. This analysis 
allows for a more precise and less intuitive account of the distinction between different 
types of first-order properties. By fitting all those properties into a unified, common 
framework, I hope that an illuminating comparison is provided. This classification, 
however, stands quite independently of the main argument advanced in this dissertation, 
which is the general formula of intensions.  
 
3.3.1 Properties as conditions  
The issue of properties – their existence, nature, and criteria of identity – is a matter of 
considerable controversy in philosophy. Thus, although it is commonly accepted that 
Mars is a planet and that Earth is a planet too – viz., that both Mars and Earth have the 
property ‘being a planet’ – there are very different ways to spell this fact out. One 
traditional way, for example, is to say that Mars and Earth share a universal (realism)27. 
Another way is to say that properties are particulars, named tropes, rather than universals; 
i.e., Mars’s property of being a planet is numerically distinct from Earth’s property of 
being a planet, so the fact that both objects are planets merely amounts to the fact that 
both have similar such particular properties (trope-nominalism).28 Another way to avoid 
alluding to universals is to say that both Mars and Earth simply belong to the same class 
(class nominalism).29 A related view holds that terms like “planet”, that seem to refer to 
properties, in fact refer to concepts (conceptualism).30 Yet another way would be to say that 
Mars and Earth do share a universal, but not of being a planet, for such a universal does 
not exist; rather, they share many “fundamental” universals, possibly physical, which 
being a planet is but an abbreviation of, or, alternatively, supervenes upon (we shall discuss 
the supervenience relation later in this chapter). It is also commonly accepted that Mars 
weighs more than three kilograms. This fact may be accounted for in terms of truth-
makers, namely, that Mars is of a certain given weight, which is the truth-maker of the 
above fact.31 Other analyses would provide different accounts for this fact.  
Our discussion involves properties. Yet it is not in the interest of our study to 
engage in an analysis of the nature of such properties. In view of such controversies, we 
should thus seek a neutral use of properties, which would be committed to none of the 
above specific accounts. The more neutral our use of properties will be in this respect, 
the wider its application can be.  
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What would such a neutral conception be?  
As was stated above, all views agree on some basic neutral facts; e.g., that Mars 
and Earth share the property of ‘being a planet’, and that Mars has properties such as, 
‘weighing more than three kilograms’, as well as, ‘being red’; ‘being larger than the Earth’; 
‘being the fourth planet from the Sun’; etc. Now the feature that is common to all these 
attributes is that each states some condition that Mars meets. And this is regardless of how 
meeting these conditions is spelled out in terms of the nature of properties. So having a 
property, most neutrally, can be simply conceived as meeting a condition. We may thus 
use “property” in our discussion just in this way; i.e., whenever we say that an object has 
a certain property this simply amounts to asserting that the object meets a certain 
condition. 
 
3.3.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions  
The relation between an object and its properties is that of instantiation: objects 
instantiate properties.32 There are logical relations between properties and the objects that 
instantiate them. Two such logical relations are necessity and sufficiency. A property is 
necessary to an object iff the mere presence of the object entails the instantiation of that 
property, i.e., iff the absence of the property entails the absence of the object. A property 
is sufficient to an object iff the mere instantiation of the property entails the presence of 
the object, i.e., iff the absence of the object entails the absence of the property. A 
property may be necessary to its object or not; a property may also be sufficient to its 
object or not. Consequently, there are four different options for logical relations between 
a property and the object that instantiates it (the following examples for each such 
relation will rely on everyday common views33): (a) the property is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for its objects, e.g., ‘being pale’ seems neither necessary nor sufficient to 
Socrates (to follow Aristotle’s classic discussion); (b) the property is necessary but not 
sufficient to that object, e.g., ‘being mammal’ is necessary but not sufficient to Socrates 
(since the presence of Socrates entails that he instantiates this property, but the mere 
instantiation of the property does not guarantee that it is instantiated by Socrates – it may 
be Parmenides, or, for that matter, Fido); (c) the property is sufficient but not necessary 
for that object; e.g., ‘knowing that one is Socrates’ (for the mere instantiation of this 
property entails that it is instantiated by Socrates – no other individual can possibly have 
this property, yet Socrates’ mere presence does not guarantee this property’s instantiation 
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– Socrates might have doubts, or be mistaken, about who he is); and (d) arguably – 
according to the necessity of origin thesis – ‘originating from this gamete (i.e., from the 
sperm and egg from which Socrates actually originated)’, for Socrates. According to this 
thesis, the mere presence of Socrates entails the instantiation of this property, and the 
mere instantiation of this property entails that the individual who instantiates it is 
Socrates. Less controversial examples are: (i) ‘having atomic number 79’ for gold; the 
presence of gold entails the instantiation of this property, and the instantiation of this 
property entails being instantiated by gold. Neither can exist without the other; and (ii) 
‘being the sum of 2 and 3’ is necessary and sufficient for the number 5. An object cannot 
be the number 5 without having this property, and something cannot have this property 
without being the number 5.  
Interestingly, whereas properties of the first, second and fourth categories are 
widely discussed in the literature, I could not find any discussion, or even mention, of 
properties of the third category as such. 
The above definitions are stated in terms of logical dependence. The domain of 
application may vary. It may be confined to the actual world. It may, however, extend to 
all possible worlds. This will be the modal interpretation of necessity and sufficiency: A 
property is necessary to an object iff that object instantiates that property in every 
counterfactual world; and a property is sufficient for its object iff in every counterfactual 
world in which that property is instantiated, it is instantiated by that very object. Thus, 
the above four categories will be: (a) a property is neither necessary nor sufficient for its 
object iff there are some worlds where the object does not instantiate the property and 
some worlds in which the property is instantiated by another object (e.g. ‘being pale’ for 
Socrates); (b) a property is necessary but not sufficient for its object iff there are no 
worlds in which the object fails to instantiate this property, but there are some worlds in 
which it is instantiated by other objects (e.g. ‘being mammal for Socrates); (c) a property 
is sufficient but not necessary for its object iff there are no worlds in which it is 
instantiated by other objects, but there are worlds in which the object fails to instantiate 
it (e.g., ‘knowing that one is Socrates’ for Socrates); and (d) a property is necessary and 
sufficient for its object iff there are no worlds in which the object fails to instantiate the 
property and there are no worlds in which that property is instantiated by another object 
(arguably, ‘originating from this gamete’ for Socrates).  
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This framework proves very useful for the purpose of accounting for various 
central distinctions concerning properties. The next five short sections aim to illustrate 
this claim.  
 
3.3.3 Essential vs. contingent properties  
Let us begin with one such common distinction, namely, between essential and contingent, 
or accidental, properties. A property may be necessary to the object that instantiates it, or 
not necessary to its object, regardless of whether it is sufficient to its object or not. An 
essential property is just a property which is necessary – whether sufficient or not – to its 
object; an object simply cannot survive its loss.34 E.g., being a mammal is an essential 
property of Socrates (and also of Fido) – he could not survive losing this property; 
similarly, having the atomic number 79 (on the material view) is essential to gold – gold 
could not survive losing this property. A contingent property, by contrast, is one that is 
not necessary – whether sufficient or not – to the object that instantiate it, viz., an object 
can survive its loss. E.g., being pale is contingent to Socrates. Similarly, knowing that he 
is Socrates is contingent to Socrates.  
A similar distinction can be drawn regarding sufficient properties. A property 
may be sufficient to the object that instantiates it, whether it is necessary to it or not; or, 
it may not be sufficient to its object, whether it is necessary to it or not. Yet I know of no 
special title for either of these two categories. This fact may indicate that, for some 
reason or other, we seem to have no special interest in such properties.  
 
3.3.4 Criteria of identity vs. secondary substances 
The category of essential properties includes all necessary properties; it thus has two sub-
categories: essential properties that are also sufficient to their object on the one hand, 
and essential properties that are not sufficient to their object on the other. An example of 
the latter category would be being a mammal for Socrates. There are good reasons to 
believe that the properties in this sub-category are what Aristotle called secondary substances. 
The other sub-category within essential properties, namely, properties that are both 
necessary and sufficient to their objects, is in fact the group of properties that serve as 
the criteria of identity of their objects. Let me demonstrate this.  
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Criteria for being identical to X are defined as some necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being identical to X. Now, recall that according to our neutral definition of 
properties, having a property is just meeting some condition. Thus, meeting some 
necessary and sufficient conditions is just having some necessary and sufficient property. It 
thus follows that the criterion for being identical to X is simply having a property which is 
necessary and sufficient for X. E.g., the criterion for being identical to gold is having a 
property which is necessary and sufficient for gold – widely believed to be, ‘being stuff 
with atomic number 79’. Anything that fails to meet the condition/to have that property, 
is not gold, and anything that meets the condition/has that property, is gold. Similarly, 
the criterion for being identical to Kripke is having a property which is necessary and 
sufficient for Kripke – believed by some to be, ‘originating from the gamete from which 
he actually originated’.  
(Recall that criteria of identity can be given in terms of second-order properties, 
as well as in terms of first-order properties. The latter is simply a more explicit and 
particular way of specifying them. See end of Section  3.2.) 
To conclude, within the group of necessary properties, which is just the group of 
essential properties, the sub-group of necessary and sufficient properties is the group of 
properties the having of which form the (explicit) criteria of identity of the objects that 
instantiate them. The other sub-group within the group of essential properties if that of 
properties that are necessary but not sufficient (also known as secondary substances).  
 
3.3.5 Sortal properties  
In Section  3.2 we established that a criterion for being identical to X is having the 
(individual) sortal property of X. Thus, a criterion for being identical to water is having 
the sortal property of water (whether it is ‘being watery’ or ‘being constituted by H2O’); a 
criterion for being numerically identical to Kripke is having the individual sortal property 
of Kripke, (whether it is originating from a certain gamete or something else). In the 
previous section we established that the criterion for being identical to X is having a 
property which is necessary and sufficient for X. It thus follows that all sortal properties are 
necessary and sufficient for the stuffs that instantiate them; similarly, all sortal individual 
properties are necessary and sufficient for the individual objects that instantiate them. 
However, does the converse hold as well? Are all necessary and sufficient properties 
sortal properties?  
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It is tempting to think that they are. Indeed, it is tempting to think that necessary 
and sufficient properties are just sortal properties. This, however, appears to be wrong.  
Intuitively, a sortal property states what the object is, as opposed to what it is like. 
Thus, according to the material view, the sortal property of water, for instance, is (being 
constituted) by H2O, i.e., H2O is what water is, whereas being watery is merely what 
water is like. (The manifest view takes it to be the other way around). Now consider the 
number 5.35 The number 5 has the property ‘being the sum of 2+3’. This property is 
necessary and sufficient for the number 5; every object that instantiates that property is 
the number 5, and every object that is the number 5 instantiates that property. But, so is 
‘being the quotient of 10 divided by 2’. And so on; an infinite list of properties, all of 
which are necessary and sufficient for being the number 5. Yet we would not wish to 
claim that each one of these properties makes the number 5 what it is, as opposed to 
what it is like. Firstly, because we feel that being the quotient of 10:2 is only a characteristic 
of 5, and not what being 5 consists in. And secondly, because it seems wrong to suppose 
that the same thing will have many properties, each of which on its own makes the number 
5 what it is. Similarly, consider the property ‘being identical to Socrates’, for Socrates. 
Merely having this property guarantees being Socrates, and the mere presence of Socrates 
guarantees the instantiation of this property. Being identical to Socrates is thus a 
necessary and sufficient property of Socrates. Yet, again, we would not wish to say that 
being identical to Socrates is what Socrates is; i.e., that being identical to Socrates is the 
(individual) sortal property of Socrates.  
We may conclude then, that there are necessary and sufficient properties that are 
not sortal properties. And generally, although every sortal property is necessary and 
sufficient for the stuff that instantiates it (and every individual sortal property is necessary 
and sufficient for the individual object that instantiates it), interestingly the converse does 
not hold; there are necessary and sufficient properties that are nevertheless not sortal-
properties. It turns out then that sortal (individual) properties are a sub-category of the 
category of necessary and sufficient properties. 
It should be noted though that for the most part, criteria of identity do seem to 
overlap with sortal properties (and individual sortal properties). It seems that the only 
cases in which the two diverge are the case of properties of mathematical objects, and the 
case of the property ‘being identical to X’. Outside these, the two types of properties – 
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(individual) sortal properties and necessary and sufficient properties – do appear to 
coincide.  
Why is it that the two almost completely overlap, yet not entirely overlap?  
Here is a suggestion. The reason for the divergence lies in a difference in 
orientation between sortality on the one hand and necessity and sufficiency on the other. 
Specifically, necessity and sufficiency are about spotting something, whereas sortality is 
about accounting for something. Fundamentally, these are different orientations. E.g., the 
property of being Smith’s favourite drink spots water, but it is very different from an 
account of what makes water what it is. This difference can be clearly shown in terms of 
counterfactual worlds: although being Smith’s favourite drink spots water in the actual 
world, it spots other stuffs in other worlds. However, extending the requirement of 
spotting to be modal, i.e., extending it to spot water, and only water, in every 
counterfactual world – which is what necessity and sufficiency (as used in our discussion) 
is about – will bring the two types of orientations much closer. For it would be difficult 
to find a property that merely spots all and only water, and yet is not what makes water 
the stuff that it is (the only such property I am familiar with is the above ‘being identical 
to water’). Think of a property that is necessary and sufficient for some non-
mathematical stuff (or object), excluding the property of being identical to that stuff (or 
object), and I believe you will come up with the sortal property of that stuff (or the 
individual sortal property of that individual object). However, lacking a proof for that 
principle, it remains a mere conjecture.  
 
3.3.6 Essential properties, sortal properties and essence 
We have established that sortal properties are a sub-category of necessary and sufficient 
properties. Essential properties, by contrast, are necessary properties – whether sufficient 
or not. Thus necessary and sufficient properties are a sub-category of essential properties. 
It follows that sortal properties are ipso facto a sub-category of essential properties.  
Thus every sortal property is an essential property but not vice versa. This last 
point is a rather important one. On the material view, the sortal property of gold is 
‘having atomic number 79’. Clearly, ‘having atomic number 79’ is also an essential property 
of gold on that view (gold has atomic number 79 in every counterfactual world). 
However, gold has other essential properties as well. For instance, being a chemical 
substance. Gold is a chemical substance in every counterfactual world. Yet merely being 
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a chemical substance is not sufficient for being gold, i.e., it does not guarantee that 
something is gold; it may be, say, lead.  
Now sometimes people talk about essence. Essence has to be distinguished from 
essential properties. E.g., although ‘being a chemical substance’ is essential to gold – gold 
cannot survive its loss – ‘being a chemical substance’ is nonetheless not the essence of gold 
– otherwise it will be the case that gold and hydrogen share the same essence. However, 
‘having atomic number 79’ (on the material view) is both the essence of gold as well as an 
essential property of gold. Thus, essence is a sub-category of essential properties. In our 
terminology, essence is just a sortal property. Or, as Locke put it: 
… the Essence of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract Idea, which 
the General, or Sortal (if I may have leave so to call it, from Sort, as I do General from 
Genus) Name stands for. And this we shall find to be that, which the word Essence 
imports, in its most familiar use.36 
(Although Locke’s view involves an additional anti-realist component, to which we need 
not commit. See our discussion of nominal substances in Section  4.2.1.1) 
However, some may feel that being a chemical substance, although not the essence 
of gold, may be held part of the essence of gold. This view implies that the essence of 
something is just the collection of its essential properties; e.g., that the essence of gold 
includes the essential property of being a chemical substance, as well as the other 
properties that are essential to gold. Thus, according to such a view, the condition that is 
embodied in the sortal property amounts exactly to the sum of conditions that is entailed 
by the set of all of an object’s necessary (i.e., essential) properties. E.g., the condition of 
having atomic number 79 includes the condition of being a chemical substance etc.  
In sum, necessary and sufficient properties (e.g., being the quotient of 10:2 for 5) 
are a subclass of essential properties. Sortal properties (arguably, being the successor of 
4) are a subclass of necessary and sufficient properties. The complementary subclass is 
that of necessary yet not sufficient properties (e.g., being a number for 5). Thus sortal 
properties are a subclass of essential properties. Essences, as opposed to essential 
properties, are just sortal properties. The two should not be confused. Some believe 
essences, i.e., sortal properties, to simply be the sum of an object’s essential, i.e., 
necessary, properties.  
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3.3.7 Summary: the analysis of properties in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions 
To sum up: the relation between an object and each of its properties is that of 
instantiation. Two logical relations between properties and the objects that instantiate 
them are necessity and sufficiency. A property may be necessary to its object or not; a 
property may also be sufficient to its object or not. Consequently, a property’s relation to 
the object that instantiates it may be any of the following four (a) both necessary and 
sufficient; (b) necessary but not sufficient; (c) not necessary but sufficient (a rather 
neglected category for some reason); and (d) neither necessary nor sufficient.  
These relations provide means to clearly compare and contrast the following 
different types of properties. Contingent property: a property that is not necessary – whether 
sufficient or not – to its object (e.g., both being pale, and knowing that one is Socrates 
are contingent to Socrates. He would have survived losing either. The first is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for Socrates; whereas the second, while also not necessary, is 
nonetheless sufficient for Socrates). Essential property: a necessary property, whether 
sufficient or not – to its object. The two sub-categories of essential properties are thus, 
on the one hand, the category of necessary and sufficient properties (e.g., arguably, 
originating from the gametes from which Socrates actually originated, for Socrates; as 
well as being identical to Socrates for Socrates; or, less trivially, the property of being the 
quotient of 10:2, for 5), and, on the other hand, the category of properties that although 
necessary are not sufficient to their objects (e.g., being mammal for Socrates). The first is 
in fact the category of properties that serve as the criteria of identity of their objects; the second 
is the category of secondary substances. Both, therefore, are types of essential properties. The 
sub-category of properties that are the criteria of identity of their objects, i.e., of 
necessary and sufficient properties, itself includes a sub-category, which is that of sortal 
properties, more traditionally referred to as essences (e.g., arguably, originating from the 
gametes from which Socrates actually originated, for Socrates). However, it seems that 
for the overwhelming majority of cases these two types of properties, namely, criteria of 
identity and sortal properties, overlap. Specifically, it seems that the only cases of 
necessary and sufficient properties that are not sortal properties are mathematical 
properties, and the trivial property ‘being identical to x’. The following table summarises 
this classification:  
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Logical relations Examples  
(for Socrates)  
Types of properties 
Originating 
from the 
gamete from 
which Socrates 
actually 
originated 
Sortal 
properties/ 
Essences Sufficient 
Being identical 
to Socrates  
Criteria of 
identity 
properties Necessary 
Not 
sufficient 
Being mammal  Secondary substances 
Essential 
properties 
Sufficient 
Knowing that 
one is Socrates 
 
 
 
Not 
necessary 
Not 
sufficient 
Being pale   
Contingent 
properties/ 
Accidental 
properties 
Table 3.1 
 
3.4 Criteria of Identity vs. Supervenience: A Note About Hierarchical 
Relations  
Finally, and to a large extent independently of the above discussions, I would like to 
analyse the link between material criteria of identity and physicalism, and more generally, 
the link between criteria of identity and supervenience. In the course of this analysis, two 
more important hierarchical relations will emerge. This will culminate in a proposed 
structure of the links between these four hierarchical relations.  
Physicalism is the view according to which the manifest, as well as any other 
aspect of reality, (at least37) supervenes upon the physical.38 In its broad sense, 
supervenience is intuitively defined as following: for a set of properties A to supervene 
upon a set of properties B is for a B-duplicate of something to also be an A-duplicate of 
it (i.e., if two things are B-indiscernible they are thereby also A-indiscernible), but not 
necessarily vice versa.39 Or, in its contra-posed version, A supervenes upon B iff there 
can be no A-difference without there being a B-difference. (We shall fine-grain this 
broad definition shortly.)  
It is tempting to think that material criteria of identity – i.e., a universe that 
primarily contains material objects (such as lumps of clay and H2O) that merely happen 
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to have manifest properties (such as being a statue or being watery) goes hand in hand 
with physicalism. This linkage is ill-fated; or so at least I shall argue. More generally, it 
will be argued that supervenience and criteria of identity are mutually independent.  
In view of the varieties of supervenience relations in the literature, we should 
make some preliminary remarks before getting to the argument.  
(A terminological remark: as not everything that is physical is plainly material 
(e.g., forces, electric fields etc.), it is more customary now to talk about the physical rather 
than about the mere material. We shall thus follow this trend, and talk about physical 
criteria of identity instead of mere material criteria of identity.)  
The above broad definition of supervenience has undergone considerable fine-
graining through the introduction of various distinctions, most of which are concerned 
with the domain of application of the supervenience relation. Two such major distinctions 
(due to Kim40) are between individual (aka local) supervenience and global supervenience, 
and between ‘weak’ supervenience and ‘strong’ supervenience. In its individual version, 
the relation applies to individual objects or events. As Davidson puts it (with relation to 
the mental and the physical):  
. . . supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all 
physical respects but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter 
in some mental respects without altering in some physical respects.41 
In its global counterpart, the relation applies to the whole world. As Lewis puts it:  
If two possible worlds were exactly isomorphic in their pattern of coinstantiation of 
fundamental properties and relations, they would thereby be exactly alike simpliciter.42 
Both versions – local and global – have each a weak and a strong version (as well as most 
other types of supervenience43). With respect to individual supervenience, weak 
supervenience applies merely to the actual world, whereas global supervenience applies to 
all possible worlds. Specifically, A individually weakly supervenes on B iff “for any 
possible world w and any individuals x and y in w, if x and y are B-indiscernible in w, then 
they are A-indiscernible in w”; By contrast, A individually strongly supervenes on B iff “for 
any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any individuals x in w1 and y in w2, if x in w1 is B-
indiscernible from y in w2, then x in w1 is A-indiscernible from y in w2”.44 This strong 
supervenience entails weak supervenience but not vice versa.  
Our discussion below is concerned with the relation between supervenience and 
criteria of identity. Similar distinctions – weak vs. strong and local vs. global – may apply 
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to criteria of identity as well. I.e., criteria of identity may apply merely to the actual world 
or to all counterfactual worlds; in addition, we can talk about the criteria for being the 
same object (or stuff), as well as about the criteria for being the same world, e.g., whether 
these are manifest or material. The main claim to be advanced here is that supervenience 
and criteria of identity are independent from one another. This claim is not restricted to a 
certain domain; thus, the claim is that supervenience and criteria of identity are mutually 
independent, whether we consider individuals or the entire worlds, and whether we 
consider merely the actual world or all possible worlds.  
(However, note that it is by no means claimed that supervenience is true, and in 
particular, that physicalism is true; nor is it claimed that physical criteria of identity are 
true. The claim is that physicalism and physical criteria of identity, whether true or not, 
are independent of one another).  
We can now proceed to the argument.  
To be sure, both views – physical criteria of identity and physicalism – express 
some sort of hierarchy, in which the physical has some priority over other aspects, such as 
the manifest, the mental, the functional etc. Yet it is suggested that each of these views 
expresses a different type of hierarchy, and the two hierarchies are quite independent of 
one another.  
Before we get to analyse and compare the two types of hierarchies, we can 
consider a simple intuitive example that demonstrates the independence of the two 
hierarchies. Think of organisms. As far as material constitution is concerned, they – in 
fact, we – are all in a constant flux; molecules constantly join and leave our bodies, and 
given a sufficient period of time, we (i.e., organisms) even undergo a complete material 
change. Hence, organisms seem to merely happen to have their physical constitution. In 
other words, if organisms exist (indeed, some believe they don’t exist, as such)45, then, 
since the physical is something that such objects merely happen to have, their criteria of 
identity are not physical. Yet at the same time, many believe that a physical duplicate of 
an organism is also a duplicate of the entire organism, i.e., of all aspects of the organisms, 
but not necessarily vice versa. In other words, many believe that organisms supervene 
upon their physical constitution. Intuitively, these two views are in no conflict. It seems 
perfectly consistent to hold that while organisms supervene upon their physical 
constitution, they each merely happen to have their particular constitution, and might just 
as well have had a different constitution. It follows that the supervenience of everything 
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(including the living world) upon the physical, is compatible with non-physical criteria of 
identity.  
And now for some more rigorous analysis.  
The supervenience of B on A amounts to the idea that an A-duplicate is also a B-
duplicate but not vice versa. This a-symmetrical, i.e., hierarchical, relation is in fact a 
combination of two, simpler, hierarchical relations. The first is a formal type of relation, 
which has to do with the mathematical correlation between things of type A and things 
of type B. Namely, for B to supervene upon A is for B to stand in a one-many 
correlation to A; i.e., every A is correlated to only one B, whereas some B’s may be 
correlated to more than one A. For example, in a community where all members of each 
family drive one car and every car is driven by members of but one family, there is a one-
many correlation between cars and drivers. This correlation entails that given a certain A 
– driver – we can determine a corresponding B – car – but not vice versa; we cannot 
determine a certain A – driver – on the basis of a particular B – car. (Other formal 
relations are one-one; many-one; many-many; and no correlation. Supervenience requires 
at least one-many correlation, i.e., either one-many, or one-one correlation.) 
Supervenience relations involve such a formal hierarchy. E.g., in the case of physicalism, 
the manifest (as well as other aspects) allegedly stands in a one-many correlation to the 
physical. Thus, we can determine the manifest on the basis of the physical, but not vice 
versa (as the same manifest may be correlated with different physical states).  
However, supervenience relations involve more than just a formal one-many 
correlation. Clearly, despite the one-many correlation between cars and people in the 
above community, cars do not supervene upon people; a human-duplicate of the 
community is by no means thereby a car-duplicate of that same community. What’s 
missing is a further spatial hierarchy. When B supervenes upon A, B is not only correlated 
to A but B and A also coincide, in a way that B is instantiated by, or realised in, A; i.e., it is 
required that A somehow underlies B. (Admittedly this may not be very satisfactory a 
definition of this relation, but hopefully it will do for our present purposes).  
It thus follows that supervenience is a case in which two conditions are met. 
Firstly, B carries a one-many correlation to A; and secondly, A underlies B. In other 
words, supervenience involves both a formal hierarchy and a spatial hierarchy between A 
and B. Only the combination of the two hierarchies brings about the situation that an A-
duplicate is also a B-duplicate. In particular, to say that the manifest (and other aspects) 
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supervenes upon the physical is to say that, (a) the manifest (as well as other aspects) is 
determined by the physical but not vice versa; and (b) physical objects 
underlie/instantiate/realise the manifest (and other aspects) but not vice versa. It is the 
combination of the two hierarchies that brings it about that a physical duplicate is also a 
manifest duplicate, (as well as any other duplicate), i.e., that the manifest supervenes upon 
the physical.  
The two hierarchies that make the supervenience relation are independent of 
each other: it was already demonstrated that we could have a formal hierarchy without a 
spatial one, as in the above cars-drivers case; it is also possible, however, to have a spatial 
hierarchy without a formal one, as the following example illustrates. Consider a possible 
world in which all the following stuffs exist: watery H2O, watery XYZ, non-watery H2O 
and non-watery XYZ (note that such a world is clearly logically as well as metaphysically 
possible, even if its physical possibility may be questioned46). In such a world, the 
correlation between the physical and the manifest is many-many, and so it is not possible 
to determine the manifest on the basis of the physical or vice versa. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that the physical in this world still underlies the manifest, i.e., that the manifest is 
realised, or instantiated, in the physical. This would be a case of spatial hierarchy without 
formal hierarchy. Overall then, we may conclude the mutual independence of the formal 
and the spatial hierarchies.  
Furthermore, these formal and spatial hierarchies are distinct from yet another 
type of hierarchy, which is the one involved in criteria of identity. This is a metaphysical 
hierarchy. In the context of criteria of identity, for A to be hierarchically superior to B 
means that whereas A is what objects are, B is what (some) objects are like. (If our above 
analysis of criteria of identity in terms of sortal properties is sound, we may simply say 
that A is metaphysically superior to B if A is a sortal property, whereas B is not). Clearly, 
this metaphysical form of hierarchy is different from both the formal hierarchy – which 
is about correlation – as well as from the spatial hierarchy – which has to do with 
instantiation.  
Consequently, metaphysical hierarchy is also distinct from the combination of the 
two other hierarchies, namely, metaphysical hierarchy is distinct from supervenience 
hierarchy.  
Metaphysical hierarchy and supervenience are not only distinct from each other, 
but are also independent of each other. As a support for this claim consider the above 
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organism example: there is a view according to which it is possible for organisms to 
supervene upon their physical constitution and yet at the same time to have this physical 
constitution contingently. Whether this view is correct or not, the important point is that 
it is coherent. In other words, it is coherent to hold that the two hierarchies are in 
opposite order. However, to prove that there is no dependence, it should be also possible 
for the two hierarchies to be in the same order. This seems to be no less coherent. The 
manifest (and other aspects of the world) may supervene upon the physical while at the 
same time the universe may be such that it primarily contains physical objects that merely 
happen to have their manifest properties (as the material view has it). (On this latter view, 
what we call organisms are in fact collection of molecules that happen to have organismic 
properties, which they might have equally lacked).  
 
To sum up, hierarchical relations between things of type A and things of type B are a-
symmetrical relations between the two types. We have discussed four such sorts of 
hierarchical relations: (a) if things of type B carry a one-many correlation to things of 
type A, then A determines B but not vice versa. This is a formal hierarchy, in which A is 
superior to B; (b) if things of type A and things of type B coincide, while the former 
underlies/instantiates/realises the latter, then there is a spatial hierarchy between A and B, 
in which A is superior. These two hierarchies are distinct and independent; (c) a 
combination of the formal hierarchy and the spatial hierarchy results in supervenience 
hierarchy: B supervenes upon A iff an A-duplicate is also a B-duplicate, but not 
necessarily vice versa (in this case A is superior to B); and (d) if the universe is such that it 
primarily contains things of type A, some of which merely happen to be B’s, then there is 
a metaphysical hierarchy between A and B (in which A is superior to B). This is a 
metaphysical hierarchy.47 It has been argued that the metaphysical hierarchy and the 
supervenience hierarchy are distinct and independent. We have argued as follows. 
Metaphysical hierarchy is clearly distinct from formal hierarchy. It is also distinct from 
the so-called spatial hierarchy. It thus also distinct from the combination of these two 
hierarchies, namely, from supervenience hierarchy. Furthermore, metaphysical hierarchy 
is not only distinct from supervenience but it is also independent of it. As a support for 
this claim, we have considered two views about organisms: (a) a common view that takes 
organisms to supervene upon their physical constitution, and at the same time to have 
the specific physical constitution that they have contingently; and (b) the converse view – 
namely, that equally takes organisms to supervene upon their physical constitution, but, 
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contrary to the former view, holds them to have their manifest properties contingently. 
The fact that the two views are coherent provides a strong support for the independence 
of the two types of hierarchies. Thus, generally, we conclude that the fact that A 
supervenes upon B has no entailment as to criteria of identity, i.e., whether the universe 
primarily contains A’s that merely happen to be B’s, or whether the universe primarily 
contains B’s that merely happen to be A’s. Both options are compatible with each 
supervenience hierarchy.
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Endnotes 
                                                 
 
1 To remind, it is assumed in this dissertation that identity requires criteria of identity. See 
Endnote 23 in Chapter 1. 
2 See Section  2.3. 
3 E.g., Quine (1960, p. 199) argues as follows:  
Mathematicians may conceivably be said to be necessarily rational and not necessarily two-
legged; and cyclists necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational. But what of an 
individual who counts among his eccentricities both mathematics and cycling? Is this concrete 
individual necessarily rational and contingently two-legged or vice versa? Just insofar as we are 
talking referentially of the object, with no special bias towards a background grouping of 
mathematicians as against cyclists or vice versa, there is no semblance of sense in rating some 
of his attributes as necessary and others as contingent. Some of his attributes count as 
important and others as unimportant, yes; some as enduring and others as fleeting; but none as 
necessary or contingent.  
In other words, if Paul is the mathematician who is also a cyclist, then Paul qua mathematician is 
necessarily rational, whereas qua cyclist he is only contingently rational. (While regardless of 
description, i.e., simply qua Paul, he is neither necessarily nor contingently rational.) Indeed this 
argument for the description-relativity applies to necessary properties and to contingent 
properties, and not explicitly to sortal properties. However, as we shall see shortly, sortal 
properties are a sub-class of necessary properties, and hence the argument applies ipso facto to 
sortal properties as well.  
4 Locke (1689, III, iii, 15) 
5 Aristotle, Categories 
6 The relation between sortal properties and criteria of identity will be later refined. In particular, 
it will be shown that although all sortal properties serve as criteria of identity, some criteria of 
identity are not sortal properties (Section  3.3.5).  
7 Grandy (2006) 
8 P. F. Strawson (1959, 169 ff.; 1974, Chapters 4, 5) 
9 Quine (1960)  
10 Wiggins (1967, Part 2 and Appendix; 1980, Chapters 2, 3) 
11 Geach (1962) 
12 Geach (1962, p. 64) distinguishes his substantival terms from sortals on just this point:  
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we can speak of the same gold as being first a statue and then a great number of coins, but 
‘How many golds?’ does not make sense. Thus ‘gold’ is a substantival term, though we cannot 
use it for counting. 
13 Indeed, the Aristotelian picture is rather specific, and posits, for example, a limited number of 
categories that apply to all objects. 
14 Putnam (1977, p. 103) 
15 Molière (1673, act 3) 
16 Putnam (1977, p.104)  
17 I am indebted to José Zalabardo for helping me to formulate my ideas on this matter. 
18 Unless we have some trope conception of properties. But that will make the shape an individual 
essence. See below.  
19 Chisholm (1967) 
20 It is important to note that indiscernibility here is not merely in the epistemic sense; i.e., it is 
not confined to what properties are available to us, but it applies to all properties. Thus, it is 
different from the qualitative indiscernibility discussed above in relation to possibilities such as 
that “Nixon might have been an automaton” (see Section  2.3). In the latter case the subjects 
resemble each other for all we can tell, yet they do differ in some properties that are hidden from 
us, namely, one is a person while the other is an automaton. No such difference applies in the 
present context.  
21 Incidentally, in one place it seems that Kripke (1980, pp. 15-20) in fact prefers such an option 
of qualitatively-identical yet numerically distinct worlds (while explicitly not committing to their 
existence) to its alternative on which qualitatively-identical worlds are ipso facto held identical. This 
is because the latter view entails that a situation in which, for example, dice A shows 6 and dice B 
shows 5 is identical to a situation in which dice A shows 5 and dice B shows 6; and, 
consequently, that the probabilities related to two dice amount to merely 21 rather than to 36, 
which seems a highly undesirable result (see Endnote 97 in Chapter 1). 
22 Chisholm (1967, p. 6) 
23 Chisholm (1967, p. 5)  
24 Echoing Quine’s (1953) famous replacement of “Pegasus” with “the thing that Pegasizes”. 
25 Other adherents of such primitive thisness are Kant and Pierce. Famous anti-haecceitists include 
Leibniz, Russell, and Ayer. For contemporary applications of haecceitism to modal contexts see 
Kaplan (1975); Adams (1979); and, Lewis (1986, pp. 220-48).  
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26 Kripke (1972/1980, pp. 110 ff.) 
27 The view dates back to Plato (see Phaedo, Books V-VII of the Republic, and Parmenides). Notable 
contemporary defenders include Russell (1912), Donagan (1963) and Armstrong (1989)  
28 A notable advocate is Williams D. C. (1953). But according to D.W. Mertz (1996, ch. IV), 
versions of this view can be found in Plato, Aristotle, Boëthius, Avicenna, Averroës, Thomas, 
Scotus, Buridan, Suárez, Leibniz, Husserl, Russell (early, 1911), Stout, Cook Wilson, and P. F. 
Strawson. 
29 Loux (1998) notes that versions of this view can be found already in the medieval thinkers 
Abelard and Ockham: McKeon (1929, pp. 208-58). The recent name that is most strongly linked 
with class nominalism is of course Quine (1953). 
30 E.g., Cocchiarella (1986, Ch. 3) 
31 Armstrong (1997; 2004)  
32 The instantiation relation famously opens the door to Bradley’s regress problem, namely, if an 
object x is related to a property F by the relation of instantiation R, this relation requires another 
two relations: one that links the instantiation relation R to x; the other that links the instantiation 
relation R to F. This in turn requires four more relations to link these two relations to their relata. 
And so forth, ad infinitum. As Swoyer (2000) notes, the common solution to the problem is to 
view instantiation as a relation that links objects and properties directly, with no need for further 
intermediate relations. Thus, Strawson (1959) talks about a “non-relational tie”; Frege suggested a 
model of a function-argument link, i.e., a property is like a function that takes objects as 
arguments; Wittgenstein suggested something like links in a chain; and Broad (1933, p.85) talked 
about “metaphysical glue”. All these modes demonstrate relations that bind the relata directly, 
with no need for further relations to attach the binding agent to the relata.  
33 Having reached this stage in our study, we are aware of the fact that everyday metaphysical 
assumptions are by no means indisputable; in principle, there is nothing to rule out other, less 
common, views. E.g., although (as our first example below assumes) it is commonly believed that 
being pale is neither necessary nor sufficient for Socrates, still, there is nothing to rule out a 
metaphysical view that takes paleness to be necessary, or sufficient, or, even both, to Socrates.  
34 Although this is very widely accepted, there is some opposition nonetheless. Kit Fine (1994) 
draws a distinction between necessary properties and essential properties. Specifically, he argues 
that although all essential properties are necessary to their object, the converse does not hold; 
some necessary properties are not essential. For example, being distinct from the Eiffel tower is 
necessary to Socrates but, according to Fine, it is not essential to him. This claim is based on 
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 Thus the relation has two sub-relations: one in which there can also be no A-difference 
without B-difference; the other in which there can be an A-difference without there being a B-
difference. The first case is one of mutual supervenience (e.g., the surface area of a sphere and its 
volume mutually supervene upon each other (McLaughlin and Bennett (2005) credit the example 
to Lombard (1986)). However, the latter case is interesting as it allows for the so-called multiple 
realisability: the same B may be realised in more than one A, but one A can only realise one B. 
Putnam (1967) famously used multiple realisability to argue against the identity theory of mind: 
pains can be felt by humans as well as by other animals (and thus, possibly, by Martians as well); 
so if pains are realised in physical states, then it follows that they might be (if not actually are) 
realised in physical states quite different from one another. And generally, the same mental state 
is realisable in more than one physical state. But not vice versa: once the physical state has been 
determined, so is the mental state that it realises. So, although pains (and other mental-state 
types) may supervene upon physical-states, they may not be (type-) identical to them. (This, 
however, does not rule out token-identity; i.e., that every pain token is identical to a certain 
physical-state token.) 
Fine’s notion of essential properties as properties that are part of the object’s essence, or nature; 
being distinct from the Eiffel tower is not part of Socrates’ nature, and hence not an essential 
property. I believe this to be a mere terminological disagreement, about the meaning of the term 
“essential” and thus not a substantial disagreement. That is to say, the debate merely reveals that 
different speakers may use the term “essential” in different ways. We may say then that the above 
characterisation does not apply to Fine’s particular notion of “essential”.  
35 Note that numbers are more like stuffs than they are like individual objects: just as there is only 
one stuff which is watery H2O in each world (albeit many samples of that stuff), similarly there is 
also only one number 5 in a world (albeit many groups of five objects). By contrast, there are 
many individual people, dogs, trees, etc. 
36 Locke (1689, III iii 15) 
37 A stronger relation would be, of course, that the non-physical not only supervenes, but is also 
identical to the physical.  
38 Although the idea appears to have been around for quite a while (as McLaughlin and Bennett 
(2005) note), Davidson (1970) is normally credited for the contemporary understanding of 
supervenience, and for stirring the discussion; particularly within the philosophy of mind.  
39
 Note also that whereas the first sub-relation, namely mutual supervenience, is a 
symmetric one, the second is not. Consequently, whereas two properties may supervene upon 
one another (as in the case of the surface and the volume of a sphere), no two properties may be 
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multiply realised in one another; if B is multiply realised in A it follows that A is not multiply 
realised in B (in fact, if B is realised in A, A cannot be realised in B at all, let alone multiply 
realised). 
40 Kim (1984)  
41 Davidson (1970, p. 214) 
42 Lewis (1994)  
43 In addition to individual and global supervenience, McLaughlin and Bennett (2005) mention 
also regional (due to Horgan 1982), similarity-based (Kim 1987) and multiple domain (Kim 1988) types 
of supervenience – all of which have weak and strong versions. (For a detailed classification of 
types of supervenience and formal definitions, see McLaughlin and Bennett (2005), especially the 
supplement: “Appendix: List of definitions”). 
44 Kim (1987). With respect to global supervenience, the distinction between weak and strong 
supervenience (drawn by Stalnaker (1996), McLaughlin (1996; 1997), and Sider (1999)) is defined 
by McLaughlin and Bennett (2005) as follows: A weakly globally supervenes on B iff “for any 
worlds w1 and w2, if there is a B-preserving isomorphism between w1 and w2, then there is an A-
preserving isomorphism between them”; whereas A strongly globally supervenes on B iff “for 
any worlds w1 and w2, every B-preserving isomorphism between w1 and w2 is an A-preserving 
isomorphism between them.” 
45  Notably, Unger (1980) 
46 See also Endnote 4 in Chapter 1.  
47 In other words, A is a sortal property whereas B is not.  
 4 INTENSIONS: SOME EPISTEMIC ASPECTS 
 
 
Overview 
This chapter looks into some epistemic issues, mainly our state of knowledge or 
ignorance, and the way these are related to intensions.  
Our epistemic access to the world is limited. There is always a possible gap 
between how things are and how we take them to be. When the two coincide, we are 
right; when they don’t, we are wrong. This possible gap applies to each of the three 
factors in our intensions formula (assuming, of course, that there is a fact of the matter in 
each case). Specifically, on the metaphysical level, there are the real criteria of identity, 
and there are what people take to be the criteria of identity; on the linguistic level, there is 
the real semantic function of a term, and there is what speakers take the semantic 
function of the term to be; and with respect to actuality, there is the real actual state of 
affairs, and there is what people take the actual state of affairs to be.  
In the first part of this chapter we discuss issues to do with the relation between 
the way things are and the ways we take them to be. One common reason for changing 
the way we take things to be is following (scientific) discoveries. Thus discoveries loom 
large in this discussion. We begin by considering rigidified terms (i.e., terms with constant 
intensions), and their crucial role in securing reference in states of ignorance, and in light 
of possible future discoveries. We then discuss different ways in which we may lack 
knowledge of sortal properties. This analysis will teach us that it is not in the ken of 
science to determine the sortal properties of things. Lastly, we analyse a complication 
related to the intension of natural-kind terms that does not apply to singular terms. The 
problem is that whereas the name-givers of Aristotle cannot be mistaken in initially 
naming him “Aristotle”, the name-givers of “fish” – even under the assumption that, like 
“Aristotle”, “fish” is a rigidified designator that is introduced by stipulation – were 
apparently partly mistaken in initially naming all the swimming organisms “fish”. 
Specifically, the discovery that whales were not fish, but mammals, seems to indicate 
such a mistake.  
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In the second part of this chapter, we discuss the relation between different ways 
we may take things to be. The discussion focuses on reduction, which is a particular sort 
of hierarchical relation between one way we take the world to be, and another. We 
analyse different ways in which reduction may be described, and how these bear upon 
the intensions of the terms involved. We shall uncover two new semantic functions – to 
be termed “role” and “occupant” – which will prove very useful in explaining some 
reduction-related puzzles.  
 
4.1 The Relation between the Way Things Are and the Ways They 
are Taken to Be 
4.1.1 Rigidified vs. descriptive as “absorbent” content vs. stipulated content 
Let us recall first the relations between intensions, criteria of identity and sortal 
properties.1  
Our prime semantic distinction is between descriptive and rigidified terms. The 
intension of a descriptive term assigns to each possible world that which fits the term’s 
descriptive content in that world. Thus, we may describe the “manual” attached to a 
descriptive term “T” which is associated with a descriptive content D as follows: “pick 
out, with respect to every possible world, that which D’s (i.e., is D) in that world”. This is 
independent of any criteria of identity. By contrast, determining the intension of a 
rigidified term does require criteria of identity. A rigidified term is designed to designate, 
with respect to every counterfactual world, the same referent that it designates in the 
actual world. Being “the same referent” is dependent on criteria of identity.  
Criteria of identity are spelled-out in terms of sortal properties: X is identical to Y 
iff X and Y share the same sortal property (or individual sortal property, in case X and Y 
are individuals. See Section  3.2). Thus, the “manual” attached to a rigidified term can be 
said to be the following: “go to the actual world, find the referent of the term, find its 
(individual) sortal property, then go to other counterfactual worlds, and pick out that 
which has the same (individual) sortal property.” Thus, if this (individual) sortal property 
is S, we may say that the manual attached to the rigidified terms is simply, “pick out, with 
respect to every counterfactual world, that which S’s (i.e., is S) in that world”.  
But now, once the means by which a rigidified term designates across 
counterfactual worlds is taken into account, namely, once the (individual) sortal property 
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is located, it turns out that there is a striking resemblance between the semantic functions 
of descriptive terms and that of rigidified terms: a descriptive term designates, with 
respect to each counterfactual world that which D’s in that world; whereas a rigidified 
term designates, with respect to each counterfactual world, that which S’s in that world. 
In other words, both designate, with respect each counterfactual world, that which meets 
a certain condition, in that world; namely, D in the case of descriptive terms, and S in the 
case of rigidified terms. This is another way of saying that both designate, with respect to 
every possible world, that which fits some descriptive content. It thus follows that 
rigidified terms eventually have some descriptive content as well, which is “has the 
(individual) sortal property of the actual referent”. (This last claim may, of course, be 
very unpopular among some New Theorists. However, at present I can see no way 
around it, and am therefore compelled to hold it a necessary implication of the New 
Theory.)  
There are, nevertheless, crucial differences between the descriptive content of a 
descriptive term and that of a rigidified term. These differences make them categorically 
distinct. Let me specify those. (Indeed all three differences below are aspects of one 
central difference.)  
Firstly, the descriptive content of a rigidified term is mediated by the actual 
referent of the term. No such mediation is involved in the case of descriptive terms. The 
content of a descriptive term is simply given directly. This has the important implication 
that whereas the content of a descriptive term is determined by us, i.e., by the semantic 
conventions of our language, the descriptive content of a rigidified term is determined by 
nature, independently of us. In other words, whereas the descriptive content D of a 
descriptive term is stipulated by the language community, the descriptive content S of a 
rigidified term, by contrast, “absorbs” its content from (the sortal property of) the actual 
referent. E.g., the descriptive content of “water” is “absorbed” from the sortal property 
of the actual referent of “water”; thus, a sortal property ‘being H2O’ will generate a 
different descriptive content than a sortal property ‘being watery’. As we shall see shortly, 
this fact has some crucial epistemic implications.  
Secondly, there are different possibilities with respect to the actual referent of a 
term. E.g., it is a possibility of the actual world that Aristotle was indeed a person, but it 
is also a possibility of the actual world that Aristotle was not a person but a robot, i.e., 
there is a possible actual world in which Aristotle was a robot (although, if the “real” 
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actual world is one in which Aristotle is a person, then there is no possible counterfactual 
world in which he is a robot. see Sections  1.1.3 and  2.3). Thus, there are two possible 
actual referents of the rigidified term “Aristotle”. These two possible actual referents, the 
person and the robot, have different sortal properties. So there are different possibilities 
as to the sortal property of the actual referent of a given rigidified term. And this further 
entails that there are different possibilities as to the descriptive content attached to such a 
rigidified term. E.g., if Aristotle was actually a person, then – assuming the necessity of 
origin thesis – the descriptive content of a rigidified “Aristotle” in that case is “he who 
originated from the same gamete as the actual referent”. This descriptive content will 
obviously be different in case Aristotle was actually a robot; it will involve the sortal 
property of robots (whatever that might be). By contrast, no such variations apply to 
descriptive terms; e.g., a descriptive “the last great philosopher of antiquity” designates, 
with respect to each counterfactual world, that which fits the description in that world, 
regardless of whether the actual great philosopher of antiquity was a person, a robot, or 
anything else. Thus, relative to the possible actual worlds, the descriptive content of a 
descriptive term is constant across the intensions table, whereas the descriptive content of 
a rigidified term varies as a function of what the actual is like.  
Lastly, when considering the actual world, the two types of terms, descriptive and 
rigidified, have different implications regarding the relations between the sense and the 
reference of the term. In the case of a descriptive term, the sense determines the 
reference, e.g., the referent of “the last great philosopher of antiquity” is determined by 
the sense of that term. By contrast, in the case of a rigidified term, the sense to be 
attached to “Aristotle” (if indeed rigidified) is determined by the sortal property of the 
actual referent, i.e., by the sortal property of Aristotle. In other words, in the case of 
rigidified terms, it is the (actual) reference that determines sense and not vice versa.  
 
4.1.2 Referring terms in a state of ignorance  
One may wonder, why have rigidified terms at all? Why not simply use only descriptive 
terms? After all, all we need to do is to use some descriptive predicate that will uniquely 
refer to our object; and these seem to be in abundance.  
An intuitive reply may be that rigidified terms are there to guarantee designation 
of the same individual in all counterfactual worlds.  
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Yet, as we have witnessed, a descriptive term may be rigid as well, in which case it 
designates the same individual in all possible worlds (recall “stuff with atomic number 
79”). This happens whenever the property involved in the description is an (individual) 
sortal property. Thus, apparently, we can replace a rigidified term with a descriptive one, 
simply by using a description which is linked to the referent’s (individual) sortal property. 
For example, instead of using the (rigidified) term “gold” we may simply use “stuff with 
atomic number 79”, and get the same results. And in general, if the actual referent of a 
certain term “T” has the (individual) sortal property S, then instead of using (a rigidified) 
“T”, we may just use “that which S’s”. Thus, apparently, we could in principle discard all 
rigidified term, by replacing them with their corresponding descriptive term.  
This replacement would be successful in a state of omniscience. The fact of the 
matter, however, is that we are far from such a state. Specifically, in many cases, we 
simply do not know what the sortal property of a referent is, and thus we do not know 
what the appropriate description to replace it would be. Given this human 
epistemological limitation, rigidified terms come incredibly handy. This is because they 
are latched onto their referent regardless of our state of knowledge about that referent. 
We can simply name objects and stuffs, without knowing their sortal properties. Thanks 
to this facility, a directly-referring “Aristotle”, for instance, designates Aristotle in every 
counterfactual world, whatever Aristotle actually turns out to be in the actual world, e.g., 
if it turns out that he was not the last great philosopher of antiquity (say, if his wife 
Pythias was), and even if he was discovered not to be actually human at all, but, say, a 
robot or even a non-material hologram. No discovery about Aristotle would deprive him 
of his name; not in the actual world, and not in any counterfactual world. Whatever 
Aristotle actually is, the (rigidified) term “Aristotle” would designate that individual in 
every counterfactual world.  
The situation is entirely different when it comes to descriptive terms. Such terms 
refer to whatever fits the description associated with the term. Hence, if we were to 
discover that a certain object that we believed to fit the description in effect doesn’t, we 
would deprive it of that descriptive term. Specifically, in the case of sortal terms. For 
instance, if we were to discover that gold, contrary to our belief, does not actually have 
atomic number 79, we will cease to apply the descriptive term “stuff with atomic number 
79” to gold. In fact, part of the discovery would be that the description never actually 
designated gold (despite the fact that we, wrongly, used it in this way). By contrast, such a 
discovery would have no effect on the designation of the (rigidified) term “gold”.  
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Overall then, no matter how ignorant we are about a certain object or stuff, by 
using a rigidified term to designate it, we are guaranteed that that term would refer to it. 
No future discovery about our referent could ever change this designation.   
(A qualification needs to be made here. To remind, there are two types of 
rigidified terms: directly-referring terms and reference fixing terms. Whereas both pick 
out their counterfactual referents in a similar way, namely, both designate, with respect to 
every counterfactual world, that which they designate in the actual world, nonetheless the 
two pick out their actual referent differently: a directly-referring term designates its actual 
referent independently of descriptive content, while the actual referent of a reference-
fixing term is picked-out by fitting the term’s descriptive content. Hence, what was said 
above strictly applies to directly-referring terms, but should be slightly restricted in the 
case of reference-fixing terms: e.g., a reference-fixing “gold” whose descriptive content is 
“the (actual) golden stuff” indeed designates gold in all counterfactual worlds no matter 
what we discover about it, save for the (unlikely) discovery that it was not golden.)  
The same equally applies to natural-kinds that are not stuffs like gold; e.g., to 
tigers. According to the New Theory of reference, natural-kind terms are rigidified terms. 
We have proposed above (Section  2.2.4) to spell this out as follows: a natural-kind term 
designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, objects of the same kind as the 
objects that it designates in the actual world. (This definition allows a natural-kind term 
to designate different sets of individuals in different counterfactual worlds.) E.g., “tiger” 
designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, the individuals that are of the 
same (natural) kind as the ones referred to by “tiger” in the actual world. However, we 
may be uncertain about what being a tiger consists in, i.e., what is its sortal property. (We 
may have a theory about what it is, yet, clearly, any theory is fallible, i.e., we may be proved 
wrong). Thus, by using “tiger” as a rigidified term (as Kripke believes it to be the case2), 
we guarantee that whatever being a tiger consists in, i.e., whatever the sortal property of 
tigers is, the term “tiger” will designate members of this kind, in every counterfactual 
world.  
In sum, the content of a descriptive term is stipulated by the community of 
speakers. By contrast, the content of a rigidified term is “absorbed” from the (individual) 
sortal property of the actual referent to which it is applied (regardless of what we believe 
this (individual) sortal property to be). In other words, the content of a descriptive term 
is constant, whereas that of a rigidified term is variable. This provides rigidified terms with 
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the capacity to secure reference to an intended object of reference regardless of our state 
of ignorance (whether the object of reference is an individual, some stuff, or a natural-
kind). The same does not apply to descriptive terms.  
A final note: talking about a state of ignorance makes sense only under realist 
assumptions, i.e., that there is a fact of the matter regarding the sortal property of 
objects. If there is no fact of the matter, and these sortal properties are merely stipulated, 
then, indeed, it seems that rigidified terms do amount simply to descriptive terms whose 
descriptive contents state the stipulated sortal properties. E.g., it makes sense to hold that 
there is no fact of the matter regarding the sortal property of cars, i.e., that cars have no 
mind-independent sortal property; by designing cars to serve a certain function, we 
thereby stipulate what it is to be a car, i.e., we stipulate its sortal property. Having 
stipulated it, there is little sense to engage in exploring the sortal property of cars. 
Correspondingly “car” is an abbreviated description – simply a description of its function 
– whose descriptive content is constant and not variable. This descriptive content by no 
means depends on external facts, but rather solely on our stipulation. If, as anti-realism 
has it, there are no facts of the matter about any sortal properties, then all referring terms 
in our language are just like “car” – stipulated and constant.   
 
4.1.3 Sortal properties in a state of ignorance  
In Section  3.2 we discerned the following structure. One of the factors that determine 
the intension of a term is the criteria of identity of the actual referent of the term. Criteria 
of identity are (mostly3) spelled out in terms of sortal properties: x is identical to y iff x 
shares the (individual) sortal property of y. Thus, the intension of a term is dependent 
upon the sortal property of the term’s actual referent. The sortal property itself is 
determined by two factors: the sortal second-order property (i.e., the second-order 
property that defines the criteria of identity) and the actual first-order properties of the 
object in question: with respect to a certain object, the first-order property on which the 
sortal second-order property homes-in is thereby rendered sortal. 
From an epistemological point of view, this structure entails three ways in which 
we may be incapable of determining the sortal property of an object, and consequently 
also the intension of a term that actually refers to this object: (a) we may know one factor 
but fail to know the other; or (b) the other way around; or (c) we may fail to know both. 
In detail, (a) we may know the sortal second-order property, but lack the knowledge of 
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the first-order property on which that property homes-in. This seems to be the state of 
affairs before 1750 with regard to water. People (arguably) assumed that the sortal 
property of water was whatever the material constitution of water was, i.e., they assumed 
material sortal second-order property. However, at that time they did not know what that 
material constitution of water in fact was, i.e., they did not know what first-order 
property fell under that sortal second-order property. Thus they did not know what the 
sortal (first-order) property of water was. Consequently, they were not in a position to 
determine the intension of “water”; (b) by contrast, we may be well aware of the first-
order properties of the actual referent, yet at the same time fail to know the sortal 
second-order property, and as a result, again, fail to know which of the first-order 
properties should count as sortal. This state seems to apply to the case of “David”. We 
know its first-order properties – being constituted by a lump of clay, and having a certain 
statue-shape (and, in principle, we may know all of its other first-order properties as 
well), but unless we know the sortal second-order property, i.e., the one that defines its 
criteria of identity, we cannot determine which of these first-order properties is the sortal 
one. This, again, will also prevent us from determining the intension of a rigidified 
“David”; (c) lastly, we can simply be ignorant of both factors.  
 
4.1.3.1 Can scientific practice refute metaphysical antirealism?  
Science discovered that water is H2O; that lightning is an electrical discharge; that heat is a 
mean kinetic molecular energy; and the like. It may seem then, that metaphysical 
antirealism – i.e., the view that there is no fact of the matter with regard to criteria of 
identity – is at odds with scientific progress: for science tells us what things are, and thus 
allegedly proves that there is a fact of the matter in this respect. However, the distinction 
between first-order and second-order properties may suggest otherwise.  
It is true that physical science, for instance, uncovers the physical structure that 
underlies certain stuffs and phenomena. But this practice merely amounts to uncovering 
the first-order properties on which a certain type of second-order properties homes-in. 
For instance, in discovering that water was H2O, we came to realise that the first-order 
property that falls under the second-order property ‘being the stuff’s material 
constitution’ was ‘(being) H2O’. Very few would doubt that there is a fact of the matter 
here. Even if this discovery is to be proved wrong in the future, most will expect it to be 
merely replaced by another discovery about this first-order property, i.e., a discovery 
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about what is really the case. However, what may remain in doubt is whether this first-
order property is a sortal property. This would depend, of course, on whether the second-
order property ‘being the stuff’s material constitution’ is sortal or not, i.e., whether it is 
the one linked with criteria of identity. And the answer to this question is simply outside 
the scope of physical science. And indeed of any special science.  
To conclude, applying a second-order property, like ‘being an object’s material 
constitution’ or ‘being an object’s manifest property (or properties)’, to an object will 
home-in on some first-order property, whether we know this first-order property or not. 
It takes a special strong type of antirealism to deny that there are facts of the matter in 
this respect. However, endorsing  such facts of the matter does not suffice to enable us 
to determine which of the second-order properties is the sortal one, and, as a 
consequence, to being able to determine which of the first-order properties is the sortal 
property.  In other words, antirealism about criteria of identity does not conflict, as such, 
with our scientific practices.  
 
4.1.4 Artefacts in a state of ignorance  
Alongside natural-kinds, i.e., natural objects and stuffs, there are artefacts – objects that 
are not nature’s work but are human constructs. Such human constructs include, for 
example, cars, bridges, money, states, and football teams. As human constructs, it seems 
there is little question about their sortal properties, since these sortal properties appear to 
be just part of the very construction of these objects. When we stipulate a note to have a 
ten pound value, we thereby stipulate what it is to be a ten pound note. Similarly, (as was 
noted above,) when we design cars to serve a certain function, we thereby stipulate what 
it is to be a car, i.e., we stipulate its sortal property. It seems then that unlike in the case 
of natural-kinds, it makes little sense to engage in exploring the sortal properties of 
artefacts. Surprisingly, though, this does not seem to generally reflect all our practices 
relating to such human constructs.  
Take for example the political scientists’ endeavours to define “state”, i.e., to find 
its essence, or its sortal property. A simplified portrayal of their activity may strike one as 
very similar to the scientific practice of searching for the sortal property of water: 
political scientists “collect” a set of entities referred to as “state”, and then engage in 
attempts to reveal what these entities consist in, i.e., to reveal their sortal property. Yet 
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given that political entities like states, unlike water, are human constructs, how can such a 
practice of exploring their sortal property take place?  
I understand the matter as follows. Many of our own constructs are formed as a 
result of some intuition, rather than through some conscious definition. Once such an 
intuitive construct is formed, we often look for the underlying essence, i.e., sortal 
property, of this intuition of ours. Thus, although the essences that underlie artefacts as 
such are not determined by nature but by our own stipulations and conventions, the fact 
that these essences were not explicitly stipulated leaves room for their exploration. And in 
this respect, namely, being non-explicit, the sortal properties of natural-kinds and those of 
artefacts are alike.  
 
4.1.5 Scientific discoveries: whales, fish, cats and robots  
A widely discussed example of scientific discovery is the discovery that whales were not 
fish but rather mammals. Following the discovery, whales were no longer called “fish”. 
How should such episodes be accounted for?  
Descriptivism offers the following account.4 “Fish” designates that which fits its 
descriptive content. On that view, what happened in the discovery process, is simply that 
the term “fish” changed its descriptive content. Scientists helped to refine the concept of 
the layman, roughly, from “a swimming animal” to something like “animal with gills”,5 
thus excluding whales from the group of fish. In other words, before the scientific 
refinement, the term “fish” applied to whales, but not afterwards. There was a conceptual 
change. 
Kripke denies this. He insists that  
scientific discoveries of species essence do not constitute a “change of meaning”; the 
possibility of such discoveries was part of the original enterprise. We need not even 
assume that the biologist’s denial that whales are fish shows his ‘concept of fishhood’ 
to be different from that of the layman; he simply corrects the layman.6 
Kripke’s objection is of course based on his proposed semantics of natural-kind 
terms, i.e., that they are rigidified terms. On this view, (some7) natural-kind terms, like 
proper names, are introduced via an act of baptising a certain referent (by ostension or 
intending), and then designate that same referent in all counterfactual worlds (i.e., on our 
understanding as discussed in Section  2.2.4, objects of the same kind of the actual 
referents). In particular, “fish”8 designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, 
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just that which “fish” baptised in the actual world, i.e., regardless of any descriptive 
content. And if there is no descriptive content involved, how can there be a change of 
content? So descriptivism is wrong. (We shall see below, however, that even if “fish” is 
indeed rigidified, still descriptivists are onto something in their claim for a conceptual 
change.) 
Yet Kripke’s proposal faces a serious problem which its descriptive competing 
proposal does not. The New Theory, that Kripke endorses, takes some natural-kind 
terms to be directly referring. One aspect that seems to follow from such semantics is 
that since the initial actual referents of such terms are introduced by stipulation, there can 
be no mistake in the initial application of the term. E.g., if “Aristotle” was introduced in 
the actual world by his name-givers – presumably his parents – in a baptising ceremony, then 
it seems his parents could not have possibly been wrong in naming him “Aristotle”. 
Indeed other people, not the initial name-givers of Aristotle, may be wrong in applying 
the name; e.g., (adapting Kripke’s example here9) noticing from afar, at twilight, a man 
raking the leaves in Aristotle’s garden, this man may be taken for Aristotle while being in 
fact Aristotle’s new gardener. No such mistake can be made in the process of the initial 
naming of an intended individual. After all, this is a mere stipulation. Now if natural-kind 
terms are also directly-referring, as the New Theory contends, it seems the same should 
apply to them as well; i.e., there can be no mistake in the initial application of natural-
kind terms in the actual world. However, the above fish-case seems to testify to the 
contrary. According to the New Theory, people have initially coined the natural-kind 
term “fish” by referring to a certain collection of referents. This initial collection included 
whales. Yet (as Kripke himself points-out10) others later discovered that whales were not 
fish but rather mammals. So apparently, we have a case in which the initial application of 
the term “fish”, the naming ceremony, was mistaken; the term “fish” was wrongly used 
to initially include whales in its extension. (We shall see below however, that there is 
nevertheless some sense in which the idea of infallibility of naming applies in such 
episodes as well).  
So it seems that the fish case serves as a counterexample to the view that natural-
kind terms are directly-referring terms. And so are numerous similar episodes in the 
advent of our knowledge. Unless, however, the New Theory can account for this 
apparent counterexample. Kripke hints at a suggestion but does not elaborate:  
the substance is defined as the kind instantiated by (almost all of) a given sample. The 
‘almost all’ qualification allows that some fools’ gold may be present in the sample. If 
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the original sample has a small number of deviant items, they will be rejected as not 
really gold.11 
Here is a proposed elaboration of this.  
First, we locate the source of the problem. The complication with natural-kinds 
springs from the fact that natural-kinds, such as gold and tigers, unlike individual objects, 
do not inhabit the world in one unit, but are rather scattered in many samples across it. 
Mass-terms like “gold” refer to a collection of samples; similarly, terms like “tiger” apply 
to many individuals, spatio-temporally separated from one another. This poses the 
following problem to the intension of (rigidified) natural-kind terms. If natural-kind 
terms like “gold” and “tiger” are rigidified (as New Theorists contend), then they are 
stipulated to designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, whatever has the same 
sortal property as that of the actual referents, i.e., the actual collection of samples. But, 
from an epistemological point of view, we simply assume that all the samples of stuff that 
we call “gold” (or “tiger”) are indeed of the same kind. The problem is that we cannot 
know it for certain. I.e., we cannot know for certain that all the samples that we take to be 
of the same kind actually share the same sortal property.  
The solution is not too complicated. Given our epistemic imperfection, it seems 
safer to assume that it is not all samples of the group that share a sortal property, but 
rather most of them. Consequently, the semantics of natural-kind terms should be: a 
natural-kind term is designed to designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, 
that which has the sortal property of the majority of the actual (group of) referents of the 
term. Hence, the reference of these terms is not fixed by the actual referent – as in the 
case of proper names – but rather by the majority of the actual (group of) referents. Such 
a semantic function may result in excluding some, yet by no means most, of the initial 
referents of the term, from the eventual group of referents. Just like whales were 
excluded from the designation of “fish”.  
Thus, a New Theorist’s description of this scientific episode should run as 
follows. The term “fish” was used to refer to a group of organisms. In particular, it was 
used to refer to the group of swimming organisms. Being a natural-kind term, it implied 
that most of its referents were taken to share some essential property. Given the assumed 
biological criteria of identity, it was discovered that the essential property shared by most 
of the referents of “fish” was ‘has gills’. Despite manifest appearance – swimming in 
water – not all members of the group shared it; in particular, whales didn’t. Thus, 
following the discovery, whales were excluded from the group of fish; they were no 
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longer designates by the rigidified term “fish”. In other words, it was found that they 
were wrongly referred to as “fish” all along, as they were not part of that group. They 
belonged to the minority that share the (salient) manifest property of the group – 
swimming in water – but not the essential property – having gills.  
Based on this analysis, I believe that there is some truth in both the idea of 
conceptual change implied by descriptivism, as well as in the idea of the infallibility of 
naming implied by the New Theory. Let me explain this.  
In Section  4.1.1 we concluded that whereas the content of descriptive terms is 
stipulated by the language-community, the content of a rigidified term, by contrast, is 
determined by the actual referent of the term, specifically, by the essence (i.e., the sortal 
property) of the term. The whale-fish episode involves a change in what we took the 
essential property12 of fish to be – from swimming in water to having gills. Hence, even if 
“fish” is a rigidified term, this episode also involved a change in what we took the content 
of the rigidified term “fish” to be, namely, from “that which swims in water” to “that 
which has gills”. In other words, although the content of a rigidified term “fish” is 
determined by the actual referent, and is thus independent of our discoveries, still, what 
we take this content to be does change in accordance with our discoveries. If we are 
allowed to talk about what we take some concept to be as opposed to what the concept 
really is, then we may say that although the real concept “fish” underwent no change, 
what we took the concept “fish” to be did undergo a change. So in this sense, there was 
some subjective conceptual change.  
As regards the infallibility of naming, there is some version of the thesis which is 
applicable to natural-kinds as well. Rather than saying that we cannot be mistaken in 
naming (i.e., applying a rigidified term to) an entire collection of samples (stuffs or 
individuals), we should say that we cannot be mistaken in naming the majority of a 
collection of samples. E.g., although we can be wrong in naming all members of a certain 
collection “fish” (e.g., by calling whales “fish”) we cannot be wrong in calling most of 
them “fish”. Such a scenario is simply impossible. For instance, were we to find out that 
most initial referents of “fish” had no gills, but rather some other essential biological 
property E, the (rigidified) term “fish” would in that case apply to whatever instantiates 
E, and not to whatever has gills.  
Lastly, based on this analysis, I would like to make a small comment on Putnam’s 
well-known robot-cats thought-experiment:  
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Suppose … that the cat as we know it is and always was an artefact. Every movement 
of the cat … is thought out by a man in a control centre on Mars and is then executed 
by the cat’s body as the result of signals.  
For which Putnam, being a New Theorist, draws the following conclusion, 
It seems to me that in this last case, once we discover the fake, we should continue to 
call these robots that we have mistaken for animals and that we have employed as 
house pets “cats,” but not “animals”.13  
However, before that Putnam says,  
If some cats are animals in every sense of the word, while others are automata, then 
there is no problem. I think we would all agree that these other were neither animals 
nor cats but only fake cats.14 
According to our proposal, this is not quite accurate. As the whale example taught us, 
Putnam should have qualified here that only if most initial referents were animals, then the 
robots are to be excluded from the extension of “cat”. If, however, most initial referents 
were robots, and only a minority were animals, then a rigidified “cat” would designate the 
robots, and it is the animals that would have to be excluded from the term’s extension.  
 
4.2 Reduction: A Relation between Different Ways things are Taken 
to Be  
So far we have discussed the relation between the way things are and the way we take 
them to be. Let us move on now to look at relations between different ways we take 
things to be. One such particular relation is between a reductionist view of (a certain 
portion of) the world and a non-reductionist view of it.  
 
4.2.1 The metaphysical implications of reduction 
A reduction of one type of entities, M, to another type of entities, P, has the following 
general form: M is nothing but P; what we call “M” is just P that occupies the M-role.15 
David Lewis put this pattern very clearly in his famous model for reductive method, 
exemplified through the reduction of the mental to the physical:  
Mental state M = the occupant of the M-role (by analysis),  
Physical state P = the occupant of the M-role (by science),  
Therefore M=P16 
(Note: Throughout this section, I will use “occupying the M-role”; “having the 
property M”, “being M” and simply “M” interchangeably). 
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Some other celebrated examples of reduction are: what we call “lightning” is just an 
electrical discharge that occupies the lightning-role; what we call “water” is just H2O 
which occupies the watery-role, i.e., being potable, drinkable, odourless, tasteless liquid, 
that flows in rivers etc.; what we call “heat” is just motion of molecules that occupies the 
heat-role, i.e., feeling hot.  
If the reduction of M to P means that what we call “M” is in fact P that merely 
occupies the M-role, then different reductionist theories may diverge in (at least) two 
respects; (a) in what they take the roles to be; and (b) in what they take the occupants of 
these roles to be.  
For example, functionalism takes the role to be a functional causal-role, and the 
occupants to be physical entities. So what we call “pain”, for the functionalist, is just a 
physical state, which occupies the functional pain causal role, i.e., causes winces and 
groans etc.17 E.g. Lewis asserts: 
My argument is this: The definitive characteristic of any (sort of) experience as such is 
its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we materialists 
believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong 
in fact to certain physical states. Since these physical states possess the definitive 
character of experiences, they must be experiences.18 
Another form of reductionism is, for instance, mereological essentialism. The 
mereologist takes occupants to be collections of elementary particles, and a role to be, 
being arranged in a certain way.19 Thus, what we call “cat”, for the mereologist, is a 
collection of particles arranged cat-wise. So, again, “cat” stands for “that which occupies 
the cat-role”.  
Generally then, reduction involves a change in the way we take things to be: we 
think that there are objects of kind M, and then, following the reductive process, we 
come to think that they are really objects of kind P, albeit M-like P’s.  
What are the implications of reduction; of shifting from thinking that there are 
M’s to thinking that what we took to be M’s are in fact P’s, that happen to occupy an M-
role?  
From a metaphysical point of view, the most significant aspect of reduction is the 
following. An object P that occupies an M-role, in principle, might not have occupied the 
M-role. Similarly, the M-role, in principle, might have been occupied by something other 
than P. It thus follows that occupying an M-role is contingent to an occupant P. Reduction 
therefore entails that the property of occupying the M-role, or, in short, being an M, is 
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contingent to its bearer. In other words, following the reduction, we come to believe that 
being an M is not what the object is, but rather what it is like. And what the object is, i.e., 
sortally, is P, and this P is M-like.20 For instance, the functionalist holds that the occupant 
of the pain role – the thing that causes winces and groans etc. – is a physical state; this is 
what it is; occupying the pain-role is merely what this physical state is like. Similarly, the 
mereologist holds that occupying the cat-role, i.e., being arranged cat-wise, is not what 
the occupant of the cat-role is, but rather what it is like; what it in fact is, is a collection of 
particles.  
 So we are quite clear now about the way things are taken to be following the 
reduction. But what about the way things were taken to be prior to the reduction? Before 
the reduction took place we thought that there were things of kind M, whereas following 
the reduction we came to think that there are only things of kind P that happen to 
occupy the M-role. What are those things of kind M that we no longer believe in? E.g., 
what did we think cats and pains were before we came to believe that there are merely 
collections of particles that are arranged cat-wise, or that there are merely physical states 
that cause winces and groans? Well, it seems we simply thought that there were cats, not 
merely things arranged cat-wise that might have been arranged dog-wise; and that we 
thought that there were pains, not merely painful things that might not have been painful. 
Moreover, we thought that although cats are constituted by some collections of particles, 
they might have been otherwise constituted; and that although pains may be realised in 
some physical states, they might have been otherwise realised just as much. And 
generally, we thought that M’s are sortally M, and merely contingently P’s, and not the 
other way around. 
We can thus offer the following schematic structure for the difference between a 
reductionist and a non-reductionist way we take the world to be. Following a reduction 
we take the things we use to call “M” to be P’s that occupy the M-role, i.e., to have the 
property P sortally (i.e., necessarily and sufficiently21), and the property M contingently; 
before the reduction, by contrast, we took those things to have the property M sortally 
and the property P (if we were aware of it) contingently.  
 
4.2.1.1 Nominal essences  
The non-reductionist thinks that there are things that are sortally M and contingently P. 
The reductionist takes them to be merely contingently M and sortally P. Both cannot be 
165 
 
 
right at the same time. At least one of them must be wrong. At least one of them believes 
in things that do not really exist. Locke thought that we are in such a state; that most of 
what we believe to exist does not really exist as such. In Locke’s terminology, what we 
take to be real essences are in fact merely nominal essences.22 A nominal essence, as opposed 
to a real essence, is something that we take to be an essence, whereas in reality it is not. 
But whence these nominal essences? How do we arrive at such illusions?  
Locke believed that they were the product of our own ideas and thoughts projected 
onto real essences in the world. Locke’s view thus has a realistic aspect – his belief in real 
essences – as well as a conventionalist aspect – his belief that what we take to be essences 
are in fact our own constructions and are thus merely nominal. In more detail, nominal 
essences are constructed 
by collecting such combinations of simple ideas, as are by experience and observation 
of men's senses, taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow 
from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance. Thus 
we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, etc…23 
In the same spirit, talking about species Locke later says,  
I do not deny, but nature, in the constant production of particular beings, makes 
them… very much alike and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, 
that the boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men.24 
Accordingly, we may say that a nominal sortal term is a term that we take to be a 
sortal term, whereas in reality it is not, i.e., it does not correspond to a sortal property. In 
short, the adjective “nominal” indicates the way we (wrongly) take things to be, as 
opposed to the way things really are.25 
 
4.2.2 The role/occupant distinction  
In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to propose two additional semantic 
functions – to be termed “role” and “occupant” – that we haven’t so far encountered in 
our discussion. The great importance of these functions will be argued through their 
ability to solve three related problems. Most notably, it will be argued that none of the 
semantic functions we encountered so far – namely, descriptive or rigidified (reference-
fixing or directly-referring) – can explain the behaviour of “cat” in the following ordinary 
expressions of a reductionist view: 
(1) Strictly speaking, there are no cats; there are only collections of particles 
arranged cat-wise. 
166 
 
 
It will be claimed that it is only an occupant term (to be defined shortly) that can do the 
work here.  
Below are three associated problems.  
First problem: Reductionists believe that M is nothing but P that occupies the M-role. 
E.g., the mereologist believes that cats are nothing but collections of elementary particles 
arranged cat-wise. This view can be expressed by saying (1) above. Alternatively, some 
will choose to express the same view by saying,  
(2) Of course there are cats; they are just collections of particles arranged cat-
wise. 
But how can the same metaphysical view be expressed by two seemingly 
contradicting statements – one admitting the existence of cats, while the other denying it?  
Second problem: In his robot-cats thought experience, Putnam said that “Even if cats 
turn out to be robots remotely controlled from Mars we will still call them ‘cats’ … Not 
only will we call them cats, they are cats”.26 This claim is grounded in Putnam’s view that 
“cat”, like other natural-kind terms, is a rigid (indeed, rigidified) designator. However, 
some may feel rather uncomfortable with this assertion. They may feel that what we 
should say following such a discovery is that, “we thought that there were cats in the 
world; however we were wrong. What we called “cats” were not really cats but in fact 
robots. Thus, we should stop calling them “cats”, for they are not cats”. 
How shall we account for this intuitively reasonable approach?  
Third problem: Reduction is often taken to be a vindicative process. Thus, if P’s are 
credible entities – e.g., physical states – whereas the existence of M is doubted – e.g., of 
mental states such as pains – then by showing that M’s are in fact just P’s, the existence 
of M’s is thereby vindicated. E.g., by showing that mental states are just physical states, 
mental states are allegedly thereby vindicated. However, some may feel uncomfortable 
with this. In particular, some non-reductionists may feel that as a matter of fact the 
reduction has eliminated M’s rather than vindicated them. I believe that intuitively we 
sense there is something to this contention. How shall we account for it though?  
 
I propose that the three required accounts are all based on a certain use of terms like 
“cat” and “pain” – a use that will be termed here occupant. This use will be specified while 
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addressing the first problem, and then employed in addressing the other two problems as 
well.  
 
4.2.2.1 First problem: having reduced M to P, does M still exist?  
A reductionist view can be stated by expressing statements such as (1) but also by stating 
statements such as (2). The problem is that one states that cats (or pains etc.), exist, 
whereas the other denies their existence. The solution lies in a difference in the way the 
two sentences use the term “cat”. Let me demonstrate this.  
A reductionist who states her view by expressing (2) may be (pragmatically) using 
“cat” in more than one way. She may be using “cat” descriptively, i.e., to simply designate 
that which has the property of being a cat, i.e., of occupying the cat-role. On such a use, 
“cat” designates, with respect to each counterfactual world, that which occupies the cat-
role in that world (whether it is identical to the actual referent of “cat” or not). On this 
use, “cat” may turn out a nonrigid term (in particular, if occupying the cat-role is a 
contingent property, as reductionists in fact believe). The sentence then goes on to say 
something about those actual cat-like things; namely, that they are sortally collections of 
particles (and hence only contingently occupy the cat-role).  
Alternatively, the reductionist who asserts the same sentence (2), may be 
(pragmatically) using “cat” as a rigidified term, i.e., to designate that which is of the same 
kind as this. On such a use, “cat” designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, 
that which is of the same kind of these actual referents of “cat” (whether it occupies the 
cat-role in that counterfactual world or not). Again, the sentence then goes on to say that 
these actual referents are sortally collections of particles (and hence, that when they 
happen to occupy the cat-role, they do so only contingently). 
Thus, although a descriptive “cat” and a rigidified “cat” are, of course, crucially 
different – e.g., the former may be nonrigid whereas the latter may not – nevertheless 
both can refer to things that are sortally collections of particles and contingently occupy 
the cat-role. Consequently, both terms can be used to express the same reductionist view 
(i.e., that cats are just (sortally) collections of particles that are (contingently) arranged 
cat-wise,) by stating the same sentence (2). 
Sentence (1), no less than (2), seems a very natural way of expressing the same 
reductionist view. However, it appears more difficult to account for the use of “cat” in 
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(1). On the one hand, “cat” here cannot be used as a descriptive term, since if it were, 
then “cat” would apply to these objects merely by virtue of them occupying the cat-role, 
i.e., of being cat-like (albeit only contingently). Just like “red” applies to red things by 
virtue of being (albeit only contingently) red. So in that use it makes no sense to claim 
that cats do not exist. On the other hand, “cat” in this case can neither be rigidified; for if 
it were, it would simply designate these things, whatever their sortal property is, in which 
case, again, there would be no reason to deny the existence of cats. It seems then that 
“cat” in the case of (1) is taken to have a function which we haven’t thus far 
encountered.  
I suggest that this function is the following. “Cat” in (1) is (pragmatically) taken 
to stand for “that which is not merely cat-like, but rather that which is a cat”, in other 
words, “cat” in (1) means, “that which has the property of being a cat sortally and not 
merely contingently”. And since according to reductionism the things we call “cat” are 
sortally collections of particles, and merely contingently arranged cat-wise, the term “cat”, 
thus understood, does not apply to such entities. So the reductionist who uses “cat” in 
this way thinks in fact that cats do not exist, and hence states her view by uttering (1).  
We can generalise the use of “cat” in (1). A term “M” may be taken, 
pragmatically, to mean “that which M’s sortally (i.e., has the property M sortally)”. (Those 
who use it in this way are likely to think, of course, that this is its semantic meaning). 
Correspondingly, there may also be a use of the term “M” that takes it to mean “that 
which M’s contingently (i.e., contingently occupies the M-role)”. E.g., some may use “cat” 
to mean “that which is (contingently) arranged cat-wise”. (Again, those who use “cat” in 
this way take this meaning to be the semantic meaning of “cat”). In fact, “cat” as appears 
in (2) may be used in this way as well (i.e., in addition to the descriptive and rigidified 
options mentioned above); on this use, (2) will amount to “that which contingently 
occupies the cat-role, exists” – a statement that fits the reductionist’s view. Let us call 
such “M” that stands for “that which (contingently) occupies the M-role” a role-term. 
Correspondingly, let us call “M” that stands for “that which is (i.e., sortally) an M” an 
occupant term.27  
Overall then, we have considered four types of terms here: descriptive terms, 
rigidified terms, role terms and occupant terms. All are possible semantic functions of 
referring terms. i.e., there is a possible language that includes all four functions semantically 
(whether they are syntactically distinguished in that language or not). However, we are 
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not engaged in this discussion in semantic functions; rather, we are interested in ways in 
which speakers use terms. It is suggested that someone who states (1), uses “cat” as an 
occupant term. Similarly, someone who states (2), uses “cat” either as a descriptive term, 
or as a rigidified term, or as a role-term. And this is regardless of what the true semantics 
of “cat” is (if there is a fact of the matter in this respect at all).  
We can get much clearer about the differences between the four terms by 
comparing their intensions. (For simplicity, we shall suppose a constant actual referent 
P+M.) 
An occupant term “M” stands for “that which sortally M’s (i.e., that which has 
the property M sortally)”; a role-term “M” stands for “that which contingently M’s (i.e., 
that which contingently occupies the M-role)”. Like descriptive terms, role terms and 
occupant terms designate that which fits their (constant) descriptive contents. Yet, unlike 
the case of descriptive terms, the descriptive contents of role terms and occupant terms 
involve metaphysical conditions: an occupant term “M” designates only things that are 
sortally M; a role term “M” designates only things that are contingently M. A descriptive 
“M”, by contrast, designates whatever M’s (i.e., has the property M) regardless of whether 
M is a sortal property or not.  
In this discussion, we suppose that M is a manifest property (e.g., being arranged 
cat-wise). If the criteria of identity are material, then M is a contingent property. Since an 
occupant term “M” requires that M is a sortal property, relative to such material criteria, 
an occupant term “M” will have no designation. Yet a role term, as well as a descriptive 
term, will designate things that M. The intensions of “M” are thus: 
Semantic function of 
“M” 
Actual 
referent 
Criteria of 
identity  
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
Descriptive  + + - - 
Occupant   - - - - 
Role   
(P+M) Material 
+ + - - 
Table 4.1 
If, by contrast, the criteria of identity are manifest, then M is a sortal property, and in this 
case an occupant term “M” will designate things that M, and now a role-term “M” will 
have no designation. Again, a descriptive term will also designate things that M: 
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Semantic function of 
“M” 
Actual 
referent 
Criteria of 
identity  
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
Descriptive  + + - - 
Occupant  + + - - 
Role 
(P+M) Manifest 
- - - - 
Table 4.2 
Lastly, the intension of a role-term “M” and that of an occupant-term “M” are also 
distinct from the intension of a rigidified “M”. For instance, if the criteria of identity are 
material, a rigidified “M” will designate the P+N stuff on counterfactual W3 (Row 6 in 
Table 4.3 below), whereas both a role term “M” and a occupant term “M” will never do 
(Rows 2-5 below); if they designate at all, they only designate things that are M (the same 
applies to a descriptive term (Row 1)). In other words, the modal statement “the M 
might not have M’d” is true for a rigidified “M” but not for all other three “M”s. Overall 
then, the intensions of the four types of “M” are the following:  
 Semantic function of 
“M” 
Actual 
referent 
Criteria of 
identity  
W1   
P+M
W2
Q+M 
W3 
P+N 
W4
Q+N
1. Descriptive  (Whatever)   + + - - 
2. Material  - - - - 
3. 
Occupant   
Manifest  + + - - 
4. Material  + + - - 
5. 
Role   
Manifest  - - - - 
6. Material  + - + - 
7. 
Rigidified  
(P+M) 
Manifest  + + - - 
Table 4.3 
Returning to our first problem, the proposed solution is as follows: The reason 
for the apparent contradiction between sentences (1) and (2), despite the fact that they 
both aim to express the same view, is that they use the term “cat” differently; specifically, 
(1) takes “cat” to be an occupant-term, whereas (2) does not (it is underdetermined 
whether “cat” in (2) is used as a descriptive term, or as a rigidified term, or as a role-
term). Thus the contradiction between the two, at least on the pragmatic level of use, is 
only apparent. The two tokens of “cat” in the two sentences are used as different terms.  
 We can now utilise the two newly introduced pragmatic uses of terms to quickly 
solve the other two problems.  
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4.2.2.2 Second problem: Putnam’s robot-cats scenario  
Putnam says that were we to discover that cats were robots, the term “cat” would refer 
to robots, since, “cat” is a natural-kind term, and hence a rigidified term. Viz., Putnam 
claims that in such a case, “cat” would semantically refer to those robots. Maybe he is right. 
I do not know how to argue about the correct semantic function of terms like “cat”. I 
don’t even know if there is a fact of the matter as far as semantics are concerned. 
However, it is hardly debateable that, contrary to what New Theorists like Putnam 
prescribe, natural-kind terms are frequently used, i.e., pragmatically, as occupant-terms. 
E.g., “cat” is frequently used, pragmatically, to mean “that which is, i.e., sortally and not 
merely contingently, a cat”. And since the robots in Putnam’s scenario only contingently 
occupy the cat-role, they, relative to this occupant use, do not qualify as cats, and hence 
do not deserve the title. And it is for this reason that some people, namely, those who 
use “cat” as an occupant-term, will feel uncomfortable with Putnam’s continuing to call 
them “cats”, despite the discovery. 
 
4.2.2.3 Third problem: the apparent vindicative nature of reduction  
Some realms of existence are considered more credible than others. Typically, the 
physical realm is considered more credible than the mental realm, whose existence is 
doubted. Those who deny the existence of the realm in doubt are called eliminativists. 
Those who think that it exists may do so for two reasons. They may think that it exists 
independently of the credible realm; if they also acknowledge the existence of P’s 
alongside such M’s, they are called dualists. Alternatively, they may think that the realm in 
doubt is reducible to the credible realm, and that it is for this reason that it exists. 
Schematically, since M is nothing but P, and since P exists, M also exists. Traditionally, 
they are called reductionists, or, more specifically, vindicative reductionists. Thus, speaking 
more broadly about explanations in general, Lennon and Charles say,  
Vindicating the legitimacy of certain modes of explanation requires their reduction to 
phenomena whose intelligibility was considered less problematic or to explanations 
whose value was assured.28 
Let us attend to the metaphysical level first, and then to the linguistic level.  
On the metaphysical level, a reductionist ontology includes things that are, i.e. 
sortally, P’s, some of which happen to occupy an M-role. E.g., it includes things that are 
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(sortally) physical states, some of which happen to occupy the pain-role but might not 
have occupied it. By contrast, a non-reductionist ontology (or pre-reductionist ontology, 
which is often the common ontology) includes things that are, i.e. sortally, M, and that are 
contingently constituted by P’s. E.g., A non-reductionist ontology includes things that are 
pains (i.e. sortally), which happen to be realised in certain physical states, but that might 
have been, in principle, otherwise realised. Thus, all that reductionism admits into its 
ontology are P’s that happen to be M-like. Yet the reduced things, the things that are M’s 
(i.e., things that are sortally M), are deemed nominal, and are ultimately denied.  
On the linguistic level, reductionists may use the term “M” either as an occupant-
term or not (the latter case includes using “M” as a descriptive term; or as a rigidified 
term; or as a role-term).  
Combining the metaphysical level with the linguistic level yields the following. A 
reductionist that takes “M” to be an occupant-term will assert (as in (2)) that, “strictly 
speaking, there are no M’s; there are just P’s that occupy the M-role”. By contrast, a 
reductionist that does not take “M” to be an occupant-term will claim (as in (1)) that, 
“M’s exist”. Clearly, it is the latter reductionist who is called vindicative. However, for such 
a reductionist, “M” simply refers to P’s, that contingently M (i.e., have the property M 
contingently). For the non-reductionists, by contrast, “M” refers to M’s (i.e., things that 
sortally M) that contingently P (i.e., have the property P contingently). Thus, what the 
reductionist intends by “M” is very different from what the non-reductionist intends by 
the same term. The things that the non-reductionist intends are in fact denied, i.e., 
eliminated, by the reductionist. Hence, there is an important sense in which, from the 
non-reductionist point of view, reduction does not vindicate the existence of M’s, but 
rather eliminates them. In other words, moving from the non-, or pre-, reductionist use of 
“M” in “M’s exist” to the reductionist’s use of “M” in “M’s exist” involves a shift in the 
reference of “M”.  
 
4.2.2.4 Summary  
Let us summarise our treatment of the three puzzles. We discussed the relation between 
different ways in which we take things to be. We considered two ways in which the world 
may be taken to be in a metaphysical respect, and four ways in which the semantic 
function of terms may be taken to be.  
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The two metaphysical views regarding cats were, (a) the reductionist view, 
according to which what we call “cat” are sortally collections of particles that are 
contingently arranged cat-wise; and (b) the non-reductionist view (so-called “common 
ontology”), according to which what we call “cat” are cats, i.e., things that have the 
property of being cat sortally, and that are contingently constituted by certain collections 
of particles.  
The four pragmatic linguistic views were, (i) “cat” is descriptive; it thus means, 
“that which has the property of being a cat (whether sortally or not); (ii) “cat” is 
rigidified; it thus means, “that which is of the same kind of these”; (iii) “cat” is an 
occupant term; it thus means, “that which is a cat (i.e., has the property of being a cat 
sortally)”; and (iv) “cat” is a role term; it thus means, “that which contingently occupies 
the cat role.” (The latter two were newly introduced.) The differences between the four 
functions are manifest in their different intensions (see Table 4.3).   
The metaphysical views are independent of the linguistic views. E.g., each 
metaphysical view about cats is compatible with each of the four linguistic uses of “cat”.  
Reductionists believe that the objects we call “cats” contingently occupy the cat-
role (be they collections of particles, or robots, or some unspecified physical entities). 
Thus, for those reductionists who use “cat” as an occupant term, the term “cat” fails to 
refer. Accordingly, they will claim that “cats do not exist”. By contrast, any of the other 
three uses of “cat” does allow designation of such objects, and hence reductionists who 
use “cat” in one of these ways will be happy to assert that “cats exist”. Incidentally, this 
includes New Theorists, who use “cat” as a rigidified term, and functionalists, who use 
“cat” as a descriptive term. The difference between the two, however, lies in their 
response to the counterfactual:   
(3) Cats might not have occupied the cat-role  
New Theorists will endorse it (Row 6 in Table 4.3), while functionalists will deny it (Row 
4).  
A role-term “cat” refers to things that contingently occupy the cat-role. An 
occupant term “cat” refers to things that have the property of being a cat sortally. Hence, 
the two terms stand for different types of objects. It follows that a statement “cats exist” 
that uses “cat” as a role-term, and the same statement that uses “cat” as an occupant 
term, assert the existence of different things. Consequently, they are ultimately different 
statements.   
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 There are various possible combinations of a metaphysical view with a linguistic 
view. Many of these combinations will result in similar statements. Thus, a certain 
statement may underdetermine the linguistic view and the metaphysical view of the one 
who expressed the statement. It follows that even explicit statements like “cats exist!” 
underdetermine what the speaker takes the world to be like. The next section 
demonstrates this surprising fact.  
 
4.2.2.4.1 What can we learn from someone’s assertion that “cats exist”?  
Someone declares,  
(4) “Cats exist!”  
What can we learn from this statement? One lesson that we can now draw from our 
discussion above is that as a matter of fact we can learn very little from such a statement, 
even about what the speaker asserts the case to be. The following possibilities are all 
consistent with (4).  
Firstly, on the linguistic level, the speaker may take “cat” to be rigidified. Hence, 
“cat” simply designates these things (that are actually cat-like), whatever they are. In this 
case, therefore, she may have any metaphysical view about the world and still state (4). 
E.g., she may believe that the cat-like things we call “cats” are animals, or she may believe 
that they are robots; she may believe that they contingently occupy the cat-role, or that 
they are sortally cats. In other words, if she believes that “cat” is rigidified, then as long 
as things of “this” kind exist, whatever this kind is, she believes (4).  
Secondly, she may believe that “cat” is a descriptive term, whose descriptive 
content is “that which occupies the cat-role (i.e., whether sortally or contingently)”. 
Hence, that “cat” simply designates cat-like things, regardless of what these cat-like 
things are. Thus, as in the previous case, she may have any of the above metaphysical 
views about the world and still hold (4) true. In other words, if she believes that “cat” is 
descriptive, then as long as there are cat-like things, she also endorses (4).  
Thirdly, she may, on the linguistic level, believe that “cat” is a role-term, i.e., that 
it means, “that which contingently occupies the cat-role”, and on the metaphysical level, 
that the things which we call “cat” indeed contingently occupy their cat-role. Hence, that 
they deserve the name “cat”, and that (4) is true.  
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And fourthly, she may believe that “cat” is an occupant term, i.e., that it stands 
for, “that which is a cat (i.e., sortally, not merely contingently)”, and in addition that the 
things which we call “cat” indeed have the property of being a cat sortally. Hence, she 
will believe that they deserve the name “cat” and that (4) is true.  
Overall then, the mere assertion that “cats exist”, despite appearance, teaches us 
very little even about the speaker’s view of the world. In particular, it determines neither 
her view of the semantics of “cat”, nor her metaphysical view about what the world 
contains. All it teaches us is that she is willing to endorse (4). 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
 
1 See also Section  1.3.2 and  3.1. 
2 Kripke (1972/1980, pp. 119-121)  
3 Excluding the odd cases discussed in Section  3.3.5 
4 The origins of this view are largely in Frege (1884/1974, § 47). Indeed, according to Frege, the 
sentence “all whales are mammals”, like the sentence “all squares are rectangular”, is about the 
relations between the concepts, “whale” and “mammal”: when the second concept is included in 
the first, whatever falls under the first falls under the second. Hence, on Frege’s view, such 
sentences are analytic (and hence a priori and necessary). The New Theory, clearly, has it by 
contrast that such sentences, although necessary, are by no means analytic nor a priori, but rather 
synthetic and a posteriori. Thus, following the insights of the New Theory, the status of such 
statements has been a subject of a considerable dispute.  
5 It should be reminded here though that LaPorte (2004) claims that contemporary biology tends 
to classify biological taxa according to historical evolutionary criteria. (See note 83 in Chapter 1.) 
6 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 138) 
7 Although Kripke insists that all natural-kind terms are rigidified, he nonetheless allows that the 
reference of some natural-kind terms is fixed not by a baptising act, but rather by a description. 
In our terminology, the claim is that although some natural-kind terms are directly-referring, 
others are reference-fixing. E.g., it may be that “water” was not stipulated to designate ‘this stuff’ 
in all counterfactual worlds, but rather was stipulated to designate in all counterfactual worlds, 
that which is watery in the actual world. However, the important point to our discussion is that 
some natural-kind terms are held directly-referring and not reference-fixing; and in particular, that 
“fish” is such a directly-referring natural-kind term.  
8 Admittedly, fish is not a species but rather a higher biological category. In other words, being a 
fish is not a sortal property but an essential property. i.e., a property that is necessary yet not 
sufficient to its object (see Section  3.3.6). Nevertheless, rigidified terms can be stipulated to 
designate all and only members of a category higher than the species, i.e., all and only objects that 
share a certain essential property. Thus the “fish” example is still very much relevant here. 
9 Kripke (1977)  
10 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 138)  
11 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 136)  
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12 As noted in Endnote 8 in this chapter, the fact that it is an essential property which is at stake 
here, and not essence, i.e., sortal property, makes no difference to our present analysis. 
13 Putnam (1962, p. 660). See also his (1977, p. 107). Indeed, much of what Kripke (1972/1980) 
says about three-legged tigers, automaton Nixon, etc., points in a similar direction.  
14 Putnam (1962, p. 660)  
15 Following our discussion of supervenience above (Section  3.4), it is interesting to explore the 
relation between reduction and supervenience. Supervenience was defined as follows: M 
supervenes on P iff there can be no M-difference without there being a P-difference (but not 
necessarily vice versa). Reduction requires, and hence entails, supervenience (i.e., supervenience is 
necessary for reduction): if M reduces to P then there can be no M-difference without there being a 
P-difference. It is less clear whether supervenience also entails reduction (i.e., whether 
supervenience is also sufficient for reduction). This depends on whether reduction means property 
identity (i.e., one-one correlation between M’s and P’s) or not; if it does, then supervenience does 
not suffice for reduction, because supervenience allows for multiple realisation (i.e., one-many 
correlation). See Kim (1984; 1990).  
16 Lewis (1994, reprinted in his 1999, p. 303). Jackson  (1998a, p. 59) follows a similar line:  
Pr. 1 Temperature in gases = that which plays the temperature (‘T’) role in gases 
(conceptual claim) 
Pr. 2 That which plays the temperature role in gases = mean molecular kinetic energy. 
(Empirical discovery) 
Conc. Temperature in gases = mean molecular kinetic energy. (Transitivity of ‘=’).  
However, Jackson indicates two ways in which the referring terms can be read: as rigidified and 
as descriptive. We shall come to this point soon below.  
17 For a classical exposition of causal-role functionalism see Smart (1959). Notable defenders of 
the view are Armstrong (1968), and Lewis (mainly 1972; 1994) 
18 Lewis (1983, p. 110)  
19 E.g., Chisholm (1973) 
20 It should be noted though that it is not the mere fact of occupying an M-role that renders M 
contingent; it is the fact that it is a P – i.e., something that is sortally a P, and which occupies the 
M-role – which makes M contingent. P may also be said to occupy the P-role, but that role, i.e., 
having the property P, would remain sortal (i.e., not contingent). For example, a collection of 
particles may be said to occupy the collection-of-particles role (i.e., being constituted by a 
collection of particles); yet in this case occupying the role would be a sortal property of the 
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collection. It is only when this collection occupies some other role, say the cat-role (i.e., being 
arranged cat-wise) that the role is thereby rendered contingent to the collection.  
21 In fact, as we have seen in the previous chapter (Section  3.3.6) a sortal property is that 
necessary and sufficient property that states what the object that instantiates it consists in. 
However, in view of the overwhelming overlap between sortal properties and necessary and 
sufficient properties, we shall treat them for the purpose of the present discussion as the same.   
22 Locke (1689, III iii 15, 16, 18) 
23 Locke (1689, II xxiii 3) 
24 Locke (1689, III vi 37) 
25 We can distinguish two types of nominal essences. Take the mereologist reductionist. She 
believes that cats are nominal essences. Now consider immaterial ghosts. Since the mereologist 
believes that there are no such things, she will claim that ghosts are nominal essences as well. Yet 
there is a clear difference between the two: whereas there are things that occupy a cat-role, there 
are no things that occupy an immaterial ghost role, simply because, according to the mereologist, 
there are no immaterial things. To generalise: a property is nominal if it is not sortal. A property 
is not sortal if it is, for instance, contingent; but also, if it is simply non-existent. These are two 
different ways in which a property may be held nominal.  
26 Putnam (1977, p. 107). Kripke (1972/1980) makes similar points about discovering that Nixon 
was an automaton, or that the Queen was not the daughter of George VI: we ought to still call 
him “Nixon” and her “Queen Elizabeth”. (Recall that this type of possibility is crucially different 
from considering, given that Nixon is a person, the possibility that he might have been an 
automaton. See Sections  1.1.3,  1.5.1 and  2.3 (also Section  5.1.1.4 below) for reminders about the 
differences between the two types of possibilities.)  
27 Note that an occupant term is not equivalent to a sortal term. A sortal term is just a descriptive 
term, e.g., “that which has the property of being a cat (whether sortally or not)”, whose 
descriptive content turns out to be linked with a sortal property. Thus, if being a cat is a sortal 
property, then a descriptive term “cat” turns out to be a sortal term. If, by contrast, being a cat is 
not a sortal property, then a descriptive “cat” turns out not to be a sortal term. In other words, a 
sortal term, being a descriptive term, involves no metaphysical conditions as part of its descriptive 
content. An occupant term, by contrast, does involve a metaphysical condition in its descriptive 
content. Consequently, every occupant term is a sortal term but not vice versa. However, a term 
that is used as an occupant term may be either sortal or not. Using “M” as an occupant term 
merely indicates that the speaker believes M to be a sortal property – a belief that need not 
correspond to reality. The next paragraph clarifies this point.  
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28 Lennon and Charles (1992, p.1) 
 5 TWO SAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF THE THESIS 
 
 
Overview  
In the final chapter we put the thesis developed in this dissertation to work. It is applied 
to two case-studies from relatively recent philosophical literature: the Kripke-Lewis 
debate over the identity theory of mind, and the debate over the significance of 
Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction. Each of which is a much-discussed debate 
that hasn’t been resolved for several decades. Applying our thesis to the two cases will 
generate novel accounts of the debates, and will thus serve to illustrate the importance of 
the thesis.  
First case-study: the Kripke-Lewis debate over the identity theory of mind. 
Kripke argues against the functionalist identification of mental states with physical states, 
whereas Lewis defends it. Our analysis is based on exposing the intension of “pain”. This 
analysis will reveal that the intension of “pain” as entailed by the view that Kripke attacks 
is different from the intension of “pain” as entailed by real functionalism. So Kripke fails 
to attack genuine functionalism. Interestingly, the same applies to Lewis’s argument: the 
intension of “pain” as entailed by the view that Lewis attacks is different from the 
intension of “pain” as entailed by Kripke’s original view. Thus, Lewis also fails to attack 
Kripke’s genuine view. Moreover, our analysis will reveal that both parties in fact attack 
the same view. In addition, it will be shown that although Lewis’s genuine view and 
Kripke’s genuine view comprise different elements (namely different values for the 
variables in our formula), those elements happen to produce the same intension of 
“pain”. Specifically, in both cases “pain” ends up designating, with respect to every 
counterfactual world, that which occupies the pain-role in that world. Such an intension 
is immune to the objections raised by both parties, and hence both genuine views remain 
unharmed by the objections.  
Second case-study: the debate over the significance of Donnellan’s distinction 
between attributively used definite descriptions and referentially used ones. Here, our 
analysis is based on exposing the intension of “Smith’s murderer”. In the first stage we 
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consider counterfactual worlds. Based on this consideration we conclude that three 
interpretations of Donnellan’s distinctions – namely, in terms of singular vs. general 
propositions (which seems to be the standard interpretation); in terms of de re/de dicto; 
and in terms of rigidity – are fundamentally one and the same interpretation. It thus 
follows that Kripke’s objection to the latter two interpretations is as effective against the 
first, standard interpretation. Next, we further introduce the distinction between 
designation in the actual world vs. designation in counterfactual worlds. This two-
dimensionalist analysis reveals that (a) from an exegetical point of view, there are (at 
least) three consistent ways of interpreting Donnellan’s distinction, i.e., all equally 
compatible with his original characterisation; and (b) from a philosophical point of view, 
that there are (at least) three important distinctions that apply to definite descriptions 
(regardless of which of them provides the correct interpretation to Donnellan’s original 
distinction). In addition, such analysis provides a clear understanding of the 
“mechanism” by which Kripke’s argument against the two interpretations operates.   
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5.1 The Kripke-Lewis Debate over the Identity Theory of Mind – A 
Critical Analysis 
 
Introduction  
Functionalism offers a unique way of identifying one set of alleged entities with another. 
In particular, it offers the identification of mental states with physical states. In the third 
lecture of his Naming and Necessity1, Kripke argues directly against this doctrine, and in 
particular against the functionalist identification of pain with a physical state. David 
Lewis, who advocates functionalism, takes the opportunity to defend it in his “Reduction 
of Mind”2, and at the same time to argue against Kripke. Specifically, Kripke accuses 
functionalism of allowing “pain” to designate some possible non-painful states, whereas 
Lewis accuses Kripke’s view of allowing “pain” not to designate some possible painful 
states. Thus both objections accuse their opponent of having some unacceptable modal 
consequence.  
In what follows I wish to argue that both objections are unsuccessful in attacking 
their opponent, and moreover, that they are both unsuccessful for the same reason. In 
particular, both objections successfully attack a certain view, but this view is different 
from their opponent’s. It is a “straw-man” view. Surprisingly, both objections turn out to 
attack the same view. (Although each objection attacks it on different grounds.) This 
view is a “hybrid” view, crossbred between Lewis and Kripke’s competing views, and is 
thus an additional view – neither Kripke’s nor Lewis’s. Hence each of the competing 
views, being different from this rejected view, remains unharmed by the attack launched 
against it.   
Methodologically, this observation will be based on an analysis of the different 
views in terms of their semantic and metaphysical components, as detailed below. Based 
on this analysis, we shall determine the intensions of “pain” – i.e., the reference of “pain” 
with respect to different possible worlds3 – that are entailed by the different views. 
Comparing these intensions will serve as a convenient means of comparing the views and 
assessing the objections.  
The structure of the discussion is as follows. I will begin by presenting the debate 
by introducing the competing views, and the objections they raise against each other. I 
will then proceed to provide a comparative analysis of these views and of the objections. 
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This analysis will lead to the conclusion of this paper, namely that each of the two 
objections is unsuccessful in arguing against its opponent. I will close with an overview 
of this debate.  
 
5.1.1 The debate  
5.1.1.1 Functionalism   
Functionalism offers a way of identifying a “suspected” set of entities with another set of 
“credible” entities. Consider genes – to borrow an example from Armstrong4. If we take 
the term “gene” to mean “that which occupies the causal role of the gene”, i.e., 
something like “that which transmits hereditary characteristic etc.”, then, by discovering 
that that role is actually occupied by the DNA molecule, we arrive at the identity “the 
gene is the DNA molecule”. Similarly, if we understand a mental term like “pain” to 
mean “that which occupies the role of being painful”, i.e., something like “that which 
causes winces and groans etc.”, and we find that this role is occupied by some physical 
state C,5 then we arrive at the identity “pain is C”. If we further assume, like the 
functionalist does, that the world is ultimately occupied by physical entities, then applying 
the same procedure to all mental terms will result in an overall identification of the 
mental with the physical.  
Moreover, the identity generated by functionalism is not symmetrical. Thus, pain, 
for example, is not only said to be “identical” to C, but it is also said to be “in fact”, or 
“nothing over and above”, C. Thus pain is reduced to C, and in general, the mental is 
reduced to the physical. Pain and C are of course types (that have many tokens), and thus 
the functionalist reduction applies to types and not merely to token.6  
This, in short, is the functionalist identity theory of mind. 
 
5.1.1.1.1 The modal status of reductive identity statements  
Taking “pain” to stand for “that which occupies the pain role”, whilst assuming that the 
occupant of this role (as well as of any other role) is a physical entity, entails that this role 
might have been occupied by states other than the actual one. E.g., although the pain-
role is actually occupied by the type C, it might not have been occupied by this type. In 
other words, the identity statement “pain = C”, if true, is contingently true; it is true of 
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the actual world, but false of some other possible worlds, namely, worlds in which the 
pain-role is not occupied by C.7 
This point has implications for rigidity. A term is rigid iff it designates the same 
referent in all possible worlds; otherwise it is nonrigid. Since “pain”, for the functionalist, 
designates different types of states in different possible worlds, it is thus rendered by this 
view a nonrigid designator.  
 
5.1.1.2 Kripke’s alternative  
Contrary to the functionalist, Kripke thinks that “pain” is a rigid designator.  
(A note about rigidity: As aforementioned, pain is a type and not a token. This 
makes the designation of “pain”, if rigid, somewhat problematic (as we have witnessed in 
Section  2.2.4): what exactly does it designate rigidly? Is it the abstract type (or property), 
or is it the particular collection of tokens that fall under the type? (In the latter case, 
rigidity is best accounted for by designating, with respect to every possible world, tokens 
of the same type as that of the actual referents.) For the purpose of this discussion, we shall 
remain agnostic on this issue. E.g., we shall remain agnostic on whether “pain”, if rigid, 
designates in all possible worlds the same type of state, or states of the same type. For 
want of a neutral term, we shall use either “type of state” or “states of a type” to indicate 
the disjunction of the two.) 
Thus, “pain”, if rigid, designates the same type of state in every possible world, 
and so does “C”. It thus follows that if the two terms designate the same type of state in 
the actual world, they must also designate the same type of state in all possible worlds. 
(Similarly, if they designate different types of states in the actual world, they must also 
designate different types of states in all possible worlds). Hence the identity statement, if 
true of the actual world, must also be true of all possible worlds (and if false of the actual 
world, must also be false of all possible worlds). In short, the identity statement “pain = 
C”, if true, is necessarily true, and not merely contingently true.  
Thus a central issue which Lewis’s functionalist view and Kripke’s view are at 
odds about is the rigidity of “pain”, and, accordingly, the question of the modal status of 
the identity statement “pain = C”.  
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5.1.1.3 Kripke’s objection to functionalism  
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues directly against functionalism. The argument he 
puts forward is an ad absurdum argument – it rejects functionalism on the grounds that it 
leads to absurdity:  
A typical view is that being a pain, as a property of a physical state, is to be analysed in 
terms of the ‘causal role’ of the state,8 in terms of the characteristic stimuli (e.g. 
pinpricks) which cause it and the characteristic behaviour it causes. … All I need to 
observe here is that the ‘causal role’ of the physical state is regarded by the theorists in 
question as a contingent property of the state, and thus it is supposed to be a 
contingent property of the state that it is a mental state at all, let alone that it is 
something as specific as pain. To repeat, this notion seems to me self-evidently 
absurd. It amounts to the view that the very pain I now have could have existed without 
being a mental state at all.9 
The argument is simple: suppose, as the functionalist suggests, that “pain” designates 
some physical state of type C, i.e., that the actual occupant of the pain-role is C. It seems 
that all would agree, including the functionalist, that there is a world in which this C does 
not occupy the pain-role, i.e. the role of being painful. But this would entail that in that 
world pain does not occupy the pain-role, or, in Kripke’s words, “that that very sensation 
could have existed without being a sensation.” Furthermore, if what Kripke says is true 
of a particular token of pain, it is also true of any token of pain, and thus of the whole 
type. Moreover, a similar argument may apply to any functionalist reduction of types. So 
the attack is on the whole functionalist reductive enterprise.  
Thus functionalism is accused by Kripke of entailing absurd outcomes, and hence 
of being unsustainable.  
(Note however that on this basis Kripke does not reject any mental-physical 
identification in principle; his objection is directed to the specific sort of identification 
suggested by the functionalist.) 
 
5.1.1.4 Lewis’s objection to Kripke’s view  
As earlier remarked, a key disagreement between Kripke and Lewis is about the modal 
status of identity statements like “pain = C”; and, accordingly, about whether “pain” is a 
rigid designator or a nonrigid one. Lewis’s argument against Kripke’s view is thus 
directed against the rigidity of terms like “pain”. Like Kripke’s argument, Lewis’s 
argument also aims to show that his opponent’s view leads to unacceptable modal 
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consequences, and hence has to be abandoned. In his “Reduction of Mind”, he reasons 
as follows,  
Kripke vigorously intuits that some names for mental states, in particular ‘pain’ are 
rigid designators: that is, it’s not contingent what their referents are.10 I myself intuit 
no such thing, so the non-rigidity imputed by causal-role analysis troubles me not at 
all.  
Here is an argument that ‘pain’ is not a rigid designator. Think of some occasion 
when you were in severe pain, unmistakable and unignorable. All will agree, except for 
some philosophers and faith healers, that there is a state that actually occupies the pain 
role (or near enough); that it is called ‘pain’; and that you were in it on that occasion. 
For now, I assume nothing about the nature of this state, or about how it deserves its 
name. Now consider an unactualised situation in which it is some different state that 
occupies the pain role in place of the actual occupant; and in which you were in that 
different state; and which is otherwise as much like the actual situation as possible. 
Can you distinguish the actual situation from this unactualised alternative? I say not, or 
not without laborious investigation. But if ‘pain’ is a rigid designator, then the 
alternative situation is one in which you were not in pain, so you could distinguish the 
two very easily. So ‘pain’ is not a rigid designator.11 
It is the last sentence that is aimed directly against Kripke. Suppose, again, that an 
actual occupant of the pain-role is some state of type C. We are asked to consider the 
counterfactual situation in which the occupant of the pain-role is not that C, but rather a 
state of a different type, say, D. Now if “pain” is rigid as Kripke claims it to be, then it 
designates, with respect to every possible world, the same type of state (or states of the 
same type12) as it designates in the actual world, namely, C. Hence, it does not designate 
the counterfactual state of type D. But this would mean that “pain” does not designate a 
state that is phenomenally indistinguishable from the actual state, or, in short, this would 
mean that “pain” does not designate a state that occupies the pain-role. And this result is 
unacceptable. Thus, concludes Lewis, “pain”, contrary to Kripke’s claim, cannot be a 
rigid designator, and is therefore nonrigid.  
 
5.1.2 Analysis  
So much for the presentation of the debate. Let us move on now to some analysis. In 
this part, I propose a reconstruction of the debate by revealing the elements composing 
the two views, and assessing the objections in the light of these elements.  
The structure of this part is as follows. First, I propose that each view is best 
understood as being composed of two elements: a semantic one and a metaphysical one. 
The two views differ in both respects. This analysis will provide a clear comparison of 
the two views by specifying the exact respects in which they contrast. Subsequently, 
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determining the intensions of the term “pain” according to each view – i.e., what “pain” 
designates with respect to different possible worlds – will help to make these differences 
evident.  
Next, the same analysis will serve to understand the objections as well; in 
particular it will reveal that in each case the metaphysical and semantical assumptions of 
the view that each objection actually attacks are different from the assumptions of the 
view that each objection claims to be attacking. In other words, both objections 
successfully attack a certain view, but this view is different from their opponent’s one. 
The view that is in fact attacked is a mere “straw-man” view. Moreover, surprisingly, the 
two objections attack the same straw-man. Determining the intension of “pain” that is 
entailed by the attacked straw-man view as well will clearly illustrate its difference from 
the two genuine views. 
Lastly, comparing the intensions of “pain” as entailed by each of the three views 
will serve as an explanation of the weakness of the attacked straw-man view, and, at the 
same time, of the strength of the two genuine views. 
 
5.1.2.1 Functionalism analysed   
The crux of functionalism lies in taking mental terms like “pain” to mean, “that which 
occupies the pain-role”. Such reading has crucial implications – both semantic and 
metaphysical. On the semantic level, “pain” is thereby taken to be an abbreviation of a 
description, namely, “that which occupies the pain-role”; it thus designates, with respect 
to every possible world, that which fits this description in that world. In short, “pain”, 
for the functionalist, is a descriptive term.13  
On the metaphysical level, we have noted above that the distinction between role 
and occupant implies the (modal) contingency of the occupant to the role, i.e., the same 
role might be occupied by occupants of different types.14 However, the independence 
implied by the role-occupant structure works both ways. i.e., the actual occupant might 
have occupied a different role. Thus, for instance, it is possible for the pain-role to be 
occupied by states of type other than C; and, also, it is possible for some C to occupy 
roles other than the pain-role. It follows, as Kripke observed above, that on the 
functionalist view occupying the pain-role turns out to be contingent to the occupants.  
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(Note that it is only the second of the above two possibilities – namely, the 
possibility that a certain state might not have occupied the role it actually occupies – that 
entails the contingency of the role to its bearer. By contrast, the mere possibility that the 
role may be occupied by different types of occupants does not in itself suffice to entail 
the contingency of the role. For example, the role of being a chemical element is 
occupied by different kinds of stuff, e.g., helium and hydrogen, and yet this role is 
essential (although not sufficient) to them; no kind of stuff can survive the loss of this 
property.15)  
It is the combination of these two implications of functionalism – namely, the 
semantic assumption that terms like “pain” are descriptive, and the metaphysical 
assumption that occupying the pain-role is contingent to the state that occupies this role 
– that entails the nonrigidity of terms like “pain”, i.e., that terms like “pain” do not 
designate the same type of state in all possible worlds. Neither of these assumptions on 
its own can guarantee nonrigidity. Firstly, the mere semantic assumption of descriptiveness 
does not suffice for nonrigidity; this is because a descriptive term may, in principle, be 
rigid (albeit, de facto rigid). E.g., the term “the sum of 2 and 3” is descriptive – it 
designates, with respect to every possible world, that which fits its descriptive content – 
yet nonetheless it is also rigid; it designates the same entity, the number 5, in all possible 
worlds. Similarly, but somewhat more controversially, the term “stuff with atomic 
number 79” is also descriptive and, arguably, rigid – it designates gold in all possible 
worlds. Secondly, the mere metaphysical assumption of contingency does not guarantee 
nonrigidity either: a rigidified designator (i.e., de jure rigid16), e.g., the actualised description 
“the actual author of Naming and Necessity”, is designed to designate, with respect to every 
possible world, the same referent that it designates in the actual world, namely, Kripke; it 
is thus rigid by stipulation. And this is regardless of Kripke’s properties, and thus, a 
fortiori, regardless of the modal status of his properties. (After guaranteeing sameness of 
reference across worlds by using a rigidified designator, then, to be sure, the modal status 
of Kripke’s properties will make a difference to what would count as the same as Kripke 
in other possible worlds and what would not. But this is only after sameness has already 
been secured by the rigidified term.17)  
Thus in sum, the functionalist view is composed of two elements: a semantic 
element, namely, that “pain” is a descriptive term, and a metaphysical element, namely 
that occupying the pain-role is contingent. It is the combination of the two elements which 
yields the nonrigidity of terms like “pain”, that is implied by this view.  
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5.1.2.2 Kripke’s view analysed   
Like functionalism, Kripke’s alternative view is also composed of a semantic element and 
a metaphysical one. On the semantic level, Kripke takes “pain”, like other natural-kind 
terms, to be rigidified18, i.e., each such term is designed to designate, with respect to every 
possible world, the same (type of) referent that it designates in the actual world.19 Thus 
“pain”, according to Kripke, is rigid by stipulation; its rigidity is guaranteed by the very 
semantic function of the term.   
(It follows that unlike in the case of functionalism, the semantic element alone 
guarantees the rigidity of “pain”. In the case of functionalism, by contrast, nonrigidity 
was a result of both the semantic and the metaphysical components of that view. 
However, as we shall soon witness, the force of Kripke’s view relies nonetheless on the 
combination of both of its elements.)  
On the metaphysical level, Kripke takes the property of being painful to be 
essential to its bearer. In his own words: “if something is pain it is essentially so”.20 So 
whatever has the property of being painful cannot survive the loss of this property. 
Moreover, being painful is not only essential, i.e., necessary, to its bearer, but it is also 
sufficient to it. As Kripke puts it: 
Pain … is picked out by an essential (indeed necessary and sufficient) property. For a 
sensation to be felt as pain is for it to be pain.21 
What Kripke means by this, is that since being painful is a necessary and sufficient 
property of its bearer, it follows that it is the criterion of identity of its bearer, i.e., that 
something is pain iff it is painful. In terms of possible worlds, being necessary to its 
bearer means that if a state is painful in the actual world then it is painful in every 
possible world; being sufficient to its bearer means that, with respect to each possible 
world, whatever state is painful in that world, it is of the same type as the state that is 
painful in the actual world – they are both pains. Together, these two conditions entail 
that all and only painful states are pains, i.e., that something is pain iff it is painful.22 
 (Indeed, whereas functionalists talk about occupying the “causal pain-role”, 
Kripke is talking about a “sensation” being “felt as” pain. Can we compare the two? I 
believe the answer should be yes. Both are talking about something like the property of 
occupying a pain-role, i.e., of being painful. The functionalist accounts for this property 
in terms of causes and effects, Kripke seems to have something more like qualia in mind. 
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However, it is clear that whereas functionalism takes occupying the pain-role to be 
contingent to the occupant (however we are to account for this property), Kripke takes 
this property to be essential and sufficient to the occupant (again, however, we are to 
account for this property). Accordingly, we shall henceforth use “occupying the pain-
role” and “being painful” neutrally and interchangeably; i.e., whether it is to be accounted 
for in terms of causes and effects, in terms of qualia, or in other terms altogether.)  
 
Overall then, the two views differ in both their semantic and their metaphysical 
components. In the semantic respect, whereas Lewis takes “pain” to be descriptive, i.e., 
“pain” designates, with respect to every possible world, that which fits the description 
“occupies the pain-role” in that world, Kripke takes “pain” to be rigidified, i.e., “pain” 
designates, with respect to every possible world, the same type of state that it designates 
in the actual world. On the metaphysical level, whereas Lewis believes that occupying the 
pain-role is contingent to its bearer, Kripke takes it to be essential (i.e., necessary) as well 
as sufficient. Table 5.1 below summarises this: 
 Semantics  Ontology  
Functionalism  “Pain” is descriptive;  
“pain” designates, with respect to each 
possible world, that which is painful in that 
world.  
Occupying the pain-role is 
contingent  
Kripke’s view “Pain is rigidified;  
“pain” designates, with respect to every 
possible world, the same type of state that it 
designates in the actual world.  
Occupying the pain-role is 
essential (i.e., necessary) and 
also sufficient 
Table 5.1 
 
5.1.2.3 Kripke’s objection analysed  
To recall, Kripke’s argument considers the counterfactual situation that is allegedly 
entailed by functionalism in which the actual occupant of the pain-role, say some C, does 
not occupy the pain-role. This, Kripke concludes, means that some pain is not painful, 
which is absurd.  
On the metaphysical level, Kripke’s scenario is in line with functionalism: by 
allowing the occupant of the pain-role to survive this role’s loss, i.e., to stop being 
painful, being painful is rendered contingent – an element in the story that the 
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functionalist is happy to embrace. However, the functionalist should be less content with 
the semantic assumptions implicit in Kripke’s scenario. Kripke’s contention is that 
functionalism entails that pain might not have been painful. This is because functionalism 
allows that a state of type C, that is actually painful, might not have been painful. In 
possible-worlds semantics, this amounts to allowing a possible world in which C is not 
painful in that world. It thus follows that Kripke allows the (counterfactual) non-painful 
state of type C to deserve to be called “pain”. In other words, Kripke takes “pain” to be 
a rigidified designator, i.e., to designate, with respect to every possible world, that which 
it designates in the actual world. (Had Kripke taken “pain” to be descriptive, i.e., to 
designate, with respect to each possible world, that which is painful in that world, “pain” 
would not designate the counterfactual non-painful C, and hence he would be barred 
from accusing functionalism for implying that “pain might not have been painful”). But 
according to functionalism, “pain” is a descriptive term, i.e., “pain” designates, with 
respect to each possible world, that which is painful in that world. Hence, for the 
functionalist, whereas the state in the actual world, the painful C, deserves to be called 
“pain”, the state in the counterfactual world, the non-painful C, does not deserve to be 
called “pain”, simply because it is not painful in that world; Just as Kripke does not 
deserve to be called “the author of Naming and Necessity” in worlds in which he did not 
author it (although he will still deserve to be called “the actual author of Naming and 
Necessity” in such worlds). Hence, on the functionalist view, the counterfactual situation is 
not one in which pain is not painful, but rather one in which something, which is not pain, 
is not painful. And this is far from being absurd.  
Calling the state in the counterfactual situation “pain”, as Kripke does, 
presupposes that “pain” is a rigidified term, i.e., that it simply designates, with respect to 
every possible world, the same (type of) state that it designates in the actual world. Thus, 
on this presupposition, since the actual referent, C, is called “pain”, “pain” designates C 
in every possible world, including the non-painful C in the above counterfactual world. 
This semantic assumption is in fact just Kripke’s own view on the semantics of “pain”. 
But it is not the functionalist’s semantic view. So, ultimately, the view that Kripke attacks 
is not the functionalist view. It is a “straw-man” view that shares the metaphysical 
element of functionalism, but not its semantic element.  
To make the difference between functionalism and the straw-man view that 
Kripke attacks clearer, we can compare the intensions of “pain”, i.e., what the term 
designates with respect to different possible worlds, as entailed by each view. We divide 
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possible worlds into the following four relevant types: W1: the occupant of the pain-role 
is C (states of type C+P); W2: the occupant of the pain-role is not C (states of type 
¬C+P); W3: C occupies another role instead of the pain-role (states of type C+¬P); and 
W4: a world devoid of states C, and in which the pain-role has no occupant (states of type 
¬C+¬P).23 With respect to these possible worlds, the intensions of “pain” on the 
functionalist view and on the view that Kripke attacks clearly differ. Specifically, the 
functionalist’s “pain” designates whatever is painful, and thus designates the type of state 
in W1 and in W2. By contrast, according to the view that Kripke attacks, “pain” 
designates the same type of state that it designates in the actual world, which is C+P; and 
since, in this scenario, P is considered contingent (i.e., not necessary) and C is considered 
necessary and sufficient, being the same as C+P amounts to just being C; thus “pain” 
designates the type of state in W1 and in W3. In total, the intensions of “pain” are thus 
the following:  
  
Semantics  
 
Metaphysics 
W1  
C+P 
W2 
¬C+P 
W3 
C+¬P 
W4
¬C+¬P 
Functionalism  “Pain” is 
descriptive  + + - - 
Straw-man 
functionalism 
attacked by 
Kripke 
“Pain” is 
rigidified  
P is 
contingent; C 
is essential + - + - 
Table 5.2 
The two views thus have different designations in W2 and W3, and thereby 
ultimately different intensions.  
Kripke’s objection is based on the fact that “pain” allegedly designates the type of 
state in W3, i.e., the C+¬P type of state (bottom row), which he takes to be absurd since 
this type of state is not painful. This, indeed, is a fair accusation. However, as is clear 
from Table 5.2 (top row), functionalism entails no such designation.  
To conclude, the position that yields the absurd result is one that has the 
metaphysical element that being painful is a contingent property, and the semantic 
element that “pain” is a rigidified (i.e., de jure rigid) term. This is a hybrid position that has 
the metaphysical element of functionalism yet the semantics of Kripke’s own view. 
Ultimately, it is not functionalism. Functionalism, as it is, was not shown to yield any 
absurdity, and thus remains unharmed. At least by this argument. Indeed, the 
functionalist may consistently accept Kripke’s argument, i.e., that the straw-man view 
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that Kripke attacks leads to absurdity and hence needs to be abandoned, and at the same 
time continue advocating functionalism.  
 
5.1.2.4 Lewis’s objection analysed  
Interestingly, an examination of Lewis’s argument based on the analysis suggested here 
shows that his objection to Kripke is flawed in the same way that Kripke’s objection is; it 
successfully rejects some view, but that view is not Kripke’s. Specifically, the attacked 
view has Kripke’s semantic element, but lacks Kripke’s metaphysical element, which is 
replaced by the functionalist’s metaphysical element. Let me demonstrate this.  
To recall, Lewis’s argument considers a counterfactual situation in which the 
pain-role is being occupied by a type of state other than the state C (which occupies the 
pain-role in the actual situation). Now if “pain” is rigid, says Lewis, it cannot designate 
the type of state in this counterfactual situation, ¬C, as this state is of different type from 
the actual C. But, since the type of state in the counterfactual situation, ¬C, is painful, 
this will entail that a painful state is deprived of being called “pain”, a consequence that 
we should not accept. Thus Lewis concludes that “pain”, contrary to Kripke’s view, is a 
nonrigid designator.  
On the semantic level, Lewis’s scenario is in line with Kripke’s view: “pain” is 
taken to be rigidified (i.e., de jure rigid) in that it is stipulated to designate, with respect to 
every possible world, the same type of state that it designates in the actual world. Given 
that the type of state in the actual world is a painful C, i.e., C+P, “pain” in this scenario is 
taken to designate whatever is identical to that C+P type of state. However, Lewis’s 
premise that “pain” does not apply to the type of state in the counterfactual situation, 
namely, to the ¬C+P type of state, is at odds with Kripke’s metaphysical assumptions. Let 
me explain this. Recall that according to Kripke, being painful is a property that is 
necessary and sufficient to its bearers. Hence, merely having that property in some 
counterfactual world guarantees that that type of state is identical to the one that is 
painful in the actual world. Hence, according to Kripke’s metaphysical assumption, the 
type of state in the counterfactual scenario, (¬C+P), by the mere fact of being painful, is 
identical to the actual type of state (C+P). It follows that if “pain” is a rigidified term, as 
is assumed in this case, it does apply to the counterfactual type of state ¬C+P as well. 
Thus, on Kripke’s view, the counterfactual situation is not a case in which a painful state 
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is not called “pain”, but rather a case in which a painful state is called “pain”. Contrary to 
what Lewis claims. And this is perfectly acceptable.  
Indeed, if we take Lewis’s metaphysics on board, i.e., if we take being painful to 
be contingent, and being C to be essential, then the type of state in the counterfactual 
situation, ¬C+P, is rendered distinct from the actual type of state, C+P, and thus a 
rigidified “pain” cannot designate it. So Lewis’s contention is in line with his own 
metaphysics, but not with Kripke’s. Accordingly, the unacceptable outcome follows from 
Lewis’s scenario only for a view that accepts his metaphysics rather than Kripke’s. In 
other words, the view attacked by Lewis is not Kripke’s view, but rather a hybrid view, 
which is composed of Kripke’s semantics, namely, the (de jure) rigidity of “pain”, together 
with Lewis’s metaphysics, namely, the contingency of being painful.  
Once again, revealing the intensions of “pain” that are implied by Kripke’s view 
and by the view that Lewis attacks will clarify the difference between the two views. Both 
Kripke’s “pain” and the “pain” in the view attacked by Lewis are rigidified terms, i.e., 
they designate, with respect to every possible world, that which is identical to the actual 
referent, namely, to the C+P type of state. However, since Kripke takes being painful, P, 
to be necessary and sufficient to its bearer, it follows that being the same as C+P is 
simply being P; by contrast, on the view that Lewis attacks, being the same as C+P 
amounts to being C, i.e., this view (implicitly) takes C to be necessary and sufficient (and 
P to be contingent). Thus, with respect to the same types of possible worlds as before, 
Kripke’s “pain” designates the types of states in worlds W1 and W2; whereas “pain” on 
the view that Lewis attacks designates the types of states in worlds W1 and W3. The 
intensions of “pain” according to the two views are thus:  
 Semantics  Metaphysics W1   
C+P
W2
¬C+P
W3
C+¬P 
W4 
¬C+¬P
Kripke’s view  P is essential;  + + - - 
Straw-man Kripkeanism 
attacked by Lewis 
“Pain” is 
rigidified  
P is 
contingent;  
C is essential 
+ - + - 
Table 5.3 
Again, the intensions of the two views clearly differ; they have different 
designations in W2 and W3.  
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Lewis’s argument against Kripke is based on the alleged fact that “pain” fails to 
designate the type of state in w2 (bottom row), i.e., the painful ¬C+P type of state. Yet, as 
Table 5.3 clearly demonstrates, Kripke’s view in fact entails that “pain” does designate 
this type of state (upper row).  
To recap, the position that yields the unacceptable result is a hybrid position that 
has the semantic element of Kripke’s view, yet the metaphysical element of Lewis’s 
functionalist view. Ultimately, it is not Kripke’s view. It is, again, a straw-man view. 
Kripke’s genuine view, as it is, was not shown to yield any unacceptable circumstances, 
and thus remains unharmed by Lewis’s argument. Thus Kripke may consistently accept 
Lewis’s claim that the straw-man view leads to unacceptable consequences and therefore 
has to be discarded, and at the same time cling to his own view. 
 
5.1.2.5 Overall comparison  
It might have struck you already that the two straw-man views attacked by the two 
arguments are in fact one and the same view; namely, it is a view composed of a semantic 
element that takes “pain” to be rigidified, as Kripke believes, combined with a 
metaphysical element that takes being painful to be contingent, as Lewis believes. As 
shown above, this view has the following intension:  
  
Semantics  
 
Metaphysics  
W1   
C+P
W2
¬C+P
W3
C+¬P 
W4 
¬C+¬P
Straw-man 
functionalism,  
as well as… 
Straw-man 
Kripkeanism 
“Pain” is 
rigidified  
P is contingent;  
C is essential and 
sufficient + - + - 
Table 5.4 
Both arguments rightly indicate that this view carries unacceptable consequences, and 
hence that it is unsustainable. However, each argument points to different unacceptable 
consequences. Specifically, Kripke’s argument highlights the fact that on that view, 
“pain” designates the type of state in W3, (C+¬P), which entails that “pain” designates a 
non-painful type of state; Lewis, in his turn, points to the fact that on this view “pain” 
does not designate the type of state in W2, (¬C+P), which entails that “pain” does not 
designate a painful type of state. Indeed, both these consequences are disturbing and thus 
strongly support rejection of that view.  
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So much for the weakness of the attacked view. Wherein lies the strength of the 
original genuine views held by Kripke and by Lewis?  
To avoid Lewis’s type of objection, a view has to entail that it would not be 
possible for “pain” not to designate a painful state, or, in short, a view has to entail that 
“pain” designates all painful states. To avoid Kripke’s type of objection, a view has to 
entail that it would not be possible for “pain” to designate a non-painful state, or in 
short, “pain” has to designate only painful states. Thus, to avoid both objections, a view 
simply has to entail that “pain” designates all and only painful states. Technically speaking 
then, a resistant view should thus have the following intension:  
 W1    
C + P 
W2
¬C + P 
W3
C + ¬P
W4
¬C + ¬P
Resistant view + + - - 
Table 5.5 
But looking back at our analysis, it turns out that both Lewis’s and Kripke’s 
genuine views entail just this very same intension of “pain”!  
 Semantics  Metaphysics  W1 
C + P
W2 
¬C + P
W3 
C + ¬P 
W4 
¬C + ¬P
Lewis  Descriptive  Being painful is contingent + + - - 
Kripke  Rigidified  Being painful is essential  + + - - 
Table 5.6 
Thus by sharing this very same intension, Lewis and Kripke’s views are equally resistant 
to the objections considered.  
This is rather interesting as Lewis and Kripke are completely opposed with 
respect to both their semantical and metaphysical elements, and yet they yield the same 
intension of “pain” (as Table 5.6 shows). Generally, it thus follows that two views with 
different semantic and metaphysical elements may nevertheless entail the same intension. 
In other words, although the intension of a term in a theory is determined by the theory’s 
semantic and metaphysical elements,24 these elements are nonetheless underdetermined 
by the intension. In our case, this common intension of “pain” is one that designates all 
and only painful states.  
However, there is nonetheless some indication of the difference between the two 
views. This difference is manifested in their different implications with regard to the 
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rigidity of “pain”, and, accordingly, with regard to the modal status of the identity 
statement “pain = C”. Since the functionalist takes being painful to be contingent 
whereas being C to be essential (and, indeed, sufficient), it turns out that the referents of 
“pain” across possible worlds, namely, P+C and P+¬C, are distinct, and hence that 
“pain” is nonrigid, and that the identity statement “pain = C” is accordingly, if true, 
contingent. By contrast, since Kripke takes being painful to be necessary and sufficient, it 
turns out that these same referents are identical, and hence that “pain” is a rigid 
designator, and the identity statement “pain = C” is, if true, necessary: 
 Semantics  Metaphysics  W1   
C+P
W2 
¬C+P
W3
C+¬P
W4
¬C+¬P 
Rigidity of 
“pain”  
Kripke  Non-
descriptive  
Being painful is 
essential  
+ + - - Rigid  
Lewis  Descriptive  Being painful is 
contingent 
+ + - - Nonrigid 
Table 5.7 
 
5.1.3 Conclusion  
To sum up, we can look at the debate in the following way. It seems to be agreed on 
both sides that a good theory should have the consequence that the term “pain” 
designates all and only painful states, that is, in the actual world as well as in all possible 
worlds. In terms of intensions then, a desired view is one that entails the following 
intension of “pain”:  
W1    
C + P 
W2
¬C + P 
W3
C + ¬P 
W4
¬C + ¬P
+ + - - 
Table 5.8 
Lewis’s view and Kripke’s view differ both in their semantic and in their 
metaphysical elements. Nevertheless, both Kripke’s and Lewis’s views entail the above 
intension of “pain”. So the criterion of complying with this intension underdetermines 
which of their theories is right.  
The view that both Kripke and Lewis attack has a different intension:  
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W1    
C + P 
W2
¬C + P 
W3
C + ¬P 
W4
¬C + ¬P
+ - + - 
Table 5.9 
It allows both that a non-painful type of state is pain (W3), and that a painful type of state 
is not pain (W2). Kripke attacks this view for the first consequence; Lewis for the second. 
Each rightly concludes that this view is wrong. However, as the attacked view is neither 
Lewis’s nor Kripke’s, their own views remain unharmed by the attacks.  
The intension that is implied by a certain view is the result of the combination of 
the semantics and metaphysics assumed by a view. The three views – Lewis’s 
functionalism, Kripke’s, and the attacked view –all differ in these assumptions. Both 
Lewis’s and Kripke’s views entail the same intension. It turns out then that although 
intension results from the combination of a semantic element and a metaphysical 
element, nonetheless different elements may yield the same intension. The difference 
between Kripke and Lewis’s views is nonetheless manifested in the different implications 
of the views with respect to the rigidity of “pain”. 
The following table summarises this analysis: 
 Semantics Metaphysics W1   
C+P
W2
¬C+P 
W3 
C+¬P 
W4
¬C+¬P 
Rigidity 
Kripke  Non-
descriptive 
Being painful 
is essential  
+ + - - Rigid  
Lewis  Descriptive Being painful 
is contingent 
+ + - - Non-
rigid 
Pseudo-
Lewis 
and  
Pseudo-
Kripke 
Non-
descriptive  
Being painful 
is contingent  
+ - 
Unacceptable 
because a 
painful state is 
not called 
“pain” 
+ 
Unacceptable 
because a non-
painful state is 
called “pain” 
- Rigid  
Table 5.10 
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5.2 Donnellan’s Referential-Attributive Distinction: An Argument 
against the Standard Interpretation and a Proposed Two 
Dimensionalist Analysis  
 
Introduction 
I discuss Donnellan’s distinction between attributive and referential uses of definite 
descriptions.25 I put forward two theses. The negative thesis is a challenge to the standard 
interpretation of Donnellan’s distinction in terms of general vs. singular propositions. 
The positive thesis offers a two-dimensionalist analysis of the distinction and of the ways 
in which it may be interpreted.  
The standard interpretation of Donnellan’s distinction between attributive and 
referential uses of definite descriptions is in terms of general vs. singular propositions. In 
particular, on this interpretation, when “the F” is used attributively in a sentence of the 
form “the F is G”, the sentence communicates a general, object-independent, 
proposition, [the x: Fx](Gx); whereas when “the F” is used referentially in a sentence “the 
F is G”, the sentence communicates a singular, object-dependent proposition, (Ga). (It is 
widely agreed that an attributively used definite description not only communicates, i.e., 
pragmatically, a general proposition, but that it also expresses, i.e., semantically, that 
proposition. The controversy over the semantic significance of the distinction is about 
whether a referentially used definite description, in addition to communicating, i.e., 
pragmatically, a singular proposition, can also express, i.e., semantically, that singular 
proposition.) Given the context of the Russell-Strawson debate over the semantics of 
definite descriptions,26 this interpretation seems highly plausible. Kripke objected to two 
other interpretations of Donnellan’s distinction, namely, in terms of rigidity, and in terms 
of de re/de dicto.27 It will be argued that Kripke’s arguments are as effective against the 
above standard interpretation, and hence pose a real challenge to it. This extension of 
Kripke’s arguments is based on introducing possible-worlds analysis.  
Next, it is proposed that things become even clearer if we employ (in the spirit of 
two-dimensionalism) the distinction between worlds considered as actual and worlds 
considered as counterfactual. Analysing Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction in 
this light reveals that Donnellan’s initial characterisation of his distinction is compatible 
with (at least) three different interpretations of it (one of which is the above standard 
200 
 
interpretation). It thus follows that Donnellan’s characterisation of his distinction leaves 
it underdetermined which of the three interpretations is the correct one. I thus conclude 
that Donnellan’s distinction is not well-defined. In addition, such analysis provides a 
clear understanding of the “mechanism” by which Kripke’s argument operates.   
 
5.2.1 Referential/attributive – Donnellan’s cases  
Donnellan introduces two fundamentally distinct cases in which the following sentence 
that includes the definite description “Smith’s murderer” is asserted: 
(1) Smith’s murderer is insane. 
The first case takes place in front of Smith’s brutally mutilated body. Looking at the 
body, someone who does not know who the murderer is, exclaims sentence (1).  The 
second case takes place on Jones’s trial for Smith’s murder. In this case, watching the 
rather odd behaviour of Jones, someone exclaims (1) again; it so happens that Jones did 
not in fact murder Smith. In the first case, says Donnellan, the speaker “states something 
about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so”; this is an attributive use of the definite 
description “Smith’s murderer”. In the second case the speaker “uses the description to 
enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something 
about that person or thing”; and this is a referential use of the definite description. 
 
5.2.2 The Russell–Strawson debate and the standard interpretation  
Donnellan’s explicit aim in introducing his distinction was to contribute to the debate 
between Russell and Strawson over the semantics of definite descriptions. On Russell’s 
account, definite descriptions of the form “the F” are to be analysed as quantificational 
expressions [the x: Fx], and hence they contribute to express object-independent, general 
propositions of the form [the x: Fx](Gx).28 In other words, on Russell’s view, the semantic 
value of a definite description is a rule for “picking out” the referent (namely, fitting the 
descriptive content of “the F”); it is not a concrete individual. Strawson objected to 
Russell’s quantificational account. He claimed that there are cases, such as incomplete 
definite descriptions like “the table is covered with books”, to which Russell’s analysis 
fails to provide an adequate account. (Russell’s account suggests a table that uniquely 
satisfies the definite description “the table”, which is clearly not the case here.)29 In these 
cases, the sentence seems to express an object-dependent, singular proposition (Ga); viz., in 
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such cases the semantic value of the definite description is a concrete individual. If this is 
sound, then such cases serve as counterexamples to Russell’s quantificational account, 
which is thereby refuted. It is in the context of this debate that Donnellan proposed his 
distinction between the two uses of definite description: the attributive and the 
referential. The proposal was that Russell’s analysis captures the attributive use but not 
the referential one, whereas Strawson’s remarks apply to the referential use but not to the 
attributive one.  
Given this context, it is but natural that the standard interpretation of 
Donnellan’s distinction was formed along the following lines:30  
Attributive use: If a definite description “the F” is used attributively in a sentence “the F 
is G” then the sentence communicates an object-independent, general, proposition.  
Referential use: If a definite description “the F” is used referentially in a sentence “the F 
is G” then the sentence communicates an object-dependent, singular, proposition.  
An ongoing debate concerning this distinction is about whether in addition to 
being able to communicate general and singular propositions, definite descriptions can also 
express, i.e., semantically, the two types of propositions.31 Or, in short, whether in addition 
to being pragmatic, it is also semantic or not. In particular, it is controversial whether a 
definite description can semantically express a singular proposition, that is, whether the 
semantic value of a definite description may, in some cases, be a concrete individual.32 
Reimer puts it very clearly:  
It is uncontroversial that definite descriptions can be used either referentially or 
attributively – that they can be used to communicate either singular or general 
propositions. It is also (relatively) uncontroversial that, when used attributively, the 
proposition literally expressed by the sentence uttered is a general proposition. What is 
controversial is the claim that, when used referentially, the proposition literally expressed 
by the sentence uttered is a singular (rather than general) proposition.33  
One outcome of interpreting referential definite descriptions in terms of 
contributing to singular propositions is that it allows, in principle, a definite description 
“the F” to apply to individuals that fail to F (as in fact happens in Donnellan’s trial case. 
Note however that although the referent of a referentially used description may fail to fit 
the description, it, of course, need not do so). Some, understandably, find it highly 
problematic. E.g., Wiggins says, 
Donnellan’s [account] … depends on the, for me, incredible idea that if I say ‘the man 
drinking champagne is [G]’ and the man I mean, although drinking water, is [G], then 
what I say is true.34 
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In particular, many of those who endorse the semantic significance thesis, i.e., that 
definite descriptions may have a referential semantic function, feel uncomfortable with this 
feature, and thus make the additional provision that the referent of a referentially used 
“the F” is indeed F. I.e., that in addition to being the object intended by the speaker, it 
also has to fit the descriptive content of “the F”.35 This clearly deviates from Donnellan’s 
original definition of referential definite description, which explicitly allows such terms to 
designate an intended object even if that object fails to fit the description: “… using a 
definite description referentially, a speaker may say something true even though the 
description applies to nothing”. 
 
5.2.3 Kripke’s rejection of the de re/de dicto interpretation and of the rigidity 
interpretation 
Kripke’s “Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference”36 is best known for arguing 
against the semantic significance of Donnellan’s distinction. The argument is inspired by 
Grice’s ideas about conversational implicature.37 In holding that “what … a speaker has said 
may be false, what he meant may be true”,38 Grice draws a distinction between what a 
speaker says and what a speaker means. In a similar spirit, Kripke argues that although in 
the trial case the speaker reference may be Jones (i.e., what is meant), nevertheless this is not 
the semantic reference (i.e., what is said); the semantic reference of “Smith’s murderer” is just 
Smith’s murderer, regardless of how the speaker chooses to use the term. Most anti-
ambiguity arguments follow a similar line of reasoning.39 However, before offering his 
anti-ambiguity argument, Kripke dedicates a few passages to rejecting a couple of 
interpretations of the attributive/referential distinction. This part, I will argue, implies a 
serious challenge to the standard interpretation in terms of expressing singular/general 
propositions – a challenge which I suspect was largely ignored by those engaged in the 
semantic debate over Donnellan’s distinction.  
The two interpretations of the attributive/referential distinction that Kripke 
rejects are, (a) in terms of de re/de dicto; and (b) in terms of rigidity. In particular, Kripke 
argues against the identification of attributively used definite descriptions with de dicto 
definite description, and also against the identification of attributively used definite 
descriptions with nonrigid definite description (by which, I believe, he means non-
rigidified definite description. I’ll explain this soon). In each argument, Kripke provides a 
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powerful counterexample to make his case. Let me briefly introduce these 
counterexamples. 
To argue against identifying attributively used definite descriptions with de dicto 
definite description, Kripke provides the following example:40 
(2) The police know concerning Smith’s murderer, whoever he is, that he committed 
the murder; but they’re not saying who he is. 
The definite description “Smith’s murderer” carries Donnellan’s mark of the attributive: 
it has the “whoever is the so-and-so” mark. Thus, Kripke concludes that it is used 
attributively (by this Kripke assumes that the “whoever is the so-and-so” mark is not 
only necessary for the attributive use, but is in fact also sufficient for it). Nevertheless, 
claims Kripke, the description in this context is also de re. I take it that this amounts to 
saying that (2) should be analysed as follows:41  
(2’) There is someone such that, this someone murdered Smith, and the police 
know of that someone – whoever he is - that he committed the murder; but they’re 
not saying who he is. 
In other words, the existential quantifier has a wide scope relative to the propositional 
attitude operator “know”;42 so we have a case of an attributively used definite description 
which is also de re. It thus follows that attributively used definite descriptions cannot be 
identified with de dicto definite descriptions; and, accordingly, that referentially used 
definite descriptions cannot be identified with de re definite descriptions (since the above 
example shows that some de re definite descriptions are used attributively).43  
Let us look now at Kripke’s argument against the interpretation of Donnellan’s 
distinction in terms of rigidity.  
The argument is based on objecting to the identification of attributively used 
definite descriptions with nonrigid definite descriptions. Kripke provides the following 
example:44 
(3) That bastard – the man who killed Smith, whoever he may be – is surely 
insane. 
Here, Kripke, in Kaplan’s style, uses “that” as a rigidifying device (it would be more 
explicit to use Kaplan’s “dthat” – see Section  2.2.3), to ensure the rigid designation of the 
definite description. (Those who take demonstratives to require an act of demonstration, 
i.e., ostension, may object here that since there is no ostension involved in (3), the “that” 
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device is not a demonstrative one, and hence cannot be said to rigidify the definite 
description. However, this can be easily remedied by using another rigidifying device 
instead, namely, actualisation:  
(3’) The actual murderer of Smith – whoever he is – is surely insane.) 
As in (2), according to Donnellan’s mark of the “whoever is the so-and-so” clause, the 
definite description in (3) is used attributively (again, this requires Kripke’s assumption 
above that the “whoever is the so-and-so” is sufficient for an attributive use). Yet it is also 
de jure rigid, i.e., rigidified; it is designed to designate the same individual (namely, the one 
who murdered Smith in the actual world) in all counterfactual worlds (at least in the case 
of (3’) if not in (3)). It thus follows that an attributively used definite description cannot 
be identified with a definite description which is non de jure rigid (i.e., not rigidified45). 
Correspondingly, a referentially used definite description cannot be identified with a de 
jure rigid designator, since some de jure rigid designators are used attributively.  
 
5.2.4 Extending Kripke’s argument - against the standard interpretation 
I would like to argue that the above arguments can be extended to apply to the standard 
interpretation as well. Thus, I will attempt to show that if Kripke’s (3) (or, more clearly, 
our (3’)) undermines the rigidity interpretation, then it equally undermines the standard 
interpretation in terms of general vs. singular propositions. And the same goes for (2) 
(and more clearly for (2’)). My argument will rely on possible-worlds analysis.  
In its possible-worlds version, the Russellian account of a definite description 
takes it to designate, with respect to each counterfactual world, that which fits the 
description in that world. Thus such a definite description may (and typically does) 
designate different referents in different counterfactual worlds. Hence the generality of 
the proposition. By contrast, a definite description that contributes to a singular 
proposition is such that it is designed to designate, with respect to every counterfactual 
world, the same referent that it designates in the actual world. Hence the singularity of 
the proposition.  
In other words, a definite description that contributes to a general proposition is 
just a non-rigidified (i.e., descriptive) definite description – namely, it designates, with 
respect to each counterfactual world, that which fits the description in that world 
(whether this referent is identical to the referent in the actual world or not). Whereas a 
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definite description that contributes to a singular proposition is just a rigidified (i.e., de 
jure rigid) definite description – it is designed to designate, with respect to every 
counterfactual world, that which it designates in the actual world (whether it also fits the 
description in that world or not). This assimilation of definite descriptions that 
contribute to singular propositions with rigidified definite descriptions is nicely expressed 
in Wettstein (1991); talking about the referential use of “Smith’s murderer” in 
Donnellan’s trial case, he says:  
I am committed to the view that the singular proposition determined in the context in 
question is true in a possible world just in case Jones, the actual murderer, is insane in 
that world.46  
Now (3’) above purports to show that attributively used definite descriptions 
cannot be identified with rigidified definite descriptions. Given the present assimilation 
of rigidified definite descriptions with definite descriptions that contribute to singular 
propositions, it follows that attributively used definite descriptions cannot be identified 
with definite descriptions that contribute to a general proposition. Indeed, (3’) seems to 
be just a case of a sentence that expresses a singular proposition, and which at the same 
time also involves an attributively used definite description. So if (3’) suffices to refute 
the rigidity interpretation of Donnellan’s distinction, it thereby suffices to refute the 
standard interpretation of that distinction.  
I believe that similar considerations apply to (2). The intensional context that 
induces the de re/de dicto ambiguity in (2) is the propositional attitude ‘know that’. Let us 
induce a similar ambiguity using a modal context instead of a propositional attitude 
context:47 
(4) Necessarily, Smith’s murderer (whoever that is) is insane.  
This sentence is ambiguous between a de re reading, on which (4) amounts to 
(4’) There is someone who is Smith’s murderer (whoever that is), and it is 
necessary that that someone is insane.  
and a de dicto reading, on which (4) amounts to  
(4’’) It is necessary that, someone murdered Smith’s and (whoever that someone 
is) that someone is insane. 
In (4’) the existential quantifier has a wide scope relative to the necessity operator, 
whereas in (4’) the existential quantifier has a narrow scope relative to the necessity 
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operator. The necessity operator suggests an easy reformulation of the two readings in 
terms of possible worlds. Thus on the de dicto reading, (4) expresses the proposition,  
(4*) With respect to every counterfactual world, the person who murdered Smith 
in the actual world (whoever that is) is insane in that counterfactual world.  
whereas on the de dicto reading, (4) expresses the proposition 
(4**) With respect to each counterfactual world, the person who murdered Smith 
in that counterfactual world (whoever that is) is insane in that counterfactual world. 
It is clear now that the de re reading of (4), namely (4*), takes it to express a singular 
proposition (whether this proposition is true or not).  
However, (4*) has the attributive “whoever that is” mark, and hence (if this mark 
is indeed sufficient for being attributive,) “Smith’s murderer” is used attributively. So (4*) 
is a case of an attributively used definite description that contributes to a singular 
proposition. It thus follows, again, that attributively used definite descriptions cannot be 
identified with definite descriptions that contribute to a general proposition.  
 
In sum, we’ve discussed four distinctions that apply to definite descriptions: (a) between 
those that contribute to general propositions and those that contribute to singular 
propositions; (b) between non-rigidified ones and rigidified ones; (c) between de re ones 
and de dicto ones; and (d) between those used referentially and those used attributively. 
Using possible-worlds semantics, it was suggested that the first three distinctions amount 
to just one distinction, namely, between a definite description that designates, with 
respect to each counterfactual world, that which fits the description in that world, and 
between a definite description that is designed to designate, with respect to every 
counterfactual world, that which it designates in the actual world (respectively):48  
Definite descriptions that designate, 
with respect to each counterfactual 
world, that which fits the description in 
that world 
Definite descriptions that are designed to 
designate, with respect to every 
counterfactual world, that which they 
designate in the actual world 
Definite descriptions that contribute to 
general propositions 
Definite descriptions that contribute to singular 
propositions 
Non-rigidified definite descriptions Rigidified definite descriptions 
De dicto definite descriptions De re definite descriptions 
Table 5.11 
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Consequently, the intensions of all definite descriptions on each column are identical: 
constant on the left column; not necessarily constant on the right column.  
Now this distinction cross-cuts the fourth distinction between attributive and 
referential definite descriptions (if Kripke is right about the sufficiency of the “whoever 
is the so-and-so” mark for the attributive use). In particular, attributively used definite 
descriptions may be rigidified (either by a de re reading, or by actualisation or by Kaplan’s 
dthat operator, etc.), and thus express singular propositions. Hence, the attributive 
cannot be defined in terms of general propositions (since some attributive definite 
descriptions contribute to singular propositions); likewise, the referential cannot be 
defined in terms of singular propositions (as some singular propositions involve 
attributive definite descriptions): 
 Definite descriptions 
expressing general 
propositions 
= De dicto definite descriptions  
= Non-rigidified definite 
descriptions 
Definite descriptions 
expressing singular 
propositions 
= De re definite descriptions  
= Rigidified definite descriptions
Attributively used 
definite descriptions  
“Smith’s murderer, whoever that 
is, is insane”  
(Mutilated body case)  
“Smith’s actual murderer, 
whoever that is, is insane” 
Referentially used 
definite descriptions 
? “Smith’s murderer is insane” 
(Trial case)  
Table 5.12 
 
5.2.5 A novel account: referential/attributive and two-dimensional semantics  
In this last section, I would like to propose a novel two-dimensionalist account for 
Donnellan’s distinction. This account also reveals the “mechanism” by which Kripke’s 
above arguments against the two interpretations operates.   
If our above possible-worlds analysis is correct, then (2) and (3) express singular 
propositions. But despite being singular propositions, the “whoever he is” clause still 
seems to indicate some sense of generality. I.e., there is some sense in which “the 
murderer, whoever he is” is different from simply “Brown” (supposing that Brown is the 
actual murderer). True, (2) and (3) show that this generality does not apply to 
counterfactual worlds, as the referent is the same in all those worlds. Whence the 
generality then?  
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The answer, I suggest, lies in the distinction between possibilities of the 
counterfactual vs. possibilities of the actual. Thus, although the generality in (2) and (3) does 
not apply to possible worlds considered as counterfactual, it does apply to possible worlds 
considered as actual. In particular, the generality involved in “Smith’s murderer (whoever 
that is)” corresponds to the different possibilities with respect to the actual murderer. If 
this actual murderer is Jones, then the definite description in (2) and (3) designates Jones 
in every counterfactual world, yet if the actual murderer is Brown, then the same definite 
description designates Brown in every counterfactual world, etc. In sum, the intension of 
(an attributive) “Smith’s murderer, whoever that is”, when contributing to singular 
propositions (like in (2) and in (3) above) has the following structure: 
Counterfactual 
worlds 
 
The actual world  
W1   
Smith’s murderer 
is Jones 
W2
Smith’s murderer 
is Brown 
W3
Smith’s murderer 
is Taylor 
… 
W1 
Smith’s murderer is 
Jones 
Jones Jones Jones Jones 
W2 
Smith’s murderer is 
Brown 
Brown Brown Brown Brown
W3 
Smith’s murderer is 
Taylor 
Taylor Taylor Taylor Taylor
Table 5.13 
In other words, although the definite description “Smith’s murderer (whoever that is)” in 
sentences like (2) and (3) designates the same individual in all counterfactual worlds (i.e., 
possible worlds considered as counterfactual), nevertheless, it designates different 
individuals in different actual worlds (i.e., possible worlds considered as actual). And 
hence the generality aspect. 
This two-dimensionalist distinction, between possibilities of the actual vs. 
possibilities of the counterfactual is a powerful tool. Applying it to the 
referential/attributive distinction will generate a novel account of the latter distinction 
and its interpretations. Let me demonstrate this.  
I believe the following to be an adequate summary of Donnellan’s initial 
characterisation of the referential/attributive distinction. An attributively used definite 
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description designates that which fits the description, regardless of whether that object is 
intended by the speaker or not. Such designation entails (potentially) different referents 
in different possible worlds. Hence the generality aspect of the attributive use. A 
referentially used definite description, by contrast, designates the object intended by the 
speaker, regardless of whether that object fits the description or not. Such designation 
entails the same referent in all possible worlds. Hence the singularity aspect of the 
referential use.  
But a definite description may, in principle, pick out its referent in either of these 
two ways (i.e., via fitting the description, or regardless of the description) in each of two 
types of possible worlds, namely, possible worlds considered as actual, and possible 
worlds considered as counterfactual. The two types of designation, together with the two 
types of possible worlds, thus give rise to four possible semantic functions: 
 Designation in possible 
actual worlds 
Designation in possible  
counterfactual worlds  
 
1 By fitting a descriptive content  By fitting a descriptive content  Descriptive  
2 By fitting a descriptive content  Regardless of descriptive content Reference-fixing  
3 Regardless of descriptive content By fitting a descriptive content  --- 
4 Regardless of descriptive content Regardless of descriptive content Directly-referring  
Table 5.14 
We called the three types of terms that seem to be used in English, descriptive; reference-
fixing; and directly-referring, as detailed in Table 5.14.49 (The third category was cancelled-out 
on grounds of being un-instantiated, and hence will play no part in our analysis.)  
Donnellan’s original characterisation of the attributive/referential distinction is 
not sensitive to the distinction between the two types of possible words. Thus, whereas 
his characterisation points to some general vs. singular aspect of designation in possible 
worlds, it does not tell us whether these are possible worlds considered as actual or as 
counterfactual, or both. It is thus open to various interpretations. Let us specify these.  
One such interpretation takes the distinction to apply to designation in 
counterfactual worlds. Thus, an attributively used definite description designates, with 
respect to every counterfactual world, that which fits the description in that counterfactual 
world, whether it is the same referent as the actual one or not (since the third category, 
Row 3, is cancelled-out). This category thus includes non-rigidified terms, i.e., descriptive 
terms alone (Row 1). A referentially used definite description, by contrast, designates, 
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with respect to every counterfactual world, regardless of the descriptive content, i.e., it 
simply designates that which it designates in the actual world, whether it fits the 
description in that counterfactual world or not. This category thus includes rigidified 
terms, namely, reference-fixing definite descriptions (Row 2) as well as directly-referring 
definite descriptions (Row 4).50 This seems to be the standard interpretation. (And, if our 
analysis above is sound, it is also the interpretation in terms of de re/de dicto, and the 
interpretation in terms of rigidity – all of which were claimed to amount, in principle, to 
the same interpretation.)  
In light of the above two-dimensionalist analysis, we can now better understand 
Kripke’s arguments against the rigidity interpretation and against the de re/de dicto 
interpretation of Donnellan’s distinction (which were taken here to be as effective against 
the standard interpretation). One mark of the attributive is the “whatever is the so-and-
so” clause. This mark guarantees some generality. The standard interpretation took it to 
apply to counterfactual worlds. I.e., on this interpretation, the attributive is identified 
with a general designation in counterfactual worlds. Kripke construct an example in which 
the generality of the “whatever is the so-and-so” is applied to actual (rather than to 
counterfactual) worlds, i.e., the term designates different referents in different actual 
worlds, whereas in counterfactual worlds there is singularity, i.e., the term designates the 
same referent in all counterfactual worlds (as shown in Table 5.13). He does that by using 
a reference-fixing definite description, i.e., a rigidified definite description (e.g., in (2), (3), 
and (4)). Thus such a definite description is attributive since it has the “whatever is the 
so-and-so” (it is general with respect to different actual worlds), yet it is at the same time 
singular (with respect to counterfactual worlds).  
Thus our analysis reveals that the attributive is necessarily tied to some generality – 
either in counterfactual worlds or in actual worlds. What Kripke showed is that the 
attributive cannot be conclusively identified with generality in counterfactual worlds, i.e., 
with contribution to general propositions.  
Another interpretation may take Donnellan’s distinction to apply to designation 
in the actual world. On this interpretation, an attributively used definite description 
designates, with respect to every actual world, that which fits the description in that 
world, whether it is intended by the speaker or not. This category will thus include 
descriptive terms and reference-fixing terms (Rows 1 and 2). A referentially used definite 
description, by contrast, designates, with respect to every actual world, regardless of 
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descriptive content, i.e., it designates that which the speaker intends, whether it fits the 
description in that actual world or not. (As Row 3 is cancelled out,) this category will thus 
include directly-referring definite descriptions only (Row 4). This interpretation may be 
Kripke’s interpretation, at least as it emerges from his arguments presented here.51  
Yet another interpretation may take Donnellan’s distinction to apply to 
designation in both the actual world and in counterfactual worlds. On this interpretation, 
an attributively used definite description designates, with respect to every possible world 
(whether actual or counterfactual), that which fits the description in that world, whether it 
is intended by the speaker or not, and whether it is the same as the actual referent or not. 
This category will thus include only descriptive terms (Row 1). A referentially used 
definite description, by contrast, designates, with respect to every possible world 
(whether actual or counterfactual) regardless of any descriptive content. I.e., with respect 
to every actual world, it designates that which the speaker intends, and then, with respect 
to every counterfactual world, it simply designates that same actual referent. This 
category will thus include directly-referring definite descriptions only (Row 4).52 Thus on 
this interpretation, reference-fixing definite descriptions (like in (2) and (3)) fit in neither 
category. It follows that on this interpretation the referential/attributive distinction turns 
out not to be exhaustive. I believe this interpretation is no less plausible than the 
previous two, yet I’m aware of no one that explicitly endorses it.  
 Now which of these three interpretations is the correct one?  
If the present analysis is correct, this cannot be answered, as Donnellan’s initial 
formulation of this distinction is simply too loose. Put differently, each interpretation 
draws an important distinction between two types of definite descriptions. But since 
Donnellan’s initial characterisation of his distinction was not sensitive to the difference 
between designation in actual worlds vs. designation in counterfactual worlds, it leaves it 
underdetermined which of the three distinctions (drawn by the three interpretations) is 
the one that is equivalent to Donnellan’s original distinction.  
Finally, regarding each distinction drawn by the different interpretations, it is a 
fair question whether it is a semantic one or not, i.e., whether it corresponds to an 
ambiguity in definite descriptions or not. And this is regardless of whether the distinction 
is indeed equivalent to the referential/attributive distinction or not.  
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Endnotes
 
 
1 Kripke (1972) 
2 Lewis (1994) 
3 Kripke and Lewis are discussing possible worlds, without specifying whether these are 
considered as actual or as counterfactual. It is rather clear however that their discussion is 
concerned with counterfactual worlds. Yet, to conform to Kripke and Lewis’s original discussion, 
I shall be using simply “possible worlds” as well here.  
4 Armstrong (1999, p. 86), who attributes the example to Brian Medlin.  
5 “C” for the legendary C-fibre firing, of course 
6 It is very important to note that gene and pain are types and not tokens. There are many tokens of 
gene, as there are many tokens of pain. And so are the DNA molecule and C. Therefore, if the 
occupants of a certain role are all of the same type, we get a one-one correlation between the 
suspected type and the credible type, and hence the reduction is in fact a type-type identity. If, 
however, there is more than one type of entities that occupies the role, e.g., the occupant of the 
pain-role in human-beings is C, whereas the occupant of the same role in Martians is D, then the 
correlation between this suspected type and the credible types is a one-many correlation, and the 
reduction is thus mere supervenience between the two types. I.e., the credible type determines 
the suspected type, but not vice versa. In other words, the suspected type is said to be multiply 
realisable in the credible types (see Section  3.4).  
7 As was mentioned earlier (Endnote 20 in Chapter 4), it is possible, in principle, that some role 
should be occupied by a certain type of occupant essentially, and not merely contingently, i.e., 
that it might not have been occupied by another occupant instead. In other words, the mere role-
occupant relation does not, as such, necessarily entail the contingency of the occupant to the role. 
However, it is entirely obvious that the way in which functionalists use the role-occupant relation 
does imply such contingency. Indeed, they way they use it imply the mutual independence of 
occupants and roles.  Lewis’s quote below, for one, expresses this feature very clearly.  
8 Kripke’s original footnote:  
For example, David Armstrong (1968); see the discussion review by Thomas Nagel, 
Philosophical Review 79 (1970), pp. 394-403; and David Lewis, ‘An Argument for the Identity 
Theory’, The Journal of Philosophy, pp. 17-25. 
9 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 147, italics in original) 
10 Lewis’s original footnote: “Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Blackwell, 1980) pp. 147-8”.  
11 Lewis (1994, reprinted in 1999, p. 304) 
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12 Choose your favourite view of designation of rigid natural-kind terms (see Section  5.1.1.2) 
13 Indeed, at least descriptive. It is more likely to be even a role-term (see Section  4.2.2), i.e., to 
mean, “that which contingently occupies the pain-role”. In other words, it is likely to include the 
metaphysical condition as part of the description. However, for the purpose of this discussion, it 
suffices that the term is taken to be descriptive, so we need not commit to the stronger 
assumption that it is taken to be a role term.  
14 Section  5.1.1.1.1. 
15 The same holds for all other secondary substances, as Aristotle called them, e.g., being an animal. 
(See Section  3.3.4.). 
16 For the distinction between de jure and de facto rigidity see Section  1.3.1. 
17 See Section  1.3.2. 
18 Recall the difference between rigid and rigidified: all rigidified terms are rigid, yet not all rigid 
terms are rigidified; some rigid terms are descriptive. Rigidified rigid terms are rigid by stipulation, 
i.e., de jure, whereas descriptive rigid terms are not thus stipulated, they simply turn out to be rigid, 
i.e., de facto (See Section  1.3.1).  
19 Recall that the category of rigidified terms is concerned with designation in counterfactual 
worlds, and not so much with designation in the actual world. Yet there are two ways in which a 
rigidified term can pick out its referent in the actual world, namely, by fitting a descriptive content 
(“reference-fixing” terms), or directly, i.e., regardless of any descriptive content (“directly 
referring” terms). (See Section  2.1.) Kripke remains agnostic on whether natural-kind terms are 
reference-fixing or directly-referring (see Section  2.2.4). 
20 Kripke (1972/1980, p. 148) 
21 Kripke (1971/1999, endnote 18, p. 88, my italics) 
22 Indeed, Kripke seems to suggest that being painful is what pain in fact consists in. I believe it is 
appropriate to call such a necessary and sufficient property, i.e., one that specifies what an object 
consist in, a sortal property (see Section  3.3.5). Some necessary and sufficient properties don’t 
specify what the object consists in; e.g., the property ‘being the sum of 2+3’ doesn’t. However, it 
suffices for the purpose of the present argument that Kripke takes being painful to be necessary 
and sufficient, whether he also takes it to be a sortal property or not. 
23 For the sake of simplicity, let us ignore here worlds that contain more than one of these types, 
e.g., worlds in which there are both painful Cs, and non-painful Ds (as we did in all other 
examples throughout the dissertation. E.g., see Section  1.1.1 for example). The way to 
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accommodate such worlds in our analysis would be to replace the “+” and “-” signs in the table 
that apply to the whole world, with a specification of what is designated by the term in that 
world.  
24 As well as, of course, by the actual state of the world (as this thesis endeavours to maintain). 
However, as this factor is not at issue in this debate, we ignore it throughout.  
25 Donnellan (1966)  
26 Russell (1905; 1919); Strawson’s attack (1950); Russell’s rebuttal (1957). 
27 Kripke (1977)  
28 Russell (1905). Russell specific account of such a proposition is as the conjunction of the 
following three conditions: (1) there is at least one F (existence); (2) there is at most one F 
(uniqueness); and, (3) everything that is F is G (predication). 
29 Strawson (1950)  
30 E.g., Kaplan (1978); Wettstein (1981; 1991a; 1991b); Salmon (1982; 1991); Reimer (1989a; 
1998b); Neale (1990); Nelson (1999); Feit (2003); Bontly (2005) 
31 Donnellan’s own view on this matter is somewhat unclear. On the one hand, he explicitly 
states that the distinction is not semantic: “It does not seem at all attractive to suppose an 
ambiguity in the meaning of the words; it does not appear to be semantically ambiguous.” (1966, 
p. 59); yet on the other hand, much of what he in fact says in his paper suggests to the contrary.  
32 Interestingly, there is an equivalent debate about indefinite descriptions; notably, Chastain 
(1975) and Devitt (2004) think that there is a referential/attributive ambiguity in this case, 
whereas Ludlow and Neale (1990) deny such ambiguity. See also King (1988).  
33 Reimer (1998a, p. 92) 
34 Wiggins (1975, p. 28, endnote 9) 
35 E.g., Reimer (1998) and Devitt (2004). Kaplan (1978) distinguishes his demonstrative use, from 
Donnellan’s referential use just on this aspect: 
Donnellan and I disagree on how to bring the intended demonstrating into the picture. To put 
it crudely, Donnellan believes that for most purposes we should take the demonstratum to be 
the intended demonstratum. I believe that these are different notions that may well involve 
different objects. 
Exceptions to this provision are Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 213, 340-1), who argue that 
Donnellan’s referential use is semantic even without the additional proviso, i.e., that a definite 
description can semantically designate an object that in fact fails to fit the description.  
36 Kripke (1977) 
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37 Grice (1967/1975)  
38 Grice (1969, p. 142) 
39 E.g., Salmon (1982, 1991), Bach (1987), and Neale (1990) 
40 Kripke (1977, p. 9-10) 
41 For a discussion of the de re/de dicto ambiguity, and its scope analysis, see Section  2.2.2.1.2.  
42 An (unreasonable) de dicto reading of this sentence would be,  
(2’’) the police know that, there is someone such that that individual is Smith’s murderer 
– whoever that is, but they’re not saying who that individual is.  
This reading makes little sense, as it renders the use of “but” here inconsistent. I.e., since on this 
reading the police’s knowledge does not involve a particular individual, they anyway can’t tell who 
that individual is.  
43 A similar point is made by Kaplan (1978): “It is now clear that I can assert of the first child to 
be born in the 21st century that he will be bald”. Thus, although the definite description “the first 
child to be born in the 21st century” refers, in 1978, to ‘whoever is the so-and-so’, it is of a 
particular child that it is asserted that he will be bald, i.e., it is a de re attribution.  
44 Kripke (1977, p. 11) 
45 The relevant candidate for defining attributive definite descriptions is not simply being a 
nonrigid definite description, but rather being a non-rigidified definite description. I.e., a definite 
description that is not stipulated to be rigid. The two are not identical. A non-rigidified definite 
description can nonetheless be (de facto) rigid. E.g., “the sum of 2 and 3”; the term is not 
stipulated to be rigid by a rigidifying mechanism, yet it nonetheless turns out to be rigid. For a 
discussion of the distinction between rigid and rigidified (as well as between nonrigid and non-
rigidified) see Section  1.3.1. 
46 Wettstein (1991, p. 57) 
47 Whereas possible-worlds semantics copes well with intensional contexts such as tense, 
necessity, indexicals and even obligation, propositional attitudes pose some well-known problems 
to such analysis. In particular, they violate substitution of co-intensional terms. E.g., while Smith 
may know that 17*7 is not a prime, he may not know that 119 is not a prime. (See Section  ii in 
the Introduction.) 
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48 In the de re/de dicto case, this applies at least to cases in which the definite description is 
embedded in modal context. It is less clear whether such an account applies to other intensional 
contexts, such as knowledge, as in (2). See Endnote 47.  
49 See Chapter 2, in particular Section  2.1, for an elaborate discussion of these semantic functions.  
50 Those who add the proviso that the actual referent has to fit the description thereby rule out 
directly-referring definite descriptions, and limit this category to reference-fixing definite 
descriptions alone. This, however, violates Donnellan’s explicit characterisation of the referential 
(see end of Section  5.2.2.). 
51 Kripke claims that (2) and (3) are cases of attributively used definite descriptions; we have 
shown that in these cases, the definite description is reference-fixing, i.e., it designates, with 
respect to the actual world that which fits the description, and then designates, with respect to 
every counterfactual world, that same individual, whether it fits the description in that world or 
not (Row 2). Yet surely an attributively used definite description may also be descriptive (Row 1), 
and thus contribute to a general proposition (e.g. Donnellan’s mutilated body case). It thus 
follows that the attributive use includes both reference-fixing definite descriptions and descriptive 
definite descriptions. This leaves referentially used definite descriptions the third available 
category, i.e., that of directly-referring terms (Row 4). However, this reasoning is not enough to 
conclusively ascribe to Kripke the above interpretation, even on the mere basis of his above 
arguments.  
It should also be noted that Kripke’s (1977, p.15) account of the referential use includes 
the additional feature that the speaker believes that the intended referent fits the description. 
However, this requirement surely cannot be true, as it is at odds with Donnellan’s (1966) explicit 
rejection of such a requirement: “it is possible for a definite description to be used referentially 
where the speaker believes that nothing fits the description.” 
52 Note that in addition there is a combined option, i.e., a definite description may designate, with 
respect to each possible world, that which is both intended by the speaker, and also fits the 
description, in that world. This is in fact Devitt’s (2004) explicit view about referential definite 
descriptions:  
[A referential] ‘The murder is insane’ is equivalent either to ‘That is a murderer and insane’ or 
to Lepore and Ludwig's ‘[the x: x = that and x is a murderer](x is insane)’. 
However, again, that would violate Donnellan’s own characterisation of the referential, which 
explicitly allows the referent of a referentially used definite description to fail to fit the 
description.  
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